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ABSTRACT
Tracing the Roots of Disjunction:
Dutertismo and the Discourse of Liberal Democracy
in the Philippines
by
REYNALDO Kristine Marie Tayo
Doctor of Philosophy

This dissertation examines Dutertismo as an event in the context of what it put
forwards as the problem-spaces of Philippine postcolonial modernity: nationalism, democracy,
and development. Specifically, it investigates the substance of the contemporary disjunction
between the discourse of liberal democracy, which often frames critiques of Dutertismo, and
Philippine social experience. Its objective is to examine the underlying causes of the
democratic "crisis" that Dutertismo represents, both material/structural and
discursive/ideological.
“Dutertismo,” a populist political movement and discourse, is characterized by its
subversion of the inherited norms and mores of Philippine society, and consolidation of
popular support for a charismatic leader who advocates autocracy and state violence in the
pursuit of national development. For its repudiation of liberal-democratic principles (human
rights, rule of law, due process) in rhetoric and policy, Dutertismo has been interpreted as proof
of the failure of democratization in the Philippines since the end of the Marcos dictatorship
and the Cold War period. This interpretation, however, is insufficient to account for
Dutertismo’s resonance. Rather than the “failure” of democracy, this research seeks to
understand Dutertismo as a symptom of the conflictive nature of democracy in the Philippine
neocolonial context, where liberal-democratic values may have dominance but not hegemony.
What Dutertismo surfaces and amplifies are the deep-seated contradictions between the moral
and political discourses that shape the elite subjects of democracy and civil society, and those
that shape the politics of the governed masses, contradictions that have been effaced in official
political discourse in the name of building a modern, liberal-democratic, postcolonial nationstate, and creating productive nationalist subjects.
To elucidate these contradictions that have propelled Dutertismo, this thesis analyzes
a range of contemporary cultural productions, including literature, feature films and
documentaries, photojournalism, and music to surface the narratives that the discourse of
Dutertismo constructs and perpetuates. It asks, What emotion s animate Dutertismo’s
movement? What structures of representation and sentiment does it draw on and shape, and
how does it sustain the engagement of affective publics? What can the examination of this
phenomenon teach us about the Philippine contemporary and prospects for democracy?
Augmenting its primarily textual analytic approach, this research also draws on ethnographic
narratives gleaned from participant observation and interviews with Filipino migrant domestic
workers, Duterte supporters, labor organizers, and rights activists in Hong Kong, focusing on
their political practices and embodied experience. In doing so, this thesis offers understandings
of democracy beyond the terms set by the discourses of liberalism, populism, or electoral
politics, and surfaces the possibilities for democratization from below. In analyzing and
historicizing Dutertismo, this study aims to present a narrative about the (post)colonial
experience of modernity, and what that means for the continuing translation of democracy in
our present context.
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INTRODUCTION

Looking back to 2015, during the run-up to the last Philippine presidential elections,
from the vantage point of 2021 and the twin perils of the pandemic and violent state
repression leaving Philippine society and economy in omnishambles, it pains me to recall
how easily we once dismissed Rodrigo Duterte’s bid for the presidency as a joke. By “we” I
mean those of us in civil society who took the “civil” part seriously and thought national
politics would have no space for a figure who was not, even just in appearance, “disente”
(decent). Duterte cursed on live radio and television broadcasts, Duterte loved telling
homophobic and misogynistic jokes, Duterte promised to fatten the fish in Manila Bay with
the bodies of criminals he would have murdered if he became president. Again and again he
cautioned Filipinos: Do not vote for me, for my rule will be bloody. People continued
laughing at his jokes. “We” thought he was just a temporary glitch in an electoral system
dominated by polished elites, a perversely entertaining diversion during that campaign
season, and would later prove to be a “nuisance” candidate. But with his anti-establishment,
anti-elite, anti-colonial tirades and promises to lead the country back on the path to national
sovereignty and economic development, Duterte went on to become the most enduringly
popular president in social polling history. 1
The impetus for this research is the rise of Duterte as an “event" in contemporary
Philippine history. Foucault defines an “event” as a "reversal of a relationship of forces, the
usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once
used it, ... the entry of a masked 'other'"2 “on the stage of historical process.”3 The corrosion
of mechanisms of due process and rule of law, use of legal implements to repress critics,
blatant violations against human rights, and authoritarian tendencies characterize the Duterte
administration; Deinla and Dressel have described "Duterte's agenda" as "a political
reordering of the post-Marcos liberal architecture,"4 the legacy of the EDSA Revolution that
Dutertismo repudiates. Duterte’s camp fashioned his bid for the presidency as a selfless act
Cliff Venzon, “Duterte on track to become Philippines most popular president,” Nikkei Asia,
July 8, 2019, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Duterte-on-track-to-become-Philippines-most-popularpresident.
1

2 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 88.
3

Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 86.
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Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel, Introduction, in From Aquino II to Duterte (2010–2018):
Change, Continuity—and Rupture, eds. Deinla and Dressel (Singapore: ISEAS — Yusof Isak
Institute, 2019), 11.

1

of patriotism to save “the people” and the country from the injustices and violences
perpetuated by the incompetence and elitism of the Aquino administration; more
significantly, Duterte appropriated the radical languages of anticolonial nationalism and
socialism to demonize the previously ruling party, the Liberal Party, emphasizing the
hypocrisies of its “disente” politics, and the hollowness of its promise of economic growth
divorced from economic justice. Duterte’s success lay in his campaign’s ability to
communicate different aspects of his “Outsider” branding to various strategic audiences and
appeal to cross-class interests. His anti-American speeches and promises to defend
Philippine sovereignty and maritime territory against Chinese intrusion won him favor with
nationalist intellectuals as well as Filipino fishermen sailing in disputed seas. In campaign
sorties in the Visayas and Mindanao, he emphasized his Bisaya ethnolinguistic identity and
familial ties to indigenous peoples, and advocated federalism to end the cultural, economic,
and political dominance of “Imperial Manila.” His law-and-order script appealed to business
elites who were concerned with social stability, as well as to the everyday pedestrian and
commuter who feared for their safety every time they traversed dark streets.
But Duterte is also a divisive figure. The polarization in Philippine society brought
about by his presidential candidacy and subsequent win, especially in the first year of his
presidency, remains acute in my memory. Duterte was the subject of impassioned discussion
in pubs and coffee shops, at streetside sari-sari stores and in taxis, in churches and at dinner
tables, in classrooms and social media sites. His images and soundbites from his speeches
filled news broadcasts on radio and television every single day. Derogatory labels such as
“Dutertard” (for Duterte supporters) and “Yellowtard” or “Dilawan” (for so-called
“liberals”) calcified and turned into rhetorical ammunition hurled at perceived political
opponents, especially in online spaces. Disagreement over Duterte’s persona and policies
sundered many relationships: couples engaged to be married broke up; those already married
avoided discussions about politics altogether; singles looking to date automatically swiped
left on Tinder profiles featuring the Duterte logo, a clenched fist. Some people resigned from
their jobs in part to avoid dealing with bosses and coworkers who fervently supported
Duterte. Online, people unfriended each other on Facebook, blocked each other on Twitter,
left Viber and Messenger group chats. Family members who harbored opposing political
viewpoints had regular shouting matches, or stopped talking to each other.
Then came “breakups” of another sort, of tactical alliances and conciliatory gestures
between Duterte and certain groups that initially, though warily, lent him support. When
Duterte made good on his promise to kill “criminals” and the Catholic Church in the
Philippines bid him to stop, he retaliated with accusations of church corruption, saying he
2

suffered sexual abuse at the hands of a priest as a boy. When Congress vetoed the
appointment of cabinet officials endorsed by the National Democratic Left, and the Left
intensified their criticism of Duterte’s “anti-people” policies, Duterte abrogated peace talks
with communist rebels and openly persecuted activists. The so-called “liberal media,” from
the established, mainstream press like Inquirer, to newer players like online news site
Rappler, were derided by Duterte supporters as “bayaran” (bought, mercenary)
“presstitutes” that served corporate interests and duped “the people”; pro-Duterte influencers
and information portals were accused of peddling outright lies, spin, and “fake news.” Trolls
inflamed online arguments, and paid “keyboard warriors” coordinated to create social media
trends.5 Offline, killings in urban poor communities continued night after night after night.
I, like many other scholars living through this intensely conflicted moment in
Philippine history, became obsessed with what has come to be called “Dutertismo,” a
polysemic term, a floating signifier, a catch-all label for the myriad social issues that the rise
of Duterte has caused, brought to the fore, or intensified. I believe our obsession derived
from shock and grief, and its shades and phases of denial, anger, bargaining, depression,
perhaps acceptance. We agonized and wondered, how could we as a society have come to
this? In a way, this study may be read as an attempt to come to terms with the dislocation of
a particular kind of worldview, a normalized and normative ideology: that of a “liberal
consensus.” 6 Godfrey Hodgson, the English journalist and historian, popularized this term in
his book America in Our Time (1976) to describe U.S. politics in the postwar era. According
to Hodgson, underlying this “intellectual consensus” about the “progressive” “perfectibility
of American society” through capitalism were six interrelated assumptions:
… [that] postwar American capitalism can generate abundance for all; its capacity to
do so derives from the endless potential for economic growth; this creates a natural
harmony of interests by promoting a more equal society; it also furnishes the
resources for government to resolve social problems; the main threat to this
beneficent system comes from communism, against which America and its allies
must engage in prolonged struggle; America’s destiny is to spread the message of
the benefits of capitalism to the rest of the world.”7

Jonathan Corpus Ong and Jason Vincent A. Cabañes, “The Disinformation Interface: Work
Hierarchies and Competitive Collegialities of Disinformation Architects, Architecture of Networked
Disinformation: Behind the Scenes of Troll Accounts and Fake News Production in the Philippines
(Newton Tech4Dev Network, 2018), 34, https://doi.org/10.7275/2cq4-5396.
5

6 Robert Mason and Iwan Morgan, eds, The Liberal Consensus Reconsidered: American
Politics and Society in the Postwar Era (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2017), Project
MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/book/51244.

Godfrey Hodgson, “Revisiting the Liberal Consensus,” in The Liberal Consensus
Reconsidered: American Politics and Society in the Postwar Era, eds. Robert Mason and Iwan
7
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In neocolonial Philippines, this ideology of American liberalism has been associated
with Cold War-era anticommunism, capitalist modernization as the path to economic
development, and liberal democratization in the wake of the EDSA People Power Revolution
in 1986 that unseated the dictator Ferdinand Marcos and his family from power. The
postwar, post-EDSA liberal consensus manifested in not just the focus on the protection of
civil liberties and the institutionalization of governmental checks and balances in the new
Constitution, the continuation of the state’s anticommunist campaigns, or the adoption of
neoliberal economic reforms since 1980s;8 it is also evident in the dominance of a liberal
humanist worldview in the country’s foremost cultural institutions, including top schools and
universities, the capitalist art world, the mainstream English-language press, NGOs and other
civil society groups. The rise of a robust civil society, in particular, became more important
as neoliberal structural reforms, including deregulation, privatization, labor flexibilization,
and austerity in the interest of servicing external debt, heralded the retreat of the state from
the resolution of the sort of social problems (i.e. of poverty, inequality, and human capital
development) that its espousal of capitalist liberal democracy was meant to resolve. Instead,
where gaps in the delivery of public goods and services—from water and electricity supply,
to transportation and housing, to education and healthcare, to disaster response—by the state
grew, business and civil society groups like NGOs, charities, foundations, etc. stepped in.
Liberal humanism, however, had in its purview only a small sector of the Filipino
population—those in the middle and upper classes whose experiences and subjectivities were
shaped by its elite pedagogical institutions. Yet, the exclusive nature of this worldview in the
context of a highly stratified country like the Philippines is obscured by the ideology of
liberal democracy.
Founded on the juridical construction in international law of the “universal” human
being who is supposedly inherently invested with rights and able to enjoy fundamental
freedoms, liberal democracy produces what the Black feminist historian Emily Owens has
called a “fantastical imaginary … in which equality simply exists.” 9 That is to say that the
assumption of equality before the law obscures the reality of extreme economic and political

Morgan (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2017), 14, Project MUSE,
muse.jhu.edu/book/51244.
8 Walden Bello, "Neoliberalism as Hegemonic Ideology in the Philippines: Rise, Apogee, and
Crisis," Philippine Sociological Review 57 (2009): 9–19, accessed April 24, 202,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23898341.

Emily A. Owens, “Keyword 7: Consent,” differences vol. 30, no. 1 (May 2019), 148–156,
https://doi.org/10.1215/10407391-7481316.
9
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inequality. Indeed, what the burgeoning of studies of gender, class, race, and other indices of
intersectional analysis have taught us in recent decades is that the liberal "humanist su bject
and the social worlds predicated onto it," including "the premises of secularism-democracy"
that it invokes, "functioned in such a way as to legitimize bourgeois and patriarchal
interests."10 As the sociologist and statesman Walden Bello wrote, “The Philippine system is
democratic in the narrow sense of making elections the arbiter of political succession. In the
principle of ‘one man/woman, one vote,’ there is formal equality. Yet this formal equality
cannot but be subverted by its being embedded in a social and economic system marked by
great disparities of wealth and income.” 11 What is puzzling is that despite this awareness
that must be common to all those who study Philippine politics and society, the language of
“liberal democratic failure” in assessing Dutertismo persists. What accounts for this
analytical blind spot? In part, this thesis is an attempt to understand how in the Philippines,
the rise of “Dutertismo” has challenged the dominance of the liberal consensus, and brought
the hollowness of the discourse of “liberal democracy” to the fore of public consciousness
and discourse.

Research Overview
My research focuses on “democracy” as a “master term”12 of Enlightenment
modernity organizing the domain of the political in the context of the Philippine postcolonial
state. Specifically, it investigates the substance of the disjunctions between the discourse of
liberal democracy and contemporary Philippine social experience by examining a range of
cultural texts—including literature, film, photojournalism, music, political advertisements,

10

Susie Tharu and Tejaswini Niranjana, "Problems for a Contemporary Theory of Gender,"
Subaltern Studies IX: Writings on South Asian History and Society, ed. Shahid Amin and Dipesh
Chakrabarty (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 233.
11 Walden Bello, “The global crisis of legitimacy of liberal democracy,” in Globalization and
the Washington Consensus: Its influence on democracy and development in the South, ed. Gladys
Lechini (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, 2008), 137,
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/sursur/lech/10bello.pdf . An earlier version of this article
is posted in Global Policy Forum:
https://archive.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/democracy/2005/10legitimacy.htm.
12 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” in
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis and London: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996), 37. In the same page, Appadurai elaborates that associated with “democracy”
as a “master narrative” of the Enlightenment worldview is a “chain of ideas, terms, and images,
including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation” which comprise the “ideoscapes” of
cultural globalization.
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state discourse, and ethnographic material—that engage with questions relating to nation and
empire, democracy and development. Its point of departure is “Dutertismo,” which signals
a rupture or break in the dominant political order, thus forcing a reckoning with current
norms and forms of governance, especially in the postcolonial world, where the project of
decolonization and the creation of new nation-states in the post-war period was tied to the
adoption of universalist liberal principles, viz. human rights and the equality of individuals
and of states large and small before the law, among others, as a marker of “progress.” 13 It
asks, (1) Does Dutertismo represent a "crisis of liberal democracy" in the Philippine
postcolonial context? (2) If so, what are the historical, social, and cultural dimensions of this
"crisis"? (3) How can we understand the rise of Dutertismo as a symptom of underlying
problems and contradictions in Philippine society? (4) Can the study of cultural texts in
relation to Dutertismo, as a way of examining the cultural dimension of the political and the
political dimension of the cultural, open up a new perspective on our contemporary?
I adapt the term “disjunction” from the political scientist Mark R. Thompson, who
argued in his 2016 article, “Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal
Reformism in the Philippines,” that the “liberal reformist” administration of the former
president Benigno “Noynoy” S. Aquino had proven so “vulnerable to replacement by violent
illiberalism” because “its narrative of ‘good governance’ had been undermined” 14 by
allegations of corruption, inability to solve “structural problems” such as “high
unemployment and poverty rates despite economic growth with only marginal improvement
in education and healthcare for the masses,” 15 failure “in delivering efficient public services
because of under-spending on infrastructure,” 16 and a series of high-profile governmental
debacles in the latter half of Aquino’s presidency, including the disastrous response to the
2013 “supertyphoon” Haiyan, which destroyed coastal cities in the Visayas and left tens of
thousands dead, missing, or injured; a botched military operation in 2015 that killed 44

Mohammad Shahabuddin, “Liberal Self-determination, Postcolonial Statehood, and
Minorities: The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Context,” Jahangirnagar University Journal of Law 1 (June,
2013), 82, https://eprints.keele.ac.uk/247/1/JUJL%20Publication.pdf .
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14 Mark R. Thompson, “Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformism in
the Philippines,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016), 41,
https://doi.org/10.1177%2F186810341603500303 .
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soldiers, and; the police opening fire at several farmers in Kidapawan, Mindanao who were
holding a demonstration for government aid following a period of drought in early 2016. 17
The “systemic disjunction” that Thompson refers to consists in the yawning gap
between the social goods promised by the narrative of “good governance,” and the ability of
the democratic, “liberal reformist” administration of Aquino to make good on those
promises, thus creating an opening for “Dutertismo” to mount its “illiberal” challenge. By
contrast, I use “disjunction” to question the commensurability between Philippine social
experience and the normative discourse of “liberal democracy” itself, against which the
former is perpetually measured and found wanting. My inquiry involves contextualizing the
idealization of liberal democracy in the “ideoscapes”18 of Philippine politics, as well as the
analysis of Dutertismo and its conditions of emergence as a way of surfacing the
contradictions of contemporary Philippine political cultures. I would like to emphasize here
that the object of this study is not “Dutertismo” as such, but the contemporary disjunctions—
between “facts” and “norms,” between political theory and lived experience, between
“Dutertismo” as a phenomenon and “liberal democracy” as a theoretical frame—that the rise
of Duterte lays bare, in order to contribute to conversations about contemporary Philippine
politics a different perspective.

Research Context
The Philippine sociologist and public intellectual Randy David, who first wrote
about the social phenomenon that he termed “Dutertismo,” described it as the “Philippine
incarnation” of Fascism, 19 in which the “personal weaponization of government authority” 20
is “enabled by the public’s faith in the capacity of a tough-talking, willful, and unorthodox
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leader to carry out drastic actions to solve the nation’s persistent problems.” 21 That these
“drastic actions” include heightened policing and “state-sponsored mass murder” 22 would
seem, at least on the surface, a departure from the previously prevailing state discourse of
“Daang Matuwid” (“the straight path”) and its emphasis on neoliberal good governance and
bureaucratic transparency and efficiency. Subsequent analyses of Dutertismo, especially
from the fields of political science and sociology, have built on David’s definition and
emphasized Duterte’s “illiberal” populism. Duterte’s illiberal brand of populism is said to
manifest in his repudiation of liberal norms and values, including human rights, his
promotion of authoritarianism and state violence, the “gutter language”23 that characterizes
his rhetoric, and the support of anxious and hopeful “penal populist” publics24 who were
disenfranchised in the status quo, and thus taken by Duterte’s campaign promises of social
change (“Tunay na Pagbabago”) and courageous and compassionate leadership (“Tapang at
Malasakit”).
Much of the scholarly literature written about Dutertismo has focused on explaining
the immediate contexts of its emergence, and its political ramifications, especially for the
liberal-democratic order. 25 Analyses that gain currency often come from the fields of
political science, critical sociology, international relations, 26 and, to a lesser extent, from
21 Randy David, “Where is ‘Dutertismo’ headed?” Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 17,
2017. opinion.inquirer.net/109531/where-is-dutertismo-headed.
22 Matthew Krain, “State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and
Politicides,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 3 (1997): 331–60, jstor.org/stable/174282.
Also see Dahlia Simangan, “Is the Philippine ‘War on Drugs’ an Act of Genocide?”, Journal of
Genocide Research 20, no. 1 (2018), 68–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1379939.
Simangan’s answer to the titular question is “Yes.”
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Philippine Populism,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 1 (2017), 149,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2016.1239751.
23

24 Nicole Curato, “Politics of Anxiety, Politics of Hope: Penal Populism and Duterte’s Rise to
Power,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (December 2016): 91–109,
https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500305.

Mark R. Thompson’s introduction to the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
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examples of this mode of analysis. See the Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3
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media and communication studies. These analyses have generally interpreted Dutertismo as
a symptom of the “failure” of liberal-democratic consolidation and its attendant discourses of
universal human rights, due process, rule of law, and reform. In explaining Duterte’s appeal,
for instance, Walden Bello, much like Thompson above, reasons that the “electoral
insurgency” 27 that brought Duterte to power may be attributed to popular resentment against
the neoliberal status quo, as embodied by elites in government, business, and civil society.
For Bello, to understand Duterte’s ascent to power, one must reckon with “the failure of the
liberal democratic republic that emerged from the EDSA Uprising to deliver on its promises
of mass political empowerment, redistribution of wealth, and economic justice.”28 Bello
attributes this failure to the post-EDSA administrations’ adoption of a “neoliberal paradigm,”
which constrained their institutional capacity to satisfactorily address such structural issues
as corruption and class inequality.29 For the sociologist Nicole Curato, the myriad forms of
social insecurity caused by widespread poverty and injustice fueled Duterte’s “penal
populism,” a political style that emphasizes the adoption of punitive measures against “the
scum of society”30 to address popular fears and anxieties (over unemployment or
criminality, for instance). Further, Curato argues that Duterte’s penal populism not only
serves to assure an insecure public; it also lends them a sense of agency and hope that they
would see improvements in the country within their lifetime if they supported Duterte.31
After all, what legitimates Dutertismo’s macho “narrative of crushing the ‘dangerous other’
to save the Republic” 32 is the promise of economic development, security, and a better
standard of living for all—within a stringent and definite time frame. 33
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The “democratic deficit” represented by Dutertismo is also often linked to the
“global crisis of liberal democracy,”34 which is apparent in the recent rise of far-right and
white supremacist groups, religious fundamentalisms and ethnonationalisms, and “illiberal”
regimes, or nominal democracies that feature authoritarian qualities, such as media
censorship or harassment, electoral fraud, persecution of political rivals, concentration of
power in the chief executive, and the erosion of institutional checks and balances, around the
world.35 In the Philippines, thirty years since the dictator Ferdinand Marcos was overthrown
by popular uprising, democratic consolidation remains an incomplete and unsuccessful
project despite the restoration of civil liberties, given the elite capture of democratic
processes and control of vast economic resources and the state apparatus for private capital
accumulation.36 As Imelda Deinla and Björn Dressel write in their assessment of Duterte’s
rise to power in the context of the second Aquino president’s administration, “the paradoxes
of elite democracy and unequal development brought to the fore latent illiberal features that
had previously surfaced in the form of authoritarianism during the Marcos years.” 37 The
persistence of extractive and inequitable political and economic structures (both local and
global), which perpetuate fundamental problems of widespread poverty and social
inequality, has led to popular disenchantment with the “the system”—which has come to be
the face of decades of seemingly interminable poverty and underdevelopment. During his presidential
campaign, Duterte had famously promised to “get rid of corruption, drugs and criminality” within
three to six months of being elected, or else he would resign. Neither came to pass. See Ariel Paolo
Tejada, “Duterte vows to end criminality in 3 months,” The Philippine Star, February 20, 2016,
https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/20/1555349/duterte-vows-end-criminality-3-months.
Duterte also promised to ease traffic congestion in Metro Manila within a year or two of his
presidency by adding more trains and train lines. See ABS-CBN News, “PiliPinas Debates 2016,”
Youtube, April 24, 2016, https://youtu.be/950g5hwtAv8?t=6623.
For a breakdown of Duterte’s campaign promises and their results, see Pia Ranada, “Two years
of Duterte: Broken and fulfilled promises,” Rappler, June 27, 2018,
https://www.rappler.com/nation/duterte-two-years-as-president-broken-fulfilled-promises.
34 Walden Bello, “The Global Crisis of Legitimacy of Liberal Democracy,” Global Policy
Forum, October 2005,
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identified with the liberal democratic political order that is widely perceived to be
ineffectual, oligarchic, and corrupt—and with bourgeois civil society (including institutions
like the church, academe, mass media, NGOs, and center-left activists) which has been
criticized by Duterte supporters, as well as by more radically oriented leftists, as elitist,
Manila-centric, biased, hypocritical, or out-of-touch. Duterte, scholars argue, was able to
recognize, empathize with, give voice to, and capitalize on the latent anxieties, frustrations,
anger, and hopes of various marginalized publics, and to mobilize, with his “dark
charisma,”38 such excess of sentiment, to dominate national government and rally support
for his primary and most controversial policy thrust, the War on Drugs.
What the above interpretations tend to imply is that the ideals of liberal democracy
have not been sufficiently articulated, mediated, and realized in the public sphere, and thus
those who recognize its value must work harder to translate its significance to the masses
who seem to dismiss it. The normativity of “liberalism” as a moral and political system is
taken for granted. The intellectual historian Lisandro Claudio, for example, avers, “we must
also hold intellectuals to task for failing to rise to the defense of basic common principles
anchored on liberal ideals of dignity, tolerance, human rights, and, yes, a certain degree of
universalism…. [W]hat is necessary is a renewed moralism in intellectual life.”39 To this
end, Claudio continues, the “restoration of liberal democratic principles … is urgent.” 40
How might this be achieved? The usual prescription given by political thinkers and
commentators, especially those who provide expert advice on television and other news
media, is (re)building liberal institutions and deliberative spaces, reining in “bad actors” (i.e.
trolls and purveyors of misinformation) in public discourse through legal regulation, 41
improving fact-checking and analysis to combat misinformation and herd behavior, 42
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especially the “deluded,” “blind,” or “fanatical” Duterte supporters, and listening to and
correcting one’s own and the others’ “misconceptions,” and thus bridging polarized views.
However, this scholarly spotlight on the “incivility, political polarization,
normalization of disinformation” that characterize Duterte’s “populist style” 43 leaves in
darkness the more fundamental reasons why the electoral (non)representative
(non)democratic system in the Philippines does not work, and has not worked, long before
the rise of Duterte—or of viral disinformation spread on Facebook. As Bello explains,
Like the American political system on which it is modeled, the genius of the
Philippine democratic system, from the perspective of the elite, is the way it
harnesses elections to socially conservative ends (Bello, 2003: 80-91). Running for
office at any level of government is prohibitively expensive, so that only the wealthy
or those backed by wealth can usually stand for elections. Thus the masses do
choose their representatives but from a limited pool of people of means that may
belong to different factions—those ‘in’ and those ‘out’ of power—but are not
different in terms of their political programs. The beauty of the system in the eyes of
the elite is that by periodically engaging the people in an exercise to choose among
different members of the elite, elections make voters active participants in
legitimizing the social and economic status quo. Thus has emerged the great
Philippine paradox: an extremely lively play of electoral politics unfolding above a
class structure that is one of the most immobile in Asia.44
Similarly, the recommendation to create more deliberative spaces in the public
sphere skirts the question of access and formal and substantive equality among participants
in the processes of public will-formation, consensus-building, and decision-making; nor is
more deliberation among the country’s liberal-minded elites going to solve the longstanding
underlying material and structural problems that exacerbate political, economic, and cultural
inequalities in the Philippines, making its formal claim to being a “democratic” country feel
hollow for the great majority of those who have to live in it. Yet, more often than not, the
normative frame implicit in the language of “failure” is obscured. The assumptions that
liberal democracy is the ideal form of government, for the Philippines and elsewhere, and
that Filipinos had enjoyed the rights that are putatively guaranteed under such a democracy
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before Duterte became president, tend to valorize the myth of actually-existing democracy in
the Philippines without subjecting it to critical interrogation.
The ways in which “Dutertismo” is commonly used must be problematized. First, as
a pejorative, it tends to exceptionalize or monsterize Duterte’s “necropolitics,” especially in
relation to the spectacles and violence “War on Drugs.” Second, as a concept coined and
most often deployed by political scientists and sociologists, “Dutertismo” has often been
harnessed to analyses that are state-centric and provide instrumental explanations of
populism and power within the frame of electoral politics and liberal democratization. Third,
even ethnographic studies that employ more “empathetic” approaches to understand the
politics of Dutertismo, for example Nicole Curato’s theorization of “penal populist
publics,” 45 Cleve Arguelles’ study on the motivations of urban poor residents who voted for
Duterte,46 and Wataru Kusaka’s analysis of how Duterte’s “social bandit” image gave him
political cachet among slum-dwellers in Quezon City and Leyte, 47 reproduce this imaginary
of Philippine politics that is centered on state-society relations as mediated by elections.
What these studies suggest is that we need to understand Dutertismo’s political rationality so
that next time, we get “good” electoral outcomes. What makes a “good” electoral outcome?
A leader who is more of a “liberal-reformist” rather than a “violent authoritarian populist”—
a Manichean framing that reproduces the logic of the liberal consensus and effaces more
complex political configurations in the region, such as those of East Asian states that have
historically undergone a period of developmental authoritarianism to achieve rapid economic
growth and poverty reduction, if not wealth redistribution. 48
Underlying the panic about the rise of “illiberalism” is the assumption that the
global political order is, or ought to be, liberal-democratic. This, perhaps, is a testament to
the success of U.S. hegemony in the twentieth century, and of the enduring significance of
American political and economic thought in its former colony. Since the Cold War, the
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adoption of liberal-democratic principles in tandem with capitalist enterprise, became the
standard of modernization and progress in the age of Pax Americana, with “capitalist free
market economics … perceived as a crucial condition of liberal democratization.”49 The
discourse of modernization was part of the U.S. project of empire-building, an attempt to
bring newly decolonized states into the U.S. sphere of influence and address the problem of
Third World development in light of the competition between global capitalism and world
socialism during the Cold War. 50 The resolution of this competition finds a triumphalist
expression in the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s notion of “the end of
history.” In 1989, Fukuyama wrote that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the spread of
“consumerist Western culture” in China evidence the “triumph of the West, of the Western
idea … the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.” 51 He
continues: “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of
a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of
mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as
the final form of human government.”52 Such a worldview, Adair Turner writes, rests on the
naturalization of “a close and inherent link between market capitalism, liberal democracy
and the cultural attitudes of secular modernity” as “key routes to world peace,” and the
assumption that “this integrated and progressive package is capable of being a universal
model” through “market liberalisation, both within countries and globally.” 53
The universalist and essentialist narrative that draws “inherent links” between the
development of market capitalism, liberal democracy, and secular modernity has since been
roundly challenged. Political economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, David Harvey, and Walden
Bello, for example, have pointed out the anti-democratic tendencies of neoliberal
globalization in its structural “dis-embedding” (in Karl Polanyi’s terms) of the economic
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system from society, especially in underdeveloped nations.54 The political theorist Chantal
Mouffe has dwelled on the tension between the incompatible logics of individualist liberty
and democratic equality, between the protection of human rights and the exercise of popular
sovereignty expressed in the concatenation “liberal democracy.” 55 Meanwhile, historically
grounded and context-specific studies of political regimes and economic systems outside
Euro-America complicate the taken-for-granted links between free-market capitalism and
liberal democracy as the path to economic and political development. A recent notable study
in this vein is Chua Beng Huat’s Liberalism Disavowed (2018), where he argues that
Singapore’s economic development and the continuing legitimacy of the “repressive” PAP
government rests on the state’s program of embedded social democracy and its pillars: the
National Housing Program, state capitalism, multiracialism, and ideological anti-liberalism.56
In the Philippines, the drive toward “modernization” (achieved through political
democratization, capitalist economic development, and cultural liberalism) as the path to
development led to the weakening of radical left forces and the emergence of “liberal
democracy” as a dominant political ideal. This, however, occurred in the midst of
accelerated globalization and the neoliberal restructuring of political and economic policies,
which not only diminished the role of the state in the provision of social welfare as discussed
above, but also exacerbated existing structural inequalities and spurred large-scale migration
both within and away from the Philippines. This resulted in the evacuation of the domestic
middle class/bourgeois civil society, which is conventionally considered the modern agent of
social change, and the privileged political subject in liberal democracy, which locates public
sphere formation in civil society. 57 The minority status of the Filipino “middle class” further
undermines the possibility for liberal democracy’s hegemony.
The crisis of Pax Americana and current shifts in the balance of power in geopolitics
exposes the cracks in liberal democracy as a U.S. imperial export. The phenomenon of
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Dutertismo exemplifies the development of a political form that arose out of a specific
historical context when it is transplanted to a different social reality. Rather than seeing it as
a sign of a failed project of democratization, then, Dutertismo may be understood as
signifying the particular trajectory that U.S.-style democracy has taken in Philippine soil, a
trajectory that shares many similarities with other postwar projects of nation-building and
modernization in what used to be designated as the “Third World.” Seen in this light, the
social tensions that Dutertismo makes apparent reveals the historical disjunctions between
the moral-political normative framework adopted by those who align themselves with
“liberal democracy,” and other political cultures that hitherto have been marginalized in
official political discourse, especially in the wake of the Cold War, but nevertheless provide
justification for the policies and campaigns of the present regime.

Conceptual Framework and Methodology
I locate the conceptual preoccupations of this thesis in the intersections of
democratic political thought, decolonial and postcolonial studies (drawing specifically on
writings by the Subaltern Group and the Modernity/Coloniality School), literary, and interAsia cultural studies. In particular, I take heed of Chen Kuan-Hsing's assertion of the need
for "de-imperialization," "de-colonization," and "de-Cold War"-ization in knowledge
production,58 which impels this study's interrogation of liberal norms. While this is not a
primarily historical study, its analytical approach is inspired by Foucault’s writings on
genealogy as a method of writing a “history of the present” by “uncovering ... hidden
conflicts and contexts as a means of re-valuing the value of contemporary phenomena,” 59
and attending to the "hazardous play of dominations" among social forces within "various
systems of subjection" that structure an event’s emergence.60 In tracing the roots of the
present crisis, this thesis analyzes a range of contemporary cultural productions, including
literature, historiography, feature films and documentaries, music, news articles and
photojournalism, online public discourse, political advertisements, and presidential speeches
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and other genres of state discourse to surface the narratives that the discourse of Dutertismo
constructs and perpetuates. Using the notion of disjunction between Dutertismo and
liberalism as a heuristic, I chose texts that problematize the normative frame of
Enlightenment modernity, hunting for places and moments in the text rife with tension,
disconnection, or inconsistency, in order to elucidate the underlying social crises that
animate Dutertismo.
Supplementing the textual analyses that comprise this thesis for the most part are
ethnographic narratives gleaned from participant and non-participant observation, qualitative
interviews, and casual conversations with Filipino migrant domestic workers, labor
organizers, and rights activists over a period of ten months (June 2020 to April 2021) in
Hong Kong. In focusing on their practices of democratization in the activity of labor
organization and alliance-building across different social classes, nationalities, and
ethnicities, their politics of negotiation and confrontation with the state, and the tensions
between “elite” and “mass” subjectivity and experiences that they embody, I have tried to
explore a space of political contention that is not locked into the statist logics of electoral
politics, which tends to frame much of the current discussions about Dutertismo.

The Architecture of the Thesis
Each of the chapters in this thesis examines elements of the discourses of Dutertismo
and liberal democracy in the context of the “problem-spaces,” or contexts of discourse,
argument, and intervention,61 of Philippine postcolonial modernity, focusing on
nationalism and democracy as “master terms” of modernity and objects of translation
through the projects of “nation-state-building” and “development,” especially as represented
in the discourse of Dutertismo. My objective is to identify the underlying causes of the

61 David Scott, in Conscripts of Modernity (Duke UP, 2004), uses the term “problem -space” to
denote “a discursive context … a context of argument and, therefore, one of intervention” (Scott 4).
More than an ensemble of “concepts, ideas, images, meanings,” it demarcates a field of knowledge
and power by defining “particular problems that get posed as problems,” “particular questions that
seem worth asking,” and “answers that seem worth having” (Scott 4). Scott’s use of the term adds a
temporal dimension to the questions and answers we pose, and the epistemological conditions that
imbue statements with meaning. It recognizes that interpretive contexts change through time, as
“different historical conjunctions” generate “new questions and new demands” (Scott 7). This
suggests that the "truth" of something depends on the correspondence between a statement and the
generally accepted discursive structure that allowed it the property of "truth." Such structures change
through time, such that what is generally held to be true in one century is m adness in another. Some
truths, such as the normative values of liberty, equality, and fraternity for example, that hold through
centuries are a matter of enduring/institutionalized consensus.
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“crisis” that Dutertismo represents, both objective/material/structural and
discursive/ideological, through the analysis of diverse cultural materials.
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the elements of Duterte’s popular appeal and Dutertismo’s
rhetoric of “alternative nationalism” upon which that appeal largely rests. In these chapters, I
juxtapose ethnographic accounts and literary texts, respectively, to surface the contradictions
between elite liberal nationalism and the so-called “illiberal” discourses of Dutertismo’s
“populist” publics. While the first two chapters examine the problems of nationalism and the
nation-state form that Dutertismo brings to the surface and draws political cachet from,
Chapters 3 and 4 interrogate the liberal discourses of human rights and social progress in the
context of neoliberal globalization and its production of “disposable lives” by analyzing
representations of the “War on Drugs,” and its usual site of execution, the urban slum. The
thrust of the first four chapters is the elaboration of the social contradictions that fomented
Dutertismo and render liberal-normative analyses inadequate in assessing the former.
Chapter 5, meanwhile, provides a counterpoint to the elitist/populist binary that has
structured much of the conversation about Duterte by examining the discourses and practices
of Filipino migrant worker activists in Hong Kong, through the analytical lens of Partha
Chatterjee’s concept of “the politics of the governed,” and what Benedict Anderson called
“long-distance nationalism.” 62 I present the problematics of each chapter in greater detail
below.
Chapter 1 (“‘Populism’ and the Affects of Dutertismo”) seeks to explain
“Dutertismo” as a "populist" discourse, describe its elements, and trace the social and
historical processes that, so to speak, primed publics not only to resonate, but to collectively
participate in the construction of the discursive field within which Dutertismo, with its often
contradictory problematics/claims, is imbued with meaning, given credence, and reproduced.
This chapter draws on ethnographic field work conducted among Duterte supporters in Hong
Kong in 2018 and 2020, and analyzes representations of Dutertismo, surfacing its keywords,
tropes, and myths, and explaining how they frame political identities, shape structures of
sentiment, and sustain the engagement of affective publics, both in virtual and physical
spaces. While analyses of Dutertismo as a form of right-wing populism have tended to focus
on the “necropolitics” of the regime, its attendant affects of fear, terror, anxiety, and anger,
and its practices of discipline and punishment, this chapter aims to present a different
perspective by examining the appeal of Dutertismo as predicated on its systematic
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cultivation of feelings of love, joy, and community care, especially among subjects who have
long felt themselves marginalized in Philippine society.
Chapter 2 (“The Novel and the Nation”) considers the representations of the
Philippine nation in contemporary novels about the Philippines that are written by members
of the Filipino diaspora in the United States as an entry point to defamiliarizing hegemonic
nationalism and examining notions of identity, belonging, nationhood, class, and coloniality,
in the context of debates regarding the “elitist” orientation of the “official” nationalism
promoted by the Philippine state and its pedagogical institutions. These novels are Gina
Apostol’s The Gun Dealers’ Daughter (2010), Elaine Castillo’s America Is Not the Heart
(2018), and Randy Ribay’s Patron Saints of Nothing (2019). In analyzing these novels,
Chapter 2 seeks to describe a particular kind of nationalist subjectivity mediated by the
values of Enlightenment modernity, interrogate assumptions of commensurability between
liberal democratic ideals and the social reality of neocolonial, not-quite-sovereign nationstates like the Philippines, and nuance Dutertismo’s dislocation of bourgeois civil society’s
imaginary of liberal democracy and nation-building.
Chapter 3 (“The War on Drugs and the Discourse of Human Rights”) examines
cultural texts (presidential speech, photojournalism, films, music, and literature) that depict
the “War on Drugs” and their structures of representation. It explains how the “war
imaginary” that Dutertismo both promotes and is perpetuated by became normalized in the
public consciousness, and operationalized with bureaucratic efficiency and rationality. In
discussing the discursive production of the disjunction between disciplined “citizens” with a
right to make a claim to rights, and non-human “populations” that deserve to be exterminated
to protect the rights of the former, this chapter questions the emphasis placed by liberal
democratic discourse on the supposed “universality” of, and equal access to, human rights to
claim moral ascendancy over and “counter” Dutertismo, when Dutertismo legitimates the
violation of individual human rights as a function of governmental discipline, and a
necessary sacrifice for the realization of social security, economic progress, and national
development for the ultimate benefit of the Philippine polity.
Chapter 4 (“Development and Disposability”) extends the analysis in the previous
chapter of the ways in which Dutertismo represents the drug war as a form of “social
cleansing” that is a precondition for social progress. It juxtaposes filmic images that use the
chronotope 63 of the Metropolitan Manila slum, where most drug war killings take place, as a

Literally, “time-space,” a concept developed in Mikhail Bakhtin's 1981 essay “Forms of Time
and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes Toward a Historical Poetics,” in The Dialogic
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site of disposability, with images from Dutertist discourse that use the chronotope of the
“world city,” as exemplified by Hong Kong and Singapore, as a site of modernity and
development. In doing so, this chapter elaborates how the “disposability” of certain lives is
constructed in the public imagination, and in what ways this normalized extermination of
“surplus” populations has been contested by artistic interventions. Unlike studies of the “War
on Drugs” that interpret it as an instrumental form of “necropolitics” 64 that serves to
strengthen what Curato has termed Duterte’s “penal populist” appeal, 65 Chapters 4 and 5
propose that the “War on Drugs” be framed by the twin logics of “disposability” and
“development,” which allows us to examine how the spectacularization of the “war” renders
visible the structural construction of of “surplus” populations under the value regimes of
neoliberal and neocolonial globalization.
Finally, Chapter 5 (“Migrant Activism and the Politics of the Governed”) further
explores the disjunction between the politics of civil society, i.e. of rights-bearing, often
elite, “citizens,” which is framed by the norms and assumptions of liberal democracy, and
those of marginalized “populations” which exist in conditions of everyday violence,
precarity, and informality that limit their access to, if not divest them of, rights. Drawing on
ethnographic narratives gleaned from ten months (June 2020 to April 2021) of participant
observation and interviews with domestic workers, labor organizers, and rights activists in
Hong Kong, it examines the politics of the migrant Filipino working class who belong to
organizations aligned with the "national democratic" left in order to describe the sort of
“modernity” mediated by the activism of migrant domestic workers, in contrast with that
which is mediated by the more privileged subjects of liberal humanism. In attending to this
population’s constant negotiations with the Philippine state that has pushed them out, and
with mainstream Hong Kong society that does not recognize their belonging here, this
chapter seeks to recover our imagination of democratic political participation beyond mere
electoralism and the assumption of inherent or automatic access to rights.

Imagination: Four Essays, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1984), 84–258. This particular chapter, however, draws extensively on
Katrina Macapagal’s concept of the “slum chronotope” in noir films set in the Philippines. See Katrina
Angela Reyes Macapagal, “The Slum Chronotope and Imaginaries of Spatial Justice in Philippine
Urban Cinema” (PhD Dissertation, Queen Margaret University, 2017).
64 See for example, Danilo Andres Reyes, “The Spectacle of Violence in Duterte’s ‘War on
Drugs,’” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3, (2016) 111–137,
doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500306, and Vicente Rafael, “The Sovereign Trickster,” Journal of
Asian Studies 78, no. 1, February 2019, doi.org/10.1017/S0021911818002656.
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This research is animated by the notion that to understand our contemporary
juncture, we need to generate new explanatory frameworks that problematize the normative
frame of Enlightenment modernity. In analyzing and historicizing Dutertismo in relation to
the currently dominant modes of interpreting this phenomenon, this study aims to present a
narrative about the post/colonial experience of modernity, and what that means for the
continuing translation of democracy in the Philippine context. The modest aim of this thesis
is to offer perspectives for understanding Dutertismo and its implications for democracy in
the Philippines—and in other places that share similar experiences—beyond the terms set by
the discourses of liberalism, populism, or electoral politics, and reflecting on what it means
to further democratization “from below.”
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1. POPULISM AND THE AFFECTS OF DUTERTISMO

Duterte’s “Populist” Persona
In March 2015, Esquire Philippines, as part of a series of magazine issues that put
presidentiables on the cover, featured an interview with Duterte about his views on a variety
of social issues, from divorce to criminal punishment and the Davao Death Squads to the
Bangsamoro Law. 66 It was accompanied by photos shot by Jason Quibilan in then Mayor
Duterte's city of Davao, with the concept "How to be a Man." The magazine cover for the
March 2015 issue features Duterte in a white sando or tank top underneath a denim jacket—
a look that is associated with 90s action stars and the Filipino overseas contract worker,
especially seafarers or construction workers bound for the Middle East. In the image, Duterte
is shown cradling a rifle, against the backdrop of greenery and a ragtag crew of young men,
many of them topless and looking like tambays (loiterers) or insurgents, possibly both. The
photograph is a nod to the macho, maverick, rebel image that Duterte cultivated. A 2015
Rappler profile, for example, describes him as a "hands-on mayor" who "is known to patrol
his city’s streets twice a week ... on one of his big motorcycles, leading a convoy complete
with blaring sirens and M16 rifles [or] ... foregoing the pomp, opting to inspect in a regular
taxi, surprising his would-be passengers."67 The same article presents him as a down-toearth guy, sympathetic to the causes of the radical left, and unafraid to visit insurgent
communist guerilla camps in Mindanao. It also reproduces the "colorful urban legends" that
surround the man, emphasizing both his closeness to ordinary people, and his awesome
power: "There is one in which he supposedly pushes a drug trafficker from a flying
helicopter. One in which he treats taxi drivers to dinner. Another in which he beats up a
Philippine military soldier, breaking his two front teeth. One incident, confirmed by the
mayor himself, involves him forcing a tourist to swallow a cigarette butt." 68
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Fig. 1.1 Esquire Philippines March 2015 issue cover photograph shot by Joseph Quibilan.
Don Jaucian, “The magazine cover that predicted a Duterte presidency,” CNN Philippines, June 30,
2016, https://cnnphilippines.com/life/culture/politics/2016/06/30/esquire-philippines-duterte.html

This tough-guy image of a rebel, an outsider to the elite establishment, is something
that the Duterte camp cultivated in the run-up to the 2016 elections. Campaign
advertisements and crowdsourced memes represented Duterte in the familiar guise of an
action star, outfitted in a denim jacket or a plaid shirt, riding a motorbike, or cradling a gun.
He was also endorsed by macho action movie stars, such as Robin Padilla, Cesar Montano,
and Philip Salvador, and alluring female entertainers like the Mocha Girls. His image of
potency and virility, like his supposedly humble origins (a lie—the Dutertes have ruled
Davao since the 1950s), was meant to differentiate him from the leaders of the then-ruling
Liberal Party, bearers of the pious and liberal-democratic “EDSA” legacy, scions of old-rich
families, educated at top American universities, in close association with the Catholic
hierarchy, and then derided in the public sphere for elitism, incompetence, and indifference
to the plight of ordinary Filipinos. Compared to the other presidentiables, who trotted out
23

tired narratives about their records in government service or their plans for the Philippines,
Duterte seemed both larger-than-life, but also more real, more idiosyncratic and interesting.
Ernesto Laclau's On Populist Reason (2005)69 is helpful in examining "Dutertismo"
as a populist discourse that expressly repudiates the EDSA legacy. What recommends
Laclau's theorization of populism to this study is its refusal to reproduce the ideological
framing of "populism"—commonly understood as a political movement that appeals to the
interests of "ordinary people" in a hostile relation to an "elite"—as antithetical to liberalism,
where liberalism represents the democratic ideal. For example, in his 2019 book on populism
and liberal democracy, the political scientist Takis Pappas equates modern populist
movements with "democratic illiberalism" in that they participate in electoral contestation
for democratic legitimacy, but are socially polarizing rather than moderate and pluralistic,
prefer "the tyranny of majority" over the rule of law and its institutions, and advocate "the
morality of means" employed by "the people" more than the "rationality of ends" for the
good of the polity 70 —though about who gets to determine the good of the polity, much less
is said. Similarly, the intellectual historian Lisandro Claudio argues that to counter "illiberal"
populism's "totalizing telos" oriented towards the supposed interests of amorphous and
homogenous "masses," and "balance plural interests in a democratic society, liberals espouse
deliberation, and establish systems that facilitate this deliberation." Tellingly, Claudio
elaborates in the same paragraph that the elite institution of "the liberal university is the
perfect representation of the institutionalized deliberation that the liberal aspires for." 71
Implicit in these critiques are a distrust of the "masses," with its connotation of an irrational
mob, unfettered by civic and civil institutions, ready to inflict violence on the "enemy." In
Laclau's formulation, in the liberal view, "'Populism' was always linked to a dangerous
excess, which puts the clear-cut moulds of a rational community into question."72
By contrast, Laclau's analysis eschews an unquestioned commitment to liberalism in
favor of a more discursive analysis of the formation of collective political identities,
asserting that "populist" identities come into being not on the basis of the logics of their
particular content (e.g. an ideological line, a unified class position, consistent policy aims,
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etc.) but through the form of a rhetorical operation by which actually disparate and
incoherent interests are aggregated and unified by their being articulated together. This
totalizing operation is characteristic of what Laclau calls the "logic of equivalence" as one of
two main ways of organizing the social, where the particularities of aggregated demands are
suspended in favor of emphasizing what they have in common in order to create a collective
identity 73 that can be legible within a social field—especially if this field is characterized
by highly uneven relations of power and representation. In a situation of competing interests,
limited resources, and their unequal distribution, a demand may have a better chance of
being addressed if it is subsumed under the sign of "the people," i.e. claimed in the name of
the greater good (often posited against entrenched minority interests), than if it were to be
articulated on its own. Laclau uses the example of an ideal welfare state to illustrate the
obverse of the logic of equivalence, that is, the "logic of difference," which is another way of
organizing the social. He writes, "In this society, conceived as a continuously expanding
system, any social need should be met differentially; and there would be no basis for creating
an internal frontier. Since it would be unable to differentiate itself from anything else, that
society could not totalize itself, could not create a 'people.'" 74 But since there is no
"fissureless society" that can meet different demands equally, 75 the logics of equivalence
and difference coexist at tension with each other in the organization collective identities for
the articulation of claims to power.76
For Laclau, populism arises when the logic of equivalence in the articulation of
demands expands "at the expense of the differential one" 77 such that the emergence of the
"people" from a heterogeneous mass is made possible. This emergence is co-produced by
"the formation of an internal antagonistic frontier separating the 'people' from power" and the
advancement of political mobilization, which results in "the unification of these various
demands—whose equivalence, up to that point, had not gone beyond a feeling of vague
solidarity—into a stable system of signification."78 The latter condition necessitates that an
"empty signifier" impose a symbolic unity on a plurality of demands. In the case of
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Dutertismo, this empty signifier is "Tunay na Pagbabago" ("Real Change") a "universal" or
abstraction that is embodied by the concrete figure of Duterte himself. In this way, Duterte,
as the “point de capiton” or "nodal point" "whose name brings about the unity of a discursive
formation"79 comes to mediate the plurality of demands by the "people" united under the
signifier of "change," against an established political-economic order governed by
intransigent oligarchic elites.
This understanding of "populism," devoid of the moralizing bent of liberal
democratic political theory, is one part of this chapter's narrative for explicating the appeal of
Dutertismo. The other part is the examination of the processes that led to the formation of the
"internal antagonistic frontier" and the transformation of Duterte into a nodal point uniting
an equivalential chain of disparate demands. Specifically, this chapter asks, how can we
understand emotion as key to the emergence of “Duterte” as a point de capiton or quilting
point of the symbolic chain of equivalences in populist discourse? What are the implications
of the rise and amplification of “Dutertismo” through social media technologies for the
deepening of the antagonistic frontier that drives populism? In asking these questions, I
mean to displace liberalism's assumed and reproduced hierarchy of thought over feeling, as
well as the displacement of this structure into a hierarchy of emotions, wherein some
emotional responses are seen as signs of "cultivation," while others, of "primitiveness."
Questioning these hierarchies also demands paying attention to how these structures of
feeling shape the constitution of subjectivities and collective identities, and the political and
politicized nature of the affective investments we make in everyday practice.
Approaches to Duterte’s “populism” have tended to focus on apparent reasons for
popular support for him, such as deep dissatisfaction with the previous administration’s
perceived incompetence and elitism (as discussed in the introduction of this thesis), the
lower classes' sense of affinity with his “coarse” manners and speech,
ethnolinguistic/regional identity politics, the “rational” wager for an improved quality of life
at the expense of the “dregs” of society, or plain political opportunism. When emotions are
discussed in relation to Duterte, the emotions given the spotlight are usually those of fear,
anxiety, anger, and vengeance; little is said about “positive” or prosocial emotions such as
love, joy, fellow-feeling/community, and empowerment in the constitution of the mass of
Duterte supporters. After all, as Laclau writes, "The feature making the mutual identification
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between members of the group possible is a common hatred for something or somebody," 80
and, from the perspective of civil society, it is easier to condemn Dutertismo's incitement of
emotions that are "toxic," destructive, anti-social. But in my interactions and conversations
with Duterte supporters in Hong Kong, almost all of whom are women, what I have found
striking is the recurrence of such sentiments as faith, hope, and love—above all, love—in the
reasons given by my interlocutors when I ask them why they support Duterte. It is not love
for only the president that animates their political fervor either. They speak of love for their
families, their children, their social groups, their home provinces, their country. Because
much of the contemporary popular and academic literature on populism focuses on
"strongmen" (like Erdogan, Bolsonaro, Orban, Modi, Trump, etc.), 81 and Duterte himself is
represented as macho and misogynist and often criticized as such, I was intrigued by the
perspectives of my interlocutors as women who are relatively empowered in a patriarchal
society (since they are usually the primary breadwinners of their families back in the
Philippines). I was quite surprised to learn that those who support Duterte tend to downplay
Duterte's militarism and misogyny, and instead focus on his "softer" qualities, his love for
the nation, love for children, and concern for their welfare. They seem to especially
appreciate his campaigns against drugs and criminality, since they worry for their children
back home. In this chapter, I dwell on the prosocial affects of Duterte's "populism," not only
to add a piece to the puzzle of Duterte's durable popularity and counter easy and
unproductive dismissals of "DDS" as merely "blind" and "stupid," but also to contribute to
an understanding of the affective dimension of populist politics, which may be harnessed for
both repressive and emancipatory ends.

When I asked my activist interlocutors what they thought about Duterte, some of
them readily admitted that they had supported him at first. Ate Rina (not her real name), for
example, said that she and her family in Cebu had banked on his promise of bringing
“change” to the elitism, hypocrisy, and corruption that characterized Philippine electoral
politics. Unlike the scions of old political families, many of whom have dominated
Philippine politics and economy for more than a century, 82 Duterte appeared to her as
80
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something of an exception: “Malakas ang kabig niya sa masa,” she said, “dahil ang mga
Pilipino ay uhaw sa pagbabago. … Dahil sa dami ng mga nagdaang administrasyon, hindi
naman naiibsan ang hirap, kundi lalong lumalala.” (He has a strong hold on the masses,
because Filipinos thirst for change. … Because through numerous administrations, poverty
hasn’t been alleviated, instead it’s gotten worse). Aside from structural factors that shaped
public desire for a seeming “outsider” to national politics dominated by the traditional elite,
Rina also brought up the significance of identity politics—especially of ethnolinguistic and
identity politics—in the cultivation of popular support for Duterte. She said that one of the
reasons she and her family had voted for him was because they, like Duterte, were Bisaya.
This, coupled with his down-to-earth ways, made her think that he was like "one of us." She
talked about how Duterte was known for activism in earlier years, how he even engaged in
immersions with the New People's Army in his tenure as Mayor (or Vice-Mayor) of Davao
City since the 1980s, and was willing to negotiate with the communist revolutionists, how he
also participated in protests against the former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who is
notorious for corruption scandals and record unpopularity. 83
Rina said that even though she had some misgivings because of Duterte’s
kabastusan (boorishness/indecency) and the general culture of misogyny it has empowered,
and though she felt uneasy with the idea of a government ruled by a patriarch, she still voted
for him, thinking, “Why not? ‘Di ba hindi siya isa sa mga alta na pulitiko. … Pero honestly,
meron akong kaba. Kasi sa akin, iba pag puro lalaki ang namumuno. Dapat may nanay at
tatay. … Pero hoping pa rin ako.” (Why not? He’s not one of those elite politicians, right. ...
But honestly, I had some scruples. Because for me, it’s different when it’s men who rule.
There should be a mother and a father. … But I was still hopeful.)
While she was immediately put off by Duterte’s indecency towards women, and its
normalization through the applause and emulation inspired by his kabastusan, Rina said that
what really drove her to question her initial support was the execution of the War on Drugs,
and Duterte’s refusal to fulfill his campaign promises—aside from killing drug addicts, that
is. She recalled the disbelief she felt when the War on Drugs resulted in thousands of
casualties. She had not expected that Duterte’s declaration that he would fatten the fish in
Manila Bay with the corpses of drug pushers and users was meant quite so literally. She was
Families: State and Family in the Philippines (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009). One of
the "warlords" included in this book, the late Ramon Durano of Cebu, was a relative of the Dutertes.
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further shocked that many of the people she went to church with—she is a “Born Again”
Protestant Christian, a member of the denomination Jesus Is Lord (JIL)— expressed support
for the killings. How could they condone the deaths of the salt of the earth? She said that she
could not accept the systematic killing of the poor—“mga nakapaa at marumi, tinapon lang
sa kalsada” (those who died barefoot and dirty, thrown in the streets). She was also outraged
that Duterte broke his promises to Filipino workers to scrap the OEC (Overseas Employment
Certificate, seen as a form of state extortion for OFWs) and end labor contractualization,
which were the main reasons that labor activist organizations initially expressed support for
his presidential campaign. She likened Duterte to a lover who had asked her hand in
marriage, and then went back on his word. Although she said that there was a period when
she and other activists were still hoping that Duterte would keep his word, she eventually
realized that Duterte was just “mabola”—that he cunningly sweet-talked the Filipino people
into putting him into power with wonderful promises he did not intend to fulfill. This
“betrayal of trust” outraged Rina and other activists who felt themselves duped. Now, they
call for Duterte's ouster, because even though they recognize that his rise to power is
foremost an expression of the masses' "thirst" for change, and that a more fundamental
system of inequality underlies the present troubles of Philippine society, they see him as the
most "sagad-sagarin" (extreme) problem, one that exacerbates others.
While Rina and her comrades consider themselves "awakened" to Duterte's
deception and the folly of continuing to support him as early as the first year of his
presidency, Duterte still stands to enjoy the trust and approval of many supporters. In the
following sections, I focus on the role of emotions as a political resource, especially as they
are mediated and amplified by social media networks.

“Tatay Digong in Barangay Hong Kong”84 : Love, Joy, Community
For Hong Kong residents invested in Philippine politics, April 12, 2018 was a date
to watch. After attending the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), also known as the “Asian Davos,”
in Hainan Province, 85 Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte made a three-day stopover in
After the field notes of sociologist Jayeel Cornelio. See Jayeel Cornelio, “Tatay Digong in
Barangay Hong Kong,” Rappler, 14 April 2018, https://www.rappler.com/voices/thoughtleaders/tatay-digong-barangay-hong-kong
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Hong Kong to meet Filipinos working and residing in the territory. At the BFA conference,
Duterte gave a speech to regional leaders about how his administration’s “war” against
criminality, illegal drugs, extremism, terrorism, and corruption have gone a long way in
improving the Philippines’ “peace and order situation” and “strengthening the policy
framework for businesses to thrive.” In somber tones and invective-free speech, he said,
“[For] far too long, the Philippines has nurtured the dream of a comfortable life for our
citizens. We want a society where there are opportunities for all. We want a nation where the
hard-working, the talented, and the law-abiding can advance together and move [up the]
socio-economic ladder. We are slowly making the Filipino dream a reality.” 86
This vision of the “Filipino dream” of a “comfortable life” for “hard-working,”
“talented,” and “law-abiding” citizens, predicated on a social environment characterized by
“peace and order” conducive to business is the same message Duterte relayed to the over
2,000 Filipinos who attended the six-hour “town-hall style gathering” held in his honor in
one of the massive halls of the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal in Kowloon. It was a message wellreceived by the “elated” audience87 of mostly OFWs, who had come to Hong Kong
precisely in pursuit of the “good life” for their families that they could scarcely provide had
they stayed in the Philippines.
That the government was making headway to realize the “Filipino dream” for all
was emphasized in the speeches given by Duterte’s political allies as we awaited the arrival
of the man himself. Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque promised that the government
would provide free college tuition, irrigation for farmers, and public Wi-Fi. Congresswoman
Pia Cayetano championed divorce and a nationwide ban on smoking in public and closed
spaces, and praised Davao (Mindanao’s regional capital, where members of the Duterte

it concluded with a consensus on deepening globalization. See
http://english.boaoforum.org/en/index.html
Republic of the Philippines Presidential Communications and Operations Office, “Speech of
President Rodrigo Roa Duterte during the Opening Ceremonies of the Boao Forum for Asia,”
Opening Ceremonies of the Boao Forum for Asia, BFA International Convention Center, Hainan,
China, April 10, 2018, https://pcoo.gov.ph/presidential-speech/speech-of-president-rodrigo-roaduterte-during-the-opening-ceremonies-of-the-boao-forum-for-asia/.
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family have been governing since the late 1950s88 ) for being an example of a developed,
“disciplined” city, where people followed the law. Actor Cesar Montano assured the
audience, “Ang iniisip po ng ating presidente ay gumawa ng maraming trabaho sa ating
bansa para kayo ay makabalik na at doon magtrabaho.” [What preoccupies our president is
generating many jobs in our country so that you can come back and work there.] Yet Consul
General Antonio Morales also reminded the audience that “Our workers are highly regarded.
Their work is honest work, decent work, important work”—for, he said, not only do they
support the Philippine economy, but they allow Hong Kong women to work outside the
home, thereby raising Hong Kong’s productive capacity.
All this talk, presumably, “was music to Filipino ears” 89 —for who among the
migrant workers in the audience would not like improved public services and reassurances of
one’s importance to the nation to which one hopes to return? While speakers repeatedly
mentioned the administration’s campaigns for “change” and the eradication of lawlessness
and “corruption,” the specificities of these campaigns were not disclosed. No statistics were
given, nor any illustrative examples or detailed reports (even mentions of bills or
regulations), as the previous administration, with its technocratic bent, was wont to do. Here,
the specifics of policy and implementation seemed unnecessary, for it looked like it was
already conventionally accepted among the audience that the present regime had brought
about improvements in Philippine society. I asked one of the Filipinas beside me what she
thought, and she said that her neighborhood back home now feels safer. I asked her when she
had last lived in the Philippines, and she answered, over ten years ago. It is not the veracity
of these beliefs that is the point here, but the strength of the conviction of those who held
onto them, notwithstanding contrary perspectives or evidence, demonstrating the tenacity of
political beliefs strengthened by feeling. The realization, much less the actual benefits of the
promised social goods in the context of the Duterte administration’s overall policies, may be
debated—free college tuition could well be a subsidy to the higher classes, farmland
irrigation a small consolation for the liberalization of the rice trade. But what mattered to the
attendees of the meeting with Duterte then, it seemed, was that they felt good to be there, to
have their hopes invigorated, to meet and be with others who felt the same. What was
important in the moments of that meeting was the sense that everyone present was party to
something great and wonderful in the making, just by dint of their support for the man who
Claire Jiao, Andreo Calonzo and Hannah Dormido, “A Power Shift Is Under Way in
Duterte’s Game of Thrones,” Bloomberg, 8 June 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019philippine-political-dynasties/.
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had promised to bring about change in a country that, in the terms of modernization, seems
perpetually stuck in a continuous tense, a tense continuity: developing.
I had expected the six-hour event, promoted as a town hall-style meeting, to involve
politicians addressing their overseas constituents about national issues, and informing them
about government projects and public policies. However, the event seemed more like a mix
of campaign sortie, variety show, and fan meeting. The atmosphere in the audience was
reminiscent of the live audiences of noontime variety shows: primed for maximal emotional
expressivity. The program proceeded in this way: a politician or celebrity supporter of
Duterte would come up onstage, talk about themselves and their accomplishments under the
Duterte regime, and remind the audience that Duterte loves them, and so they must also
continue showing their love for “Tatay Digong” (a pet name for Duterte, figuring him as the
nation’s father) by sharing the successes of the Duterte administration with their friends and
family and posting about Tatay and his accomplishments on social media. Following one or
two such speeches would be a musical number involving dancing or singing, and then more
speeches punctuated by celebrities, politicians, and celebrity politicians taking selfies with
the audience (a crowd gathered around the beautiful and charismatic Mocha Uson, who
readily accepted requests for pictures, often taking the selfie herself). The audience
participated by clapping, cheering, crying, taking photos and videos and posting them online,
or livestreaming the event on Facebook.
It was Duterte’s second official visit to Hong Kong, a top destination for OFWs,
since becoming president. According to the 2016 HKSAR Government Census, the city
hosted over 186,800 Filipino residents, most of whom were employed as migrant domestic
workers (MDWs).90 Official estimates in 2018 put this number at around 222,000. Hong
Kong is significant to Philippine political economy not only because of the substantial
amount of remittances sent home by Filipino MDWs; since the passage of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act (R.A. 9189) in 2003, which allowed overseas Filipinos greater
participation in the electoral politics of the homeland, Hong Kong has also become a hotspot
for political campaigns. Since 2007, Hong Kong has consistently ranked as among the top
five sources of OAVs.91 During the 2016 national elections, Hong Kong was a close second

90 The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Census and Statistics
Department,, “Population by Nationality, Year and Duration of Residence in Hong Kong,” 2016
Population By-census, https://www.bycensus2016.gov.hk/en/bc-mt.html?search=A122.
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to Abu Dhabi in Overseas Absentee Voters (OAVs) turnout. Of the 52,449 Filipinos in Hong
Kong who cast votes in 2016, 65% voted for Duterte. Globally, Duterte was the choice of the
majority of Filipino OAVs, garnering 75% of almost half a million votes. The long lines at
the event registration tables, the crowded corridors, and the packed and noisy meeting hall in
the Kai Tak Cruise Terminal supported the impression given by these statistics. Indeed,
Cook and Salazar identified the growing OFW vote as one of the relatively recent structural
changes, along with rapid urbanization and the rise of social media as a campaign
mechanism, that the Duterte camp was able to exploit to win the presidency.92 While in
absolute terms, the overseas Filipino vote in 2016 may not seem like much (just about 1.38
million out of a total of 54.4 million registered voters)93 , it is likely that they influence the
votes and political views of members of their households (sometimes multiple households),
who depend on them for economic support.94
The mass of people who came to see Duterte at Kai Tak was impressive, considering
the limitations faced by the MDWs that predominantly comprised his audience; it was a sight
that stood in stark contrast to the small anti-Duterte protest that morning by local human
rights groups and migrant labor activists in the pavement outside one of the exits of Tsim
Sha Tsui MTR station. April 12 was a Thursday, and domestic workers in Hong Kong
typically had only Sundays off. The registration requirements were also cumbersome:
interested attendees were required to submit a formal application to the Philippine Consulate
General (PCG) in Hong Kong two weeks before the event, providing scans of their passports
and Hong Kong IDs, and other personal information; these documents also had to be
presented to the authorities before entering the venue. Only those who had received a
confirmation message from the PCG would be allowed to enter the venue, which the
authorities did not confirm until a couple of days before the event. An officer at the PCG told
me that this was a normal security measure, that they had chosen attendees randomly, but I
still got the feeling that the PCG wanted to avoid any “disturbances” from activists. Later,
my activist interlocutors who had also attended the event would tell me that those of them
who had managed to get in were asked to sit at the very back of the hall, their protest
Malcolm Cook and Lorraine Salazar, “The Differences Duterte Relied Upon to Win,” Yusof
Ishak Institute Perspective No. 34 (22 June 2016),
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2016_34.pdf.
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materials confiscated in accordance with a supposed prohibition on carrying any political or
religious images and messages, flags or banners “that may be used for protest or
demonstration.” And yet, around the hall, tarpaulins, banners, and placards celebrating the
president or his allied politicians were proudly held aloft by gleeful supporters, giving the
impression that the audience was united in their pro-government stance.
The communication of this controlled and deliberate image of united support by
masses of people for the president, it would turn out, was an important part of the event. Like
other activities that involved President Duterte’s appearances, the meeting at Kai Tak was
fully documented by the Presidential Communications and Operations Office (PCOO), with
footage from the event edited into a short film and circulated through the government’s
official media channels, including social media accounts. But the most significant mediators
of the spectacle were the attendees themselves, who took selfies around the venue, took
countless photos of the speakers and performers onstage, as well as other members of the
audience, posted updates online in real time for their friends and family who could n ot be
there. They were encouraged by the organizers and speakers to do this; several times during
the course of the event, the politicians and celebrities who took the stage reminded the
audience to post about what they learned there on Facebook, to spread the word about the
government’s achievements, and to express their love for “Tatay Digong.” But this
exhortation for copious documentation and expression again seemed to apply only to those
who might reliably relay, through social media, the message the powers-that-be desired;
media presence at the event was tightly regulated, the members of the press allowed access
carefully vetted. Those spotted carrying professional cameras and other such equipment
without permission were forbidden by Filipino volunteer marshals from using them, even if
they identified themselves as journalists. With spaces for articulating views that contradicted
the “official” narratives being presented so constrained, it would be easy for an observer
looking from afar to think that in that moment and the spontaneous sense of community that
it engendered, at least, there was only love and support and delight by “the people” for
Rodrigo Duterte and the men and women in his inner circle. Anyone saying otherwise might
easily be drowned out by the crowd’s repeated chanting of the president’s name.
Given the demands on attention taken by real-time documentation, reaction, and
communication, not to mention the myriad entertainments provided by the politicians and
performers onstage, it was no wonder that the audience stayed abuzz even as we waited
hours for Duterte’s arrival. Although Duterte himself would arrive closer to seven p.m.
rather than the event’s publicized start at three in the afternoon, that did not seem to matter to
his supporters who had gathered there, some of whom told me that they had been lining up
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outside the venue as early as 11 a.m. One domestic worker I spoke with said that her
employer had allowed her to take Thursday afternoon and evening off if she would work for
the whole day on Sunday. She said that she did not mind the long wait, because we were
fortunate enough to be among those chosen to meet the president; many of her friends were
disappointed because they did not get a confirmation from the Philippine Consulate, or were
not allowed by their employers to go. Another woman told me that she was afraid that she
would be fired, because she had cursed and shouted at her employer, who would not let her
take Thursday afternoon off. Desperate to see the president, she had left her employer's
house without permission, in a huff. By six p.m., as we continued waiting for Duterte’s
arrival, she was so anxious that she was twisting her hands, squeezing her fingers. “I really
have to go now,” she kept repeating, jumpy in her seat. “I need to walk my master’s dog.”
These stories exemplify how much getting a glimpse of Duterte mattered to most of
the people who had gathered there, and how their attendance, especially for those who were
expressly forbidden by their employers to go, represented something of a triumph. Such was
the emotional force that Duterte commanded, that some would even risk their jobs to share
an evening with him and his coterie, which included (in addition to those mentioned above)
presidential daughter and Davao City Mayor Sara Duterte, prominent social media campaign
propagandists (and by then, government officials) Mocha Uson and Lorraine Badoy,
Duterte’s aide (and later senator) Bong Go, Senator Imee Marcos, and other politicians and
entertainers. When Duterte finally arrived, flanked by a retinue of Hong Kong police in
black suits and ties, the audience was already primed to feel a profusion of emotions: pride,
anticipation, worry, delight, fear, gratitude, excitement, affirmation, adoration—which,
having simmered all afternoon, erupted with Duterte’s arrival. As the camera panned from
the stage to the audience, we saw on the large screen in front scenes of people jumping up
and down, whooping, crying in joy.
When I looked around me while politicians were giving speeches, I noticed that
most of the audience members did not even seem to be listening to what was being said.
They were chatting with their seatmates, or were on their phones, chatting with their friends
online, taking selfies with cute filters, posting content to Facebook, liking posts on
Facebook, commenting on each other’s posts. I seemed to be the only one listening with rapt
attention, taking notes. At first I thought that they paid scarce attention only because
someone else other than Duterte was speaking, but they exhibited the same behavior during
Duterte’s characteristically rambling speech. Whenever he cursed or made a lewd remark,
they would look up from their mobile phones for a little while and laugh or hoot and clap,
then abruptly go back to fiddling with their phones as the old man droned on and on. The
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content of Duterte's speech, soundbites from the likes of which are routinely reproduced in
the mass media and incessantly fact-checked, debated, and used to criticize the Duterte
administration's "illiberalism" and "fake news," seemed to matter less to the public to whom
it was spoken than the fact that Duterte and other important people came to commune with
the people there. It was enough that the event and its myriad entertainments evoked feelings
of delight and community among the Filipinos gathered in the hall, where class and
ethnolinguistic divisions for a few hours seemed to melt in the face of shared ardor for the
president. Of particular significance was the event's orchestration of direct and intimate
interactions between politicians and their electorate in the context of a stratified society that
severely constrains practices of direct democracy, and where often, one's political
representative does not represent one's political interests.
In my conversations with Duterte supporters, sentiments of love and care often come
up in relation to Duterte, constructed as the Tatay or Father of the nation. Usually, they speak
about his personal character, or at least their perceptions of him; as one of my interlocutors, a
woman, said, his tough-talking persona serves to hide his "pusong mamon" (soft heart;
“mamon” is a sponge cake), his sincerity and genuine care for the Filipino people. My
interlocutors explained away his failures to fulfill many of his campaign promises, including
the generation of employment that would have enabled them to make a decent living in the
Philippines; they said that people must be more patient with the president because he was old
and ailing, but that he was doing his best; that his heart was in the right place, and that we
should instead blame corrupt bureaucrats and corrupted bureaucratic processes. It seemed to
me that it is this seemingly unassailable faith in and devotion to Duterte as a person, as a
beloved father figure with whom they share intimate feelings of connection, more than the
pragmatic calculations of realpolitik, that shape the political consciousness and rationality of
those who support the president. As one of my interlocutors, a prominent member of a proDuterte group in Hong Kong, said, “We are loyal to Duterte only.” Who comprises this "we"
whose basis of collective identification seems to be their shared devotion to Duterte? Rather
than dismiss this sentiment as “fanaticism” (as anti-Duterte factions are wont to do), it may
be more productive to seek to understand how Dutertismo as a "populist" movement is
constructed and maintained, and the role political emotions play in generating a sense of
community, and agency.
To this end, it is instructive to consider the role of love in the constitution of the
political subjectivity and collective identity of self-identified "DDS" or Duterte Diehard
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Supporters.95 While the invocation of love is standard in rallying a citizenry, “love” in the
civic sense is usually mobilized in relation to such abstractions as nation, principles
(“freedom, “democracy,” “truth”), “our way of life”; in the Philippine cultural context,
“love” is usually conceived in relation to romantic partnership and the family. During
Duterte's meeting with Filipinos in Hong Kong, however, every speaker spoke of “love” as a
relationship between Duterte and the audience, between the president and “the people” who
voted him into power. The call-and-response dynamic between speaker and audience serves
to reinforce this affective bond. Take these interactions, for example:
Harry Roque: Namamatay daw ng tao si presidente. Totoo ba yan? [They say the
president kills people. Is that true?]
Audience: HINDI! [NO!]
Roque: Iparating ang pagmamahal kay Presidente Rodrigo Roa Duterte! [Let’s
convey our love to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte!]
Philip Salvador (an action star): Alam ko kung bakit andito kayo ngayon: MAHAL
NIYO SI DIGONG! [I know why you’re here now: YOU LOVE DIGONG!]
Audience: YES! YES! YES!
Salvador: Sana po ang pagmamahal na yan ay ‘wag niyong putulin. Dahil ang
pagmamahal niya sa inyo ay walang hangganan. Mabuhay ang ating presidente!
Kayo ang aming bayani. [I hope that you would not cut off that love. Because his
love for you is endless. Long live our president! You are our hero.] God bless us all.
When Duterte arrived, the Consul General relays the gratitude felt by Filipinos in
Hong Kong, telling him, “Ramdam na ramdam po ng ating mga kababayan ang
inyong tunay na pagmamahal sa OFWs at sa mga Pilipino.” [Our countrymates
earnestly feel your sincere love for OFWs and the Filipinos.]
After hours of such affective priming, at around 7 PM, the host announced that
Duterte was finally about to enter the event hall, and reminded the audience not to stand up
when Duterte arrived. Like the prohibition of materials for demonstration that did not appear
to favor the administration, this instruction served to create a spectacle of magnificence: the
official video of the event released by the Presidential Broadcast Staff - Radio-Television
Malacañang (PBS-RTVM) shows Duterte walking impressively down the aisle to the stage,
flanked by suit-clad members of Hong Kong’s elite VIP protection police unit, to the sound
“DDS” originated from the acronym for the Davao Death Squad, a vigilante group that is
alleged to have carried out thousands of summary executions of petty criminals, drug dealers, street
children, and political opponents during the tenure of Rodrigo Duterte and his children as mayors of
Davao City since the late 1980s. With Duterte’s rise to the presidency, the term “DDS” has been used
as a pejorative label for "Diehard Duterte Supporters"; self -identified “DDS” or "Digong Duterte
Supporters" also use this term as a marker of group identity and belonging; many pro -Duterte pages
and groups on Facebook use the acronym with pride.
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of swelling music and chants of Duterte! Duterte! From the crowd. 96 The mandate of PBSRTVM, which was established in 1987 upon former president Cory Aquino’s assumption of
office, is “to provide daily broadcast coverage of the activities of the President and the
Executive Branch as well as the First Family,”97 supposedly to better communicate to the
public the government’s policies, projects, and other matters of national importance; under
Duterte, this agency seems to fulfill the same function as wedding videographers: to present
cinematic narratives of the presidency, constituted by carefully curated images and
soundbites that create the sense of a meaningful and emotionally charged experience, in a
form that can be widely shared on social media, and watched again and again. Splicing
together tracking shots of the Hong Kong cityscape, choice bits from Duterte’s lengthy
speech that emphasize his commitment to serve Filipinos, close-up shots of members of the
audience with tears streaming down their faces, and personal interviews with ardent Duterte
supporters talking about how Duterte had made them feel touched, important, understood,
and cared for, the seven-minute video uploaded by Presidential Communications Office
conveyed a sense of reciprocal love and gratitude between Duterte and “the people”
represented by the audience.
Music plays a significant part in communicating this love. Duterte’s official
campaign song, “Para sa Tunay na Pagbabago" [For Real Change]98 is set to the tune of
Freddie Aguilar’s 1985 hit, "Ipaglalaban Ko" [For this I will fight], 99 a song about
transformative and everlasting love, a staple at Filipino weddings and karaoke parties. The
verses of “Para sa Tunay na Pagbabago" lament the corruption and crimes (rape, drugs,
thievery) characteristic of Philippine society’s dark past (“madilim na kahapon”), and
heralds a future where all Filipinos join hands to build a better society, rallying behind
Duterte’s transformative leadership. It continues to be played at events in honor of the
president. During the meeting in Hong Kong, it accompanied his entrance and exit. When
Duterte arrived, more than four hours after the start of the official program, only then was
Presidential Communications (Government of the Philippines), “Editor's Cut - President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,” April 14, 2018,
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=432427170550096 .
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the Philippine national anthem played, as if expressing love of country were contingent on
his presence. Indeed, in the rhetoric of Dutertismo, love of nation and love of the president
are conflated. I had never heard the national anthem, “Lupang Hinirang” ("Chosen Land")
sung so fervently by a crowd. Among the many musical performances, of note was the
performance of “Ikaw” [You],100 another popular wedding song about heaven-sent love, and
supposedly Duterte’s favorite ballad. In the middle of the song, the president stood up from
his seat with other officials onstage, took a microphone, walked to the velveted platform
facing him where the singer stood, and joined her in the duet, delighting the audience and
leaving many in tears. The woman beside me was weeping into her handkerchief. Cameras
panned the crowd, and the monitor above the stage showed close-up shots of crying faces.
As the song comes to end, the audience chants Duterte’s name again. In the midst of this
affectively charged space, where emotional expressions inundate bodies that mediate and
circulate stories and images of delight and affection in both physical and virtual
environments, I, despite my supposed critical stance and political views, also felt touched.
“Affective publics” is a term used by communications scholar Zizi Papacharissi to
refer to “networked publics that come together, are identified, and disband through shared
sentiment” 101 mediated by “platforms that invite affective attunement, support affective
investment, and propagate affectively charged expression,” 102 such as social networking
sites Facebook and Twitter. Unlike the normative Habermasian concept of “the public
sphere,” conceived as a unitary and coherent social space, mediated primarily by print
technology, in which rational deliberation, collective opinion- and will-formation, and the
legitimization of democratic forms of governance occur, the notion of “affective publics”
foregrounds the “relational, processual, and performative character”103 of discursive spaces
that come into being not “only in relation to texts and their circulation,” 104 but, more so,
100 OPM MTV VIDEO, “Ariel Rivera and Regine Velasquez Ikaw,” Youtube, March 25, 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z-c6MJ2ZhCM.
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through “the public display of affect” in homophilic networks 105 mediated by new
technologies and forms of expression and communication and organized around shared
emotions. In the case of Dutertismo, these emotions are primarily love for the "father," Tatay
Digong, as the representative of the "people," and hatred for his enemies, also conceived as
enemies of the "people."
How might we understand this "affective public," signified by the label "DDS," as
a political identity, instead of dismissing it as mere cultish and blind fanaticism, as it is often
framed in public discourse? In The Cultural Politics of Emotion (2004), Sara Ahmed writes
that “The work of emotion involves the ‘sticking’ of signs to bodies.”106 For Ahmed,
“emotions create the very effect of the surfaces and boundaries that allow us to distinguish
an inside and outside in the first place … it is through emotions, or how we respond to
objects and others, that surfaces and boundaries are made.”107 In contrast to the hardness of
Duterte's "The Punisher" image, it is the softness of his constitution as a symbolic father
figure that comes through, mediated by my interlocutors. This is not to discount the more
right-wing masculinist expressions of his persona, but to emphasize the "incommensurable
totality,"108 the excess that Duterte signifies, that cannot be fully grasped conceptually,
because, as a signifier, Duterte is made to stand for much more than he "actually" is.
Duterte's rambling and incoherent rhetoric, much lampooned in educated circles, contribute
to his "floating" quality as a signifier. In the ellipses and inconsistencies in his speech, the
listener is forced to make an interpretive intervention, guided by their own cognitive biases
and affective investment in Duterte as "good" or "bad." No wonder then, that when civil
society represents him as a liar, a fool, or a murderer, his populist publics can counter, "You
don't understand."
The "stickiness" of emotional association, which I argue is central to the constitution
of Dutertismo as a populist discourse, is not achieved spontaneously, which this chapter's
account of the practices of affective priming evidenced in Duterte's 2018 meeting with
Filipinos in Hong Kong might seem to suggest. Public interest in Rodrigo Duterte had been
cultivated as early as late November 2013, when the then mayor of Davao City came to
national attention for sending medical teams and trucks of relief aid marked "FROM THE
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PEOPLE OF DAVAO CITY" to the victims of Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda, one of the
strongest typhoons to make a landfall in recorded history, and arguably the most significant
disaster to undermine the Aquino presidency. 109 Mayor Duterte's prompt and demonstrative
response—"His voice cracking and almost in tears," as one news feature put it110 —which
was widely covered in the media, put him in a flattering light, especially in contrast to the
bungling response of the national government,111 or the opportunism of other government
officials who tried to capitalize on the disaster for political gain by marking public donations
with their names and faces. 112
Emotions and their signs, as Ahmed stresses, have a spatio-temporal dimension, and

"accumulate over time, as a form of affective value," "through the movement or circulation
of objects. Such objects become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and
social tension” in the process of their circulation. 113 That is to say that some signs "increase
in affective value as an effect of the movement between signs: the more they circulate, the
more affective they become, and the more they appear to ‘contain’ affect." 114 The affective
saturation of a sign, then, rises with the frequency and quantity of its repetition. Th is logic is
perhaps most evident in social media trends, where repetition and reaction (by retweets,
likes, or other reactions, for example) express engagement, as well as generate more
engagement through algorithmic logics. In the mediascapes of the digital age, the repetition
and circulation of signs may reach ever greater ranges and frequencies, especially if they
circulate among networked homophilic publics and social media echo chambers. In the
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aftermath of the Yolanda debacle, the media, especially in the 2015 run-up to the 2016
national elections, represented Duterte as a wildly popular local politician who wanted
nothing to do with national politics, but who was eventually persuaded by “the people” to
run for the presidency as their “last hope” to institute lasting and “real change” to Philippine
society. Streamers with messages urging him to run were hung around the National Capital
Region; videos of rallies held in support of his candidacy went viral on social media. When
Duterte finally did decide to run at the last minute, the myth circulated then was that
Duterte’s campaign was primarily funded by the masses, with Duterte supporters launching a
crowdfunding campaign program called “Piso Para Kay Duterte” (A Peso For Duterte). 115
Campaign materials, such as posters, banners, statement shirts, political ads, and songs, were
likewise crowdsourced or paid for by supporters, subverting the usual model of electoral
campaign spending, whereby candidates wooed votes with material incentives. It would later
emerge that the biggest donors to Duterte’s campaign were in fact big businessmen, 116 but
back in 2016, the dominant impression was that it was “the people,” “the masses,” who made
Duterte president. This impression also came with the sense of reciprocal obligation: the
masses made him president, so that Duterte would serve their interests.
Affective objects, in the case of Dutertismo, include physical campaign materials
and commodities such as baller bands, calendars, car stickers, fans, keychains, t-shirts,
tarpaulins, and the like that feature Duterte's image, campaign slogans, quotations, campaign
colors, etc., but also digital objects, such as Facebook banners and profile pictures, comics,
memes, petitions, copy-pasted "scripts" and other text, selfies and other photographs that
feature the Duterte's signature gesture, a clenched fist pushed forward. These objects serve
not only to limn collective identity and harden the boundaries of in-group and out-group
belonging; they also contribute to the emotional investment in such identities, and shape
relationality by evoking "(re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness’ in relation to
such objects.”117 For instance, a man pictured doing the "Duterte fist" in a viral group
photograph may immediately be labelled a "Dutertard" "fanatic" by anti-Duterte publics and
invested with emotions like anger and disappointment, even if the person pictured may have
only been forced by his superiors to perform the gesture, or fear censure by peers if he
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refused to conform. The reaction of "awayness" from the object by someone who opposes
Duterte is also an emotional one, but the charge of "irrationality" and "fanaticism" is often
reserved for the "DDS."
Ahmed writes, "emotionality as a claim about a subject or collective is clearly
dependent on relations of power, which endow ‘others’ with meaning and value." Rather
than thinking of "emotionality as a characteristic of bodies, whether individual or collective,"
Ahmed proposes that we "reflect on the processes whereby ‘being emotional’ comes to be
seen as a characteristic of some bodies and not others." 118 Understanding emotions as
political, and politics as emotional helps us apprehend political dynamics more clearly than
insisting on rationality as a democratic ideal and readily dismissing emotionality as ground
for "illiberalism." It also fosters awareness of how the repetition and circulation of
affectively saturated signs, including labels like "Dilawan" or "DDS," serves to deepen the
antagonistic divide that drives populism, and indeed to make it more durable through the
frequent and repeated performance of signs over time, like other institutionalized “social
forms (such as the family, heterosexuality, the nation, even civilization itself) [that] are
effects of repetition.”119
The 2018 meeting between Filipinos in Hong Kong and President Duterte that I have
described above illustrates how emotional expressivity and the online communication of
sentiment are central to the conjuration of a collective "populist" identity grounded in
support for Duterte. In the discussion below, I describe how this collective identity,
fashioned largely through online networks with their algorithmic tendency to reinforce
particular worldviews and biases, also influence political movement offline. To illustrate this
dynamic, I consider moments of conflict between Filipino activists in Hong Kong who
oppose Duterte, and members of a prominent pro-Duterte group, both of whom conducted
simultaneous rallies in Chater Road in the summer of 2020, two years after Duterte's visit.

Shows of Patriotism in Two Zoom Meetings
The kalampagan (protest noise barrage) held by Filipino migrant workers in Central
on the last Sunday of July 2020 was scheduled a day before Duterte’s fifth and penultimate
State of the Nation Address (SONA), and a day after the implementation of stricter social
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distancing measures by the Hong Kong Government amid the “third wave” of COVID-19
cases in the city, a policy that has constricted the protest actions of both local and migrant
activists.
The SONA is an annual report made by the Chief Executive to Congress about “the
status of the country, … [and] the government’s agenda for the coming year”; it is also often
used as an avenue for the president to officially propose or request the prioritization of
“certain legislative measures” in accordance with executive objectives and plans.120 This
constitutional obligation and tradition dates back to the American colonial period at the turn
of the 20th century, when the American Governor-General of the Philippine Insular
Government issued reports to an executive assigned by the President of the United States.
When the Philippine Commonwealth government was created in 1935 (as part of the
“Filipinization” of the colonial bureaucracy and the movement toward independence under
American democratic “tutelage”), the annual report came to be made by the Philippine
Commonwealth President to the Congress. The political scientist Arjan Aguirre writes that as
a political practice, “the SONA should be understood as a brief moment where symbolism,
pageantry, and grandeur converge with the f ormalities, rigidities, and scrupulousness of
institutions of power. The event is an annual performative display of both excesses of power
and its deficiencies” 121 ; more than providing so-called “objective and comprehensive
information about our society,”122 the SONA, which convenes the highest officials of the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches, is meant to showcase the efficacy of the
government and especially of the chief executive in its trumping up of administrative
accomplishments and plans. As a yearly occasion for nationally televised and
spectacularized state propaganda and pageantry, 123 the SONA is a valuable opportunity to
boost or revitalize the present administration’s political cachet. It also gives
minority/opposition groups a chance to voice their frustrations with the government. Indeed,
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the annual SONA demonstrations by leftist and civil society groups are traditionally one of
the biggest protests of the year, participated in by Filipinos domestically and worldwide.
I arrived in Central at searing midmorning on the day of the scheduled SONA
protest and headed to Chater Road, where the kalampagan is usually held, and found the
activists gathered under the shade of the enclosed and air-conditioned footbridge connecting
Prince’s Building and The Mandarin Oriental. Everyone was wearing a bright red “campaign
shirt” with slogans like “Serve The People,” “Trabaho sa Pinas, Hindi sa Labas” (Jobs in
the Philippines, Not Outside), and “Makibaka! Wag Matakot!” (Join the Fight! Don’t be
Afraid!”), preparing or holding up banners, and taking photos. Unfurled on the ground or
strung along sidewalk railings were tarpaulins about the labor organizations’ campaigns for
the rights of workers, women, and indigenous peoples/minority groups in the Philippines.
Beside some of these tarpaulins prepared by the activist umbrella organization UNIFILMIGRANTE-HK were tarpaulins put up by the Emilio Aguinaldo DDS group (the most
prominent local pro-Duterte organization) extolling the Duterte government’s
accomplishments (such as cash aid for Overseas Filipino Workers who have recently lost
their jobs in the wake of the pandemic), or reproducing praises by officials of other
countries, such as China, Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands, supposedly lauding the
Duterte government’s efforts to curb drug-related crimes, uphold human rights, improve
mechanisms for accountability, and widen access to social services like education and health
care.124 The activists have often told me how sometimes, Sunday mornings feel like a race
between them and the Emilio DDS members in putting up tarpaulins around Central. Some
of them who live in the area go to Chater Road as early as 5:30 or 6:00 a.m. in order to be
the first to put up campaign materials and to occupy spaces around the protest site.

Such propaganda is decried by the activists as “fake news”; however, my aim here is not to
prove or disprove the veracity of these statements, but to point out the competing and conflicting
narratives that circulated within and are circulated by “pro -Duterte” and “anti-Duterte” groups in
Hong Kong.
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Fig. 1.2. Top: Tarpaulins by UNIFIL-MIGRANTE-HK. Bottom: Tarpaulins by the Emilio Aguinaldo
DDS praising the Duterte administration, strung beside tarpaulins protesting extrajudicial killings.
Taken by the author on July 26, 2020.

One of the activists, who is in charge of events documentation and online
propaganda, asked me to take photographs of the “lightning protest” while she took care of
filming it. From days of observing their protest activities, I understood that I was to take
photographs carefully; the writing on the placards and tarpaulins must be clearly seen, and I
was to direct people within the frame to pose in such a way as to make for a more aesthetic
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composition. After all, the primary purpose of these photographs was not just
documentation, but, more importantly, online dissemination. The better the photograph
composition and quality, the more likely it would be shared. Such sharing is important not
just to communicate the demands of the activist organizations, but also to counter the
narratives and images posted by Duterte supporters online, who defend Duterte by
representing the activists as rude and rowdy, a noisy nuisance and an embarrassment not just
for the Philippine but also for the Hong Kong government. More dangerous than this
"pasaway" or unruly narrative is the "red-tagging" of activists, or their association with the
Maoist insurgency in the Philippines, which the government has designated a "terrorist"
organization. Because of the threats of red-tagging, which has led to numerous activists in
the Philippines being killed by law enforcement agents or their suspected allied civilian
militias, the relations between Filipino activists and the pro-Duterte groups in Hong Kong
are rife with tension and distrust, which sometimes break out in conflict.
In one protest program I attended in June 2020, for example, speakers from the
Promotion of Church People’s Response and MIGRANTE-Hong Kong were interrupted by
an onlooker, identified to be from a pro-Duterte group. The apparently drunken man walked
into the protest circle and argued with the speakers, until the organizers ushered him away.
The activists said that they had been experiencing such disruption of their activities,
especially since they became more vocal with their criticisms of the Duterte administration.
This began in late 2017, when the Philippine government rejected the appointment of
activists to key cabinet positions concerning social welfare and agrarian reform, and
intensified in succeeding years as the Duterte administration abrogated peace talks with the
National Democratic Front and began more actively repressing leftist groups, indigenous
peoples, and rights activists. In the weeks previous to that afternoon’s protest
demonstration, members of the Emilio Aguinaldo DDS had been putting up tarpaulins in
Central, charging prominent activist groups and NGOs as communists and fronts for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the New People’s Army
(NPA), and calling them “terrorists.” The protest program ended with a round of noisemaking in the street, with protesters banging pots and pans, playing metal gongs, shaking
bottles filled with coins, chanting “Junk Terror Law” and “Oust, oust Duterte!” At the
periphery of the protest circle, where other migrant domestic workers congregated, Duterte
supporters booed the activists, shouting “Duterte! Duterte!”, shaking their fists in the air. In a
subsequent clash the following week, Duterte supporters would bring more speakers, trying
to drown out the protest program with birit (sustained high notes) songs on karaoke and
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raunchy dancing to budots (Pinoy EDM) music. Once again, the soundscape turned into a
clashing of calls and voices, each side trying to drown out the other.
The next phase of the SONA protest that day was to be conducted on Zoom,
convening labor leaders and members of MIGRANTE chapters in various
countries/territories in the Asia-Pacific (including Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, South Korea,
Japan, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand). The purpose of this Zoom meeting/protest
was to “speak out” about the real “state of the nation” in diasporic contexts as a counterpoint
to what the activists called the Duterte administration’s “pack of boasts and lies.”125 Hence,
the Zoom protest program, which lasted for two hours, mostly consisted of speeches by labor
leaders about the experiences and predicaments of migrant workers under the governments
of the Philippines and of their host countries. For those who could not get into Zoom or who
did not have earphones or whose phone batteries were running low, a bluetooth speaker
connected to someone’s smartphone broadcast the online rally to surrounding participants.

Fig. 1.3 Activists preparing for the Zoom protest. Taken by the author on July 26, 2020.

“Duterte’s SONA is a pack of boasts and lies – Filipinos in Asia Pacific,” Kodao
Productions, July 27, 2020, https://kodao.org/dutertes-sona-is-a-pack-of-boasts-and-lies-filipinos-inasia-pacific/.
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Every now and then, police carrying banners and loudspeakers blasting government
COVID-19 advisories would walk by to ensure that migrants were maintaining social
distancing or else face a fixed fine of 2,000 HKD. Members of the activist groups,
megaphones in hand, did the same, walking around and conveying the advisories in Tagalog
for their fellow MDWs, many of whom disregarded social distancing rules when there were
no police officers around. At around noon, a huge group of Filipinos in white t-shirts, all
bearing the logo “HPC HK” and the text “Humanitarian Group Para sa Bayan [For the
Nation],” formed a line in front of the pro-Duterte tarpaulins (right beside where the
MIGRANTE activists were having lunch) and raised their fists in the familiar DDS salute.
Although many of those having lunch seemed aghast at the proximity of this huge group, the
activists whispered to each other to not engage with the Duterte supporters and avoid
conflict.

Fig. 1.4 Duterte supporters doing the DDS fist pump. Taken by the author on July 26, 2020.

Towards the end of the protest program at around three in the afternoon, I saw
women walking by as if in procession, carrying a huge tarpaulin with the image of a fist
(Duterte’s emblem) in the colors of the Philippine flag, and with the words “Tatak ng
Pagbabago” (Mark/Stamp of Change) and “Pagkalinga at Pagmamahal” (Care and Love),
Duterte’s campaign taglines. I thought immediately that they were members of the Emilio
Aguinaldo DDS, not just because of the taglines but also because of the nationalist symbols
they carried, and ran after them to the other side of Chater Road, near The Cenotaph, where
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they put down the tarpaulin and went back to listening to a Zoom meeting126 on their
phones.
Introducing myself as a student researching (in part) the politics of migrant Filipino
workers in Hong Kong, I asked them about their event. They were kind and welcoming and
offered to discuss their perspectives and let me take photos of their activities, which included
musical performances and dance numbers and speeches by leaders of pro-Duterte
organizations and government officials, punctuated by the collective repetition of "We love
you Tatay Digong," in much the same way as the activists shouting "Oust oust Duterte."
Jinnie (not her real name) confirmed that they were members of the Emilio
Aguinaldo DDS, a pro-Duterte group named after the Philippines’ first president, who for
them, like Duterte, led a "revolutionary" government. She showed me the t-shirt she was
wearing, which had Duterte’s face, Philippine national symbols (the Philippine flag and the
Philippine eagle), and the phrases “LET’S UNITE HELP OUR GOVERNMENT” in front,
and the statements “HANDS OFF! OUR CHILDREN” and “Stop Deceptive Recruitment” at
the back. When I asked her about what her shirt meant, she said that it was a protest against
the recruitment activities of “terrorist” organizations like the CPP-NDF-NPA (Communist
Party of the Philippines - National Democratic Front - National People’s Army) and other
leftist and human rights activist groups among the youth in high schools and universities
around the Philippines. She was strongly opposed to the “deception” of children by
communist insurgents who, she said, only wished to destabilize the country, murder soldiers
and civilians, and cultivate lawlessness in the countryside.
The politicization (or, in Jinnie's terms, brainwashing) of Filipino youth is an
especially emotionally triggering issue for OFW parents, who live apart from their families
and often leave their children in the care of relatives. While today’s communication
technologies have somewhat eased the pains of distance, the social costs of a considerable
chunk of the adult population working overseas to support their families back in the
Philippines is well-documented. The Duterte administration’s preoccupation with the
politicization of technologically savvy youth may also be considered in the context of recent,
prominent youth-driven political upheavals in other countries in the region, such as Taiwan,
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Hong Kong, and Thailand, and the historical role of student movements in demanding and
enacting social change.

Fig. 1.5. T-shirt worn by a member of the Emilio Aguinaldo Duterte Diehard Supporters on the day of
their 2020 SONA rally.
Taken by the author on July 26, 2020.

Explaining why she supported the president, Jinnie began by describing Duterte as a
“very radical” leader who was unlike any other president before him—because he was from
Mindanao, outside the usual national elite power circles concentrated in Manila high society.
She said that Duterte was the first “leftist” president. Because of his radical political stance,
she explained, he was often misunderstood. She said that his so-called “violent and
dangerous” speech was mere joking, not to be taken seriously; that he may appear rough and
brutish and “iron-fisted” on the outside, but that what he truly is was someone that was
“malambot ang puso” (soft-hearted), close to “the people” and fond of his children.
Whenever he publicly made death threats during official events, she explained, it was only
out of his anger for corrupt officials who abused their power and stole from the people.
Asked what she thought about the criticisms levied against Duterte, Jinnie said that
all resistance and censure faced by the president was the expected result of his attempts to
overhaul the structures of society and change an entire corrupt system that perpetuated the
exploitation of “maliliit na tao” (little people, the powerless in society). She said that it was
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the fault of “the bureaucracy,” not of Duterte, that the “change” he had promised since his
campaign for the presidency in 2016 has been so slow in coming—she said it took so much
time and work to weed out and hold to account corrupt officials in various government
agencies, when there are regulations (systems of checks and balances) in place that
safeguarded them. This was why, she said, she favored the president’s “decisive” approach
to governance—to implement accountability, she believed, one needed to override the
bureaucracy and its systems of checks and balances exploited by powerful and corrupt
officials. People must be more patient with the president, Jinnie said, because not only was it
difficult to root out corrupt officials, but his difficult job was made harder by his age and ill
health.127 Despite these, Jinnie said, he continued to do his best and work tirelessly for the
benefit of Filipinos, because “mahal na mahal niya tayo” (he loves us very much). Every
now and then she would pause our conversation to curl her hand into a fist and shout “We
love you Tatay [Father]!” into her Zoom screen.
When I asked her how she came to love Duterte so much, Jinnie told me about
Duterte’s visits to Hong Kong in 2017 and 2018 to meet migrant Filipino workers,
particularly about how touched she and her friends were that they were treated to a buffet at
the Grand Hyatt Hotel, seated among business elites, and given equal treatment with the rich
and powerful. She described how warm and approachable and not “pa-sosyal”—or “high
society”—Duterte and his family and officials were. She said that no other Filipino official
had done that for them in all her years of working in Hong Kong since 1994. She
emphasized that, contrary to what some of the activists say, the Emilio Aguinaldo DDS are
not paid for their support by the NTF-ELCAC, the task force created by Duterte to combat
“communism”; that even the banners her group puts up around Central were paid for with
their members’ own money, and that some of them even had to borrow money to contribute
to their organization’s campaigns. She also said that their loyalty was to Duterte alone, and
that no other official or government agency could tell them what to do or “use” them,
because it was Duterte's "courage" that made them feel proud to be Filipino. As in Duterte’s
meeting with the Filipino community in Hong Kong in 2018, discussed above, the Emilio
Aguinaldo DDS members’ “love” for the country is expressed as love for Duterte as the
country’s representative and “father.” This identification of the nation with Duterte is a
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hallmark of government propaganda, devolved through various levels of the bureaucracy,
and disseminated through multimedia channels, not only by official government agencies
such as the PCOO, but, more importantly, by celebrities and social media influencers.
Whether or not recognized pro-Duterte organizations are directly or indirectly
funded by taxpayers’ money was something I could not verify; however, it seemed important
to Jinnie that the “purity” of their intentions be communicated to me, as she emphasized that
they supported President Duterte and his policies out of sincere faith in and love for the man.
She and her companions said that they felt insulted that their volunteerism was muddled by
the attribution of mercenary motives (a narrative that I often hear from my interlocutors in
the activist organizations allied with MIGRANTE).
Jinnie also told me about the United Filipino Global, a pro-Duterte alliance of OFW
groups worldwide, and how they have a “direct line” to Filipino officials and agencies
dealing with OFW concerns, which partly explains why many DDS feel personally cared for
by the government. In this way, these pro-Duterte organizations, embedded in a global
"alliance" of Duterte supporters, cultivate a sense of agency and proximity to power, which
contributes to the feelings of pride that OFWs feel in their identities as OFWs and Duterte
supporters. This complicates the picture of "blind" or "fanatic" individual allegiance to or
identification with Duterte, as the agency of these Duterte supporters emerge out of their
being part of a homophilic network of organizations, who are a privileged public for officials
in the Duterte administration. This personalistic approach to power, which rests on direct
communication between publics and officials in government, was evident in the way Jinnie
talked about ABS-CBN, a telecommunications network whose franchise was rejected by the
president’s allies in Congress that year. She said that the company officials should have
personally approached and pleaded with Duterte for the renewal of their franchise, as if it
were naturally a matter of the personal beneficence of the president, rather than of
compliance with trade regulations and other laws.
My conversation with Jinnie that day, juxtaposed with my fieldwork with the
activists, impressed upon me the divergent and polarized information ecosystems/epistemes
inhabited by “pro-Duterte” and “anti-Duterte” groups, and how, despite their shared class
interests, the difference in their worldviews becomes anchored on and exacerbated by their
contrary positions on the matter of governance under Duterte, and the sort of information and
channels that their political and affectively charged positions lead them to engage with.
When it comes to issues such as the war on drugs, state “exactions,” and the government’s
militarized COVID-19 response, the same set of “facts” get wildly different interpretations
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depending on whom you ask and which political camp they belong to. The DDS distrust
“mainstream” “oligarchic” media channels, as well as alternative “communist” news
sources, including Facebook pages of leftist activists. The only source that their DDS group
seemed to trust for news about Philippine affairs is the Philippine government, because they
“know” and trust the officials who regularly speak with them “directly”—through, for
example, Facebook Live and now Zoom—about national affairs and government services.
The activists, too, are skeptical of “mainstream” “liberal” media, and have a tendency to
dismiss positions critical of the National Democratic (ND) left as ignorant, “backward,”
“reactionary,” “liberal,” or “Trotskyist,” often taking the latter ideological positions as
automatically “wrong,” without plumbing the substance of the arguments made from those
standpoints.
Interestingly, despite her praise for Duterte's "leftist" agenda, Jinnie asserted that the
ND leftist activists, whom she identified with the NPA and "communists," cannot be trusted
because they were in cahoots with “oligarchs,” who funded their political activities—a
contradiction that makes sense when framed by populism’s binaristic logic. When I
mentioned to her that I was there when DDS members disrupted a protest against the AntiTerrorism Law the other week and heckled the activists, Jinnie explained that those hecklers
were not actually members of Emilio Aguinaldo DDS. She said they were "hardcore Marcos
loyalists" who hated Vice-President Leni Robredo (who had defeated the Marcos scion
Bongbong Marcos for the vice-presidency in 2016) and supported Duterte because Duterte
allied with the Marcoses. Indeed, Jinnie said that she and other members of Emilio
Aguinaldo DDS often served as intermediaries between the labor activists and the Marcos
loyalists whenever conflict between them broke out. By this one can see that the antagonistic
binary tags deployed in populist discourses, like "DDS" or "Dutertard" vs. "Liberal" or
"Dilawan" (Yellow, a color associated with the Liberal Party and pro-democracy activists
especially in the 1980s), serve to obscure the often complex dynamics of political alignments
on the ground. In the effacement of the distinctions between "activists," militant
"communists," and "oligarchs" by Duterte supporters, and between "liberals," "Dilawan,"
and anyone critical of the ND left by many of the activists I spoke with, we see populist
rhetoric at work: logics of equivalence unify actually disparate interests groups, hardening
the antagonistic frontier between "Us" and "Them."
Both groups, however, perform their own understandings of nationalism. The dance
and song performances that the members of the Emilio Aguinaldo DDS staged for their proDuterte Zoom rally, for example, highlighted themes of patriotism, unity, Pinoy pride,
migrant pride, service to the nation expressed as support for government policy, and, most
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importantly, love for Duterte. A similar call-and-response mechanism is observable in the
ND activists’ Zoom rally, but the latter’s refrains were typical tibak (activist) calls, like
“Makibaka! Huwag Matakot!” (Join the Fight, Do Not Fear), "Lupa, Bahay, Trabaho"
(Land, Housing, Work), and “Oust Oust Duterte!” For the activists, “nationalism”
consisted in struggling for the welfare of the masses, even if that meant attacking the
government, which they saw as an executor of elite interests. This common thread of
nationalism, however, may explain why many of the most committed members of the Emilio
Aguinaldo DDS had been long-time, active members of the "makakaliwa" (leftist) labor
activist organizations in Hong Kong. They broke away from those activist groups (or were
forced out) once MIGRANTE and its allied organizations, who had initially welcomed
Duterte’s pro-worker promises and conciliatory gestures toward the ND left during the
campaign period and his early presidency, levied criticism against the Duterte government.
Jinnie and her colleagues (Chris and Ning)128 explained their position and reasoning for
leaving MIGRANTE in favor of their current pro-Duterte group. Mainly, they said that they
could “feel” that the government under Duterte was working for their interests, and so they
wished to support it. Like the activists, their aspiration was to be reunited with their families
in the Philippines and be able to work in the home country; for them, supporting the Duterte
administration’s program of development was the way to realize this aspiration. With both
the DDS and the activists, I saw how practices and feelings of love, community, care, and
pride animated their "paninindigan" (stance).
Contrary to the popular characterization of them by civil society and leftist groups,
the self-identified DDS I spoke with were not simply "stupid" or "fanatical." Jinnie, who was
a chemistry and physics teacher back in the Philippines, was articulate and compelling in her
answers to my questions and evidenced great reflexivity about what I, who had introduced
myself as critical of Duterte, might think of her and her group. Another of my DDS
interlocutors, Ning, runs a global DDS Facebook group whose mission it is to coordinate
with the Philippine Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) in assisting OFWs
in emergencies. She does this on a volunteer basis, saying that though it was often very
tiring, she gained a sense of fulfillment in helping her fellow migrant workers —a sentiment I
also often heard from my leftist interlocutors. Chris, another member of the Emilio Aguinaldo

DDS group, and who sang the patriotic song "Bayan Ko" ("My Country") for their Zoom
rally, is a longtime activist for LGBTQ and migrant labor rights in Hong Kong.
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55

Before leaving them to go back to and talk with the MIGRANTE activists, I asked
Jinnie and her friends if I could tell MIGRANTE members about our conversation in case
they asked me what I was doing with "the other side," and Jinnie said that I could, even
though she knew that we would not be able to change each other's minds about Duterte. She
told me that I might even serve as a kind of bridge between our two groups. I answered that
that was a tall order, since the perspectives of both camps were so contrary that there seemed
no way to reconcile them. When I returned to the part of Chater Road that the activists
occupied, they asked me what I talked about with the DDS members, and warned me to be
more careful in approaching them. They said that DDS members tended to doxx people who
were critical of Duterte, or circulate photos of them with insults and curses. The activists
expressed palpable anger and resentment against the DDS members, from whom they had
suffered verbal abuse and other forms of harassment, online and offline. Despite this
resentment, they also said that Duterte supporters were, ultimately, to be pitied, because they
were “bulag,” or blind to the fact of their victimization—a sentiment that contrasted with the
sense of empowerment I observed that the Duterte supporters felt and reveled in.
The mutual distrust and antagonism between those who identify themselves as proDuterte and anti-Duterte has been cultivated by years of a constant barrage of emotionally
triggering and polarizing discourse about the never-ending 24/7 news cycle churning reports
on outrage after outrage, and their afterlives in social media. Political polarization and the
kind of emotional shock-exhaustion that stops thought seems to have become so effective
that a pro-Duterte/anti-Duterte discursive structure now commonly frames political
discussions in and about the Philippines under Duterte. On that day of the two Zoom
meetings, for example, I took the same set of facts to Duterte supporters convening on one
end of the road, and to the activists critical of Duterte on the other end. I asked both groups
about the same set of facts about such issues as the ABS-CBN shutdown and corruption in
PhilHealth, and they interpreted them in different ways, with different sources and means of
justification, despite a few common themes and agenda (e.g. anti-corruption, pro-people
development, government provision of social services, etc.). Often, the contradictions boil
down to both camps insisting that the other is misinformed, or stupid, or deluded. Often,
their justifications boil down to the question of whom they trust, whose information or
testimony or analysis bears believing.
Duterte supporters see the president as a "radical" leader, the realization of whose
vision is hobbled by a bloated and ineffectual bureaucracy that is often exploited by the elite
and corrupt public officials for private gain. To them, for the Duterte administration to
achieve "radical" aims like agrarian reform and full governmental decentralization and local
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autonomy through federalism, Duterte must become dictator first (i.e. be unhobbled by said
bureaucracy and its by-laws as enshrined in the present constitution). Many of the DDS I've
spoken with agreed that the government bureaucracy is corrupted by oligarchic interests—
which, to them, is all the more reason to upend it and to concentrate executive, legislative,
and juridical powers in Duterte, whom they see as incorruptible, for pro-people development
to be realized.

In this chapter, I have discussed the significance of emotions in the constitution of
Dutertismo as a populist movement and discourse. Adding to existing studies on anxious
populist publics, I paid particular attention to how the cultivation of "positive" emotions,
such as love, joy, and fellow-feeling in homophilic groups and networks has sustained
support for Duterte, who comes to represent the "small people," the nation, and the dream of
development that has long been deferred. However, contrary to analyses that privilege
rational deliberation in the conduct of politics and consider emotions as a danger to
democracy, I maintain that emotionality should not be taken as separable from rationality,
especially in our present information ecosystem, where biases of whatever ideological stripe
tend to be algorithmically reinforced, where the credibility of traditional sources of
information has been put to question, and the importance of interpersonal trust and personal
affinity with the purveyors of information rises. Instead, a serious consideration of the
emotions that have animated support for Duterte is necessary for a proper appreciation of the
embodied experience of social ills that have long plagued Philippine society—problems that
perhaps have become so normalized that it took the rise to power of a figure so extremely the
opposite of the ideals of liberalism to shock civil society into seeing mass politics anew.
I will return to the question of democracy and mass politics in Chapter 5. In the
following chapter, I examine the "problem-space" of the nation through contemporary
Philipine novels in English as a context for Dutertismo's mobilization of an alternative
discourse of nationalism—one positioned against dominant liberal-elite nationalism—and
anti-imperialism to unite different interest groups that propelled Duterte’s electoral success.
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2. THE NOVEL AND THE NATION

The opening ceremony of the 2019 Southeast Asian Games, hosted by the
Philippines, is emblematic of the “official” ways in which the story of the archipelagic nation
is often told.129 The cultural productions that heralded the games, divided into four suites
featuring dances, songs, and parades, followed the structure of most Philippine history
textbooks, telling the story of nation-formation in linear fashion, from pre-colonial to
contemporary times.130 After the singing of “Lupang Hinirang” (“Chosen Land”), the
Philippine national anthem, came the first suite, titled “Ugat ng Ating Lakas” / “The Roots of
Our Strength”: a series of warrior and courtly dances culled from the traditions o f indigenous
tribes across the country: from the pattong of the Kalinga people of the mountainous
Cordilleras in the north, to the sarimanok and singkil of the Maranao people from Lanao, the
ginum of the Bagobo from the highlands of Davao, and the sagayan from Muslim
Maguindanao in the south, as well as a demonstration of the pre-Hispanic martial art of arnis
by dancers costumed as pintados, tattooed tribal warriors from the Visayas. These
demonstrations of bravery, mettle, and grace were followed by the second suite titled
“Dangal” / "Honor," where the Southeast Asian delegates, waving tiny flags of their country,
were ushered onto the stage with a procession of Filipina beauty queens styled in the
religious pageantry of the Santacruzan, as dancers in Spanish colonial-era attire performed to
cheerful instrumental music. The third suite, “Sigla” / “The Energy of the People,” showed a
traditional bahay kubo (nipa hut) being carried onto the stage, representing the
characteristically “Filipino” spirit of “bayanihan” (communality and mutual aid), as two
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A videorecording of the opening ceremony, held on November 30, 2019 at the Philippine
Arena in Bulacan, may be watched on Youtube. See “FULL VIDEO: Opening Ceremony of the 30th
Southeast Asian Games,” Youtube, GMA News, December 1, 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=812xnfJWR80.
130 As Reynaldo Ileto writes, "an examination of all modern history textbooks will reveal that
they contain the following categories and chronological sequence: a Golden Age (pre-Hispanic
society), the Fall (i.e., the conquest by Spain in the sixteenth century), the Dark Age (seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries), Economic and Social Development (nineteenth century), the Rise of Nationalist
Consciousness (post-1872), the Birth of the Nation (1898), and either Suppressed Nationalism or
Democratic Tutelage (post-1901, the U.S. Regime). Either 1872 or 1896 — the year of the Katipunan
revolt against Spain —is the linchpin of several binary oppositions structuring such texts:
forward/backward, reason/superstition, enlightenment/enslavement, modern/traditional,
religion/progress, and so forth. To put it another way, sometime in the late nineteenth century there is
seen to be a breakthrough, a movement forward out of darkness and subjection, toward progress,
independence, and the Philippine nation-state." Ileto, "Outlines of a Nonlinear Emplotment of
Philippine History," in The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital, ed. Lisa Lowe and David
Lloyd (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997), 100.
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balladeers performed a tender romantic duet, in the fashion of a harana or courtship
serenade, suggesting that the vitality of the Filipino people derives from their love of
community, and communities of love. After these “traditional” cultural forms and the
representative cultural values they carried followed the more “modern” performances of
OPM (Original Pinoy Music) rap and hip hop, with Filipino-American rapper apl.de.ap
singing about Pinoy pride and the hardships that drive and characterize diasporic Filipino
experience. The ceremony concluded with the final segment of the production, called
“Pagkakaisa” / “Unity,” recalling to the stage all the previous performers for the 2019 SEA
Games’ official theme song, “We Win as One,” promoting the idea of shared “roots … old
and new,” a “common dream” and “future” “forged” through the “joyful echoing of bonds”
and the “combined power” of the participants. 131
The production’s message of strength through unity despite plurality and differences
in language, customs, religion, ideology, and state forms is addressed to the diverse peoples
of Southeast Asia, but it may also well apply to the various “peoples” of the Philippines. The
creative director of the opening ceremony, Floy Quintos, stated that he wanted “to showcase
aspects of our culture that many modern Filipinos know little about … I felt very strongly
that the show should be inclusive of our Animist, Islamic and Pre-Hispanic peoples. … To
my mind, these choices pay homage to the most marginalized and neglected … a reminder of
the enduring nobility of the marginalized and their current struggle for survival.”132 The
debates about the violence inherent in the decontextualization and appropriation of lumad
(indigenous/tribal) and Islamic people’s cultures even as they are dispossessed of their
ancestral lands and persecuted by the state will not be rehearsed here. But it is worth
emphasizing how telling Quintos’ statement is about the development of “official”
nationalism in the Philippines, whose institutions and representations have tended to eclipse
the cultural identities, histories, and traditions of non-Christian Filipinos, especially those
beyond the purview of “Imperial Manila.”
The effacement or tokenization of non-Tagalog groups as historical agents in
mainstream representations of Philippine history, culture, and society except as touristic
2019 South East Asian Games Philippines, “2019 SEAG PH Official Theme Song WE WIN
AS ONE,” Youtube, October 30, 2019,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sg5St9pGdfA&ab_channel=2019SouthEastAsianGamesPhilippin
es
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“showcases” of local color and cultural diversity, is evident in canonical anti-colonial
nationalist historiography as represented by Teodoro Agoncillo’s History of the Filipino
People, the most popular (if not the most important or critically acclaimed) work of its
kind.133 Agoncillo’s telling of the “origin story” of the modern Philippine nation, which
emphasizes cultural differences among the peoples of various regions in the archipelago and
the supremacy of familial or “tribal” loyalties over other, larger forms of social
identification, point to the enduring sense that “Filipino-ness” has never been satisfactorily
defined in any unitary way. Rather than being based on shared ethnicity, language, or
customs, Filipino “identity” has always been mixed, mottled, mongrel.
Yet such plurality is effaced and flattened in his subsequent telling of national
history as the history of Manila, its suburbs, and surrounding provinces. This “unifying”
narrative is memorialized not only in textbooks but also in symbols and pedagogical
institutions of the nation. For example, the Philippine flag, sewn in Hong Kong by exiled
leaders of the late-nineteenth century revolutionary movement against Spain, features three
stars (representing the main island groups of Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao) and an eightrayed sun. The eight rays represent the provinces that supposedly first revolted against
Spanish rule: Bataan, Batangas, Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, Manila, Nueva Ecija, and
Pampanga, all in the Tagalog areas of Luzon. Though there might be earlier anti-colonial
uprisings elsewhere in the Philippines, they are not recognized as such; rather Agoncillo
characterizes them as rebellions stemming from personal or religious grievances. To read
Agoncillo’s History as a Filipino from outside the Tagalog region is to learn almost nothing
about one’s local history.
Nationalist historiography and symbolism are just two examples of the many ways
by which other provincial and ethnolinguistic identities have been repressed or erased in the
project of constructing the nation. I mention this not to advocate for more "inclusive"
historiography, but because this epistemic violence inherent in the nation project is a huge
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First appearing in 1960 as a mimeographed textbook titled A Short History of the Filipino
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part of what fueled the support for Duterte, who presented himself as a champion of various
marginalized groups (in terms of geography, class, ethnolinguistic identity, and even gender,
if one thinks in terms of wounded masculinity), even as the discourse of Dutertismo also
emphasizes the importance of "national unity" (as evident in the language it employs, such as
"We win as one," "We heal as one," "whole-of-nation approaches," etc.) for the achievement
of "progress" and "development," with "national unity" in this discourse being interpreted as
trust in and support for President Duterte, who, like the Philippine eagle and the Philippine
flag, is represented as the embodiment of the nation.

The Problem of the Nation-State Form in the Postcolonial World
This chapter considers the representations of the Philippine nation in contemporary
novels about the Philippines that are written by members of the Filipino diaspora as an entry
point to examining notions of identity, belonging, nationhood, and nationalism, in the
context of debates regarding the “elitist” orientation of the “official” nationalism promoted
by the state and its pedagogical institutions. While thinkers such as Benedict Anderson and
Chen Kuan-Hsing recognize the affective power of “nation” in invigorating anti-colonial
struggle and the dignification of the cultural identities of the formerly colonized (who often
remain marginalized in the present world order), they have also, after scholars such as
Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, and Arjun Appadurai, cautioned against the identitarian
tendencies of the nationalism propounded by dominant groups in the post-independence
states of the “Third World.” As Chen Kuan Hsing writes in Asia as Method: Toward
Deimperialization,
Shaped by the immanent logic of colonialism, third-world nationalism inevitably
produced racial and ethnic discrimination … The ruling elites, struggling against
each other to replace the colonial regime and gain state power, mobilized preexisting
ethnic and regional differences to their advantage. … The national bourgeoisie
continues to govern by exercising colonial tactics, dividing and ruling, for example,
by exploiting ethnic differences. The situation has forced us to question the
legitimacy of using … ethnic distinctions to justify any form of government. To put
it crudely, is it more legitimate to be ruled by an insider than an outsider? 134
This distinction between “inside” and “outside” surfaces the essentially exclusionary
character of “nation.” Who belongs to the nation, and who decides the principles of
belonging? Many of the nation-states of the “Old World” came to be through centuries of
Kuan-Hsing Chen, “Decolonization: A Geocolonial Historical Materialism,” Asia as
Method: Toward Deimperialization (Duke University Press, 2010), 83–84.
134
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shared histories, languages, cultures, commerce, wars, tribes, territories, and political
institutions that contributed to the formation of a sense of social cohesion, and a sense of
“natural” identification between the character, values, and aspirations of the broad
community of people/s signified by “nation,” and the codification of these character, values,
and aspirations in the legal and bureaucratic apparatus of the “state.” In contrast, congruence
between “nation” and “state” in many countries created during the chaotic period of post-war
decolonization found state apparatuses roughly superimposed over geographical boundaries
containing a plurality of ethnicities, races, and even nations. The existence of this plurality of
peoples and cultures contained within the totalizing signifier of “nation” points to the
“essentially political character of nationalism” and the question of “why some ethnic
communities ‘went nationalist’ while others did not, and under precisely what historical
circumstances.”135 In the examination of concrete political interests working through
conflict-ridden institutional and geopolitical settings, one often finds structures and acts of
violence that are not so dissimilar to those experienced in colonial encounters. The
problem of the dominance of a particular ethnic group in a heterogeneous social space in the
age of territorial nation-states, while not unique to the Third World, is nonetheless a common
dilemma that has sparked civil strife and genocides in newly minted “postcolonial” nationstates that rose from the rubble of two world wars and the collapse of European empires.
The sort of ethnic nationalism described by Chen, exploited by the “national
bourgeoisie” to maintain its rule, is what Partha Chatterjee, in Nationalist Thought and the
Colonial World, might call a “special” type of nationalism, in contrast to the “normal”
(“classical,” “orthododox” and “pure”) type of nationalism, which “shares the same material
and intellectual premises with the European Enlightenment, with industry and the idea of
progress, and with modern democracy” and “gives the liberal-rationalist his paradigmatic
form in which nationalism goes hand-in-hand with reason, liberty and progress.” 136 That
violences committed in the spirit of the former “special” (in Chatterjee’s words, or
“derivative” in Anderson) type of nationalism are often justified by referring to the
“universal” ideals of the latter “normal” type—freedom, sovereignty, development—may
explain the present panic about “illiberal” “populist” regimes threatening the global order
supposedly characterized by liberal democracy.

135 Benedict Anderson, Introduction to Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan
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In the case of the Philippines, nationalism has been deployed both for leftwing and
rightwing ends. The kind of “nationalism” promoted by Dutertismo, for example, demands
the “unity” of the myriad members of the nation for the achievement of state-defined ends,
and identifies “nation” with the state as embodied by Duterte. In this version of nationalism,
love of the fatherland is transmuted into love of the nation’s father, “Tatay Digong.” Yet, the
state discourse of nationalism (unity for progress and development) is also used to justify the
objective/structural and subjective/direct forms of violence the state visits upon its own
citizens. Here, national belonging becomes not just about birth or residence or cultural
identification, but about the utility of a life (as opposed to its disposability) in the eyes of the
state and the elites who wield it. A related issue is the continuing dispossession and
repression of ethnic minorities, especially those who had not been effectively under Spanish
or American colonial rule, and do not see themselves as members of the Philippine nation.
Historically marginalized in the nation project, they continue to struggle for their political,
economic, and cultural rights as the state appropriates their ancestral lands, bombs their
communities, closes down their schools, and kills the leaders of their communities.
Given that the history of nation-state formation in the Philippines is fraught with
violence (especially against ethnic minorities, peasants, labor unions, the urban poor, rights
activists, journalists, and political dissidents), “leftwing” nationalism has often consisted in
the conceptual separation of the state from the nation, as embodied by the “bayan” (the
“people”) or “masa” (the “masses”) in the case of national democrats on the one hand, or by
“civil society” consisting of the “enlightened” middle class and elites who care about nationbuilding, in the case of more centrist social democrats and liberals on the other. Thus, the
nation exists in a relation of tension with the state, with the former trying to balance, counter,
or hold the latter to account through grassroots organizing, protest mobilization, or militancy
(i.e. the “politics of the governed”), or organized civil society campaigns through NGOs and
POs doing social work or lobbying for parliamentary reform.
One might say that in the Philippines, the hyphen connecting the “nation” and the
“state” sits in a precarious position between two historical formations in constant tension, if
not antagonism, with one another.

Ilustrado Nationalism and Enlightenment Modernity
The self-identified liberal and historian Lisandro Claudio contends that nationalist
historiography of the likes of Agoncillo’s History of the Filipino People and Revolt of the
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Masses “made an explicit link between ‘true’ nationalism and one’s class position …
[changing] the definition of ‘Filipino’ from mere citizenship into a belonging to a ‘socioeconomic class.’ The true Filipinos and ‘bearers of history’ became the masses (an illdefined concept).”137 However, in Agoncillo’s narration of the nation, an issue that is
glossed over is the problem of nationalism in the Philippines as historically being an elitedriven project—for in terms of privilege and access to “global” culture, the mestizo class and
the principalia had more in common with the Spaniards in the Philippines than the indios
that this clase media also positioned itself against. 138 The development of nationalist
consciousness and the campaigns for the realization of liberal values in the colony, like equal
rights, freedom of expression, and political representation, are commonly attributed to
ilustrado reformists in exile and their networks in the Philippines, who helped fund their
propaganda activities in Europe. In this narrative, the middle class is the harbinger of liberty
and Enlightenment in the darkness of theocracy, political repression, and obscurantism in
Spanish-ruled Philippines. However, the history that Agoncillo tells positions the clase
media in a state of seemingly constant tension and negotiation with the colonial rulers whose
power they wanted a greater share in, and the masses of indios over whom their class
enjoyed dominance and whose revolutionary struggle for independence threatened their
comfortable place in the social hierarchy.
While the clase media was subject to the Spaniard’s racist contempt, they were also
viewed with suspicion by the indio masses, who were “victims of the mestizos’ arrogant and
insolent mannerisms.”139 More important than their supposed snootiness, however, is the
structural advantages that they enjoyed as a wealthy, landowning, vote-bearing class among
the colonized. The principalia, Spanish mestizos, and servants of the church were legally
exempted from polo, servicio personales, and other kinds of forced labor; those who were
not legally exempt could instead tender payment to avoid manual work in forests and
shipyards.140 They “dominated the Filipino community in a way that Spanish alcaldes
[mayors] and friars, American merchants and Chinese shopkeepers, were never really able to
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alter.”141 They interacted frequently with the Spaniards “in business, church, and
bureaucracy, as partners and as rivals; this interaction produced most of what we know as
Philippine history. But it is interaction within the upper class [of ilustrados and Spanish
elites] … The eventual rivalry between the races is a key element in the coming of the
Revolution, but it is hardly a ‘middle class’ movement against a quasi-fedual artistocracy.” 142
It is no wonder then, that the Propaganda Movement, driven by this clase media, campaigned
for the recognition of racial equality (and with it, equal economic and political rights) and
reforms in public administration that would most benefit the so-called “mestizoisie”143 of
propertied local elites, ilustrados, and ordained Filipino priests that comprised the clase
media of Philippine society at the turn of the twentieth century.
The cultural forms of the novel and the nation project as vectors of modernity are
often intertwined.144 The nascence of the Philippine nation, it is said, emerged from a novel:
José Rizal’s Noli Mi Tangere (Touch Me Not), written while the author was studying
medicine in Europe and published in Berlin in 1887, depicted the corruption, hypocrisies,
and vanities of the Spanish ruling classes—the friars and the colonial governors—and the
common experience of abuse, humiliation, and violence suffered by indios and even mestizos
across different social classes. In doing so, the Noli Me Tangere, and its more radical sequel
El Filibusterismo (The Subversive), published in Ghent in 1891, inspired the foundation of
the Katipunan in Manila in 1892. 145 The nationalist, revolutionary, secret society, styled in
the Masonic tradition, is remarkable for its cross-class, archipelago-wide organization, and
its militant campaign for independence from Spanish colonial rule (in contrast to the
ilustrados’ campaign for assimilation and equal rights). 146
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Though banned by the Spanish authorities in the colony for their subversive
elements, the novels’ covert circulation paved the way for the imagination of a “Filipino”
nation. As Anderson writes, the characters of Noli Me Tangere
come from every stratum of late colonial society, from the liberal-minded peninsular
Captain-General down through the racial tiers of colonial society – creoles, mestizos,
chinos (‘pure’ Chinese) to the illiterate indio masses. … Yet the geographical space
of the novel is strictly confined to the immediate environs of the colonial capital,
Manila. The Spain from which so many of the characters have at one time or another
arrived is always off-stage. This restriction made it clear to Rizal’s first readers that
‘The Philippines’ was a society in itself, even though those who lived in it had as yet
no common name. That he was the first to imagine this ‘social whole’ explains why
he is remembered today as the ‘First Filipino’.147
In her landmark study of Philippine literature and the nation in the postindependence period, Caroline Hau argues that the promulgation of Republic Act No. 1425,
better known as the “Rizal Law,” in 1956 is a testament not only to the centrality of Rizal
and his novels in the state project of constructing the nation from which it drew its
legitimacy, but also to the instrumental role of literature and literary education in
“mediating … between the ‘universal’ ideals of freedom and nationalism, on the one hand,
and their realization within a specifically Philippine context, on the other hand.” 148 The
“Rizal Law” made the reading of Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo, as well as the
study of the “life, works, and writings” of José Rizal, mandatory in all educational
institutions in the country. Recognizing the novels of Rizal as “a constant and inspiring
source of patriotism,” the required reading of his novels by every Filipino student was meant
to foster “moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and to teach the duties of
citizenship.” Specifically, Section 1 stipulates that “in collegiate courses, the original or
unexpurgated editions of the Noli Me Tangere and El Filibusterismo or their English
translation shall be used as basic texts,” while Section 3 mandates the translation of the texts
“into English, Tagalog and the principal Philippine dialects … printed in cheap, popular
editions; and … distributed, free of charge, to persons desiring to read them … throughout
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the country,” 149 in the same way that monuments of Rizal were to be erected in public
schools and town squares.
Hau locates the “wellspring of the state’s nation-building project” in a “paradox”:
that literature “both embodied culture and helped create that culture.”150 That is to say,
where there was no one unitary, majoritarian, dominant culture in an archipelagic country
marked by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural diversity, porous boundaries, geographic
non-contiguity, and plural and small-scale pre-colonial polities, then a national culture must
be invented, and thereby “Filipino” as a national cultural identity created. In a similar way,
the “ideal” nationalist Filipino in the post-war, post-independence period came to be
constructed in the image of Dr. Rizal himself: a man of science and of letters, relatively wellto-do, educated and cosmopolitan, a liberal reformist patriot—a martyr more than a
revolutionary.
The discursive space of the Cold War decades saw the death of the old-guard
communist party, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, and its resurrection in the Communist
Party of the Philippines, formed by Jose Maria Sison in 1968 and remaining active to this
day. It also gave birth to a corpus of nationalist historiography that sought to recover history
from the grasp of the “elite,” pro-U.S. clientelist Philippine state and its pedagogical
apparatuses, and to bring the proletarian “masses” to the forefront of nationalist thought and
consciousness as the “proper” agents of history, as the bearers of the anti-colonial
revolutionary tradition heralded by the Katipunan led by Andres Bonifacio. Thus emerged
the binaristic and antagonistic debate between liberal “reformism” (embodied by Rizal) and
socialist “revolution” (embodied by Bonifacio) that to this day structures “progressive”
discourses about Philippine history and politics.151 The former is often identified with the
nation-building projects of the state and national(ist) elites, while the latter legacy is claimed
by leftist progressives, especially by Marxist-Leninist-Maoist “natdems” or NDs (nationalist
democrats), who see themselves as heirs to the 1896 Philippine Revolution, and its telos of
sovereignty, equality, and national development. Dutertismo repudiates liberal-elite
nationalism not only in its express alignment with "the masses" against national "oligarchs,"
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but also in its appropriation of the anti-colonial nationalist script of the "unfinished
revolution," rooted in institutionalized memories of the Philippine revolutions against Spain
and the United States at the turn of the twentieth century.152

What are the contexts and implications of institutionalizing nationalist - liberal ilustrado consciousness as the normative form of the “Filipino”? How is the transnational
Philippine nation imagined today, especially from the vantage point of diasporic Filipinos,
whose subject position provides a critical entry point into the reformist-revolutionary binary
and the question of belonging, of “Whose Imagined Community”153 ? In the following
sections, I consider these questions through an examination of contemporary Philippine
fiction by writers in the diaspora, paying particular attention to the four dimensions of
analysis for Third World literature proposed by Fredric Jameson in his 1986 essay "ThirdWorld Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism": (1) the "libidinal dimension of the
story"; (2) "the structure of its allegory"; (3) "the role of the third-world cultural producer",
and; (4)"the perspective of futurity projected by the tale's ... resolution."154
The first and second dimensions have to do with the relationship between the
“public” and “private” domains of human experience and story-telling: "in third world
culture," Jameson writes, "psychology, or more specifically, libidinal investment, is to be
read in primarily political and social terms. ... western antinomies—most particularly that
between the subjective and the public or political—are refused in advance."155 In this view,
literature from the third-world, even when they do not explicitly deal with “political” themes,
even when they deal with the supposedly “private” sphere of emotions and desires, is always
already political, its politics embraided with the concrete reality of colonialism and anticolonial struggle. This is because for Jameson, "All third-world texts are necessarily ...
allegorical" and "are to be read as ... national allegories ... particularly when their forms
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develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as th e novel."156
This is not to say that all literature written from the third-world context are produced to serve
as national allegories, but that the critic may, for the purposes of opening up a historical
perspective, read them as such.
The third and fourth dimensions, meanwhile, have to do with the proposition that "in
the third-world situation the intellectual is always in one way or another a political
intellectual."157 For Jameson, the third-world cultural producer/intellectual has a significant
role to play in anti-colonial struggle, especially in relation to imagining the nation's futurity.
"[T]he role of the intellectual as such,” he writes, is that of “the cultural intellectual who is
also a political militant, the intellectual who produces both poetry and praxis." 158 This
imperative relates to Jameson’s concept of “cognitive mapping” as an artistic practice of
historicization and dis-alienation contra the de-historicizing and commodifying forces of
postmodernity.159 In his view, the work of art, especially in the third world, constitutes a
theorization or “cognitive map” of society, which opens up spaces for the development of the
kind of historical sense that allows the schizophrenic subject to articulate and narrativize
biographical and public History: "the production of culture ... the elaboration of a political
culture—was a more effective form of political medicine"160 for the myriad crises
engendered by coloniality. Jameson, like Foucault, conceives of the third-world writer, the
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producer of a kind of knowledge through representation, as "a diagnostician and a
physician,"161 his "vocation" an "extrapolation from the practice of medicine." 162 What is
the social “disorder” to be treated? For Jameson, the answer seems to be “subalternity” in the
Gramscian sense: “the feelings of mental inferiority and habits of subservience and
obedience which necessarily and structurally develop in situations of domination—most
dramatically in the experience of colonized peoples.”163
Reading third-world literature as allegory and producing literature as a form of
cognitive mapping enables the cultural producer to concretize cultural patterns, the
complexity of which makes them difficult to grasp with an awareness of their historicity and
genealogy. Such cultural production “aims precisely at restructuring that view of the problem
and projecting it outwards into the realm of objective or collective spirit in some nonpsychological, but also non-reductionist or non-economistic, materialistic fashion."164 The
problem of representation that the third-world cultural producer must confront is figured as a
kind of Catch-22: Jameson, quoting Lu Xun, uses the image of an airtight, indestructible, and
inescapable iron house in which people are soundly sleeping, unaware of their inevitable
suffocation; the role of the intellectual/cultural producer is to be like the lighter sleepers who
awaken and who rouse the others to consciousness, even if their future is already
foreclosed.165 This, as Jameson put it, is the "seemingly hopeless situation of the third-world
intellectual in this historical period ... in which no solutions, no forms of praxis or change,
seem conceivable ... on the historical horizon."166 Nevertheless, the intellectual/cultural
producer must persist in this project of mapping the social world for the sake of developing
among the public greater “situational awareness” and elucidating and countering patterns
that reproduce subalternity. With this in mind, I examine the novels below.

Collaborative Neocolonialism in Apostol’s The Gun Dealers’ Daughter
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Written over the course of twelve years, Gina Apostol’s third novel, Gun Dealers’
Daughter (2010), is structurally and thematically like its visual metaphor of a book cover:
kaleidoscopic. It is a Bildungsroman, a quasihistorical account of the Marcos dictatorship
(and oblique retelling of the Philippines’ modern colonial history), a novel of manners
revolving around Manila high society, a psychological drama (or horror) centering on a
young woman trapped in the psychic carousel of cyclical flashbacks.
Set primarily during the Marcos Dictatorship in the 1980s, just before the formal
lifting of martial law in 1981, The Gun Dealers’ Daughter is told from the first-person point
of view of a psychologically impaired, and thus highly unreliable, narrator recuperating in
New York sometime during the Obama administration and looking back on her teenage
years in the 1980s. The novel’s narrator and titular protagonist, a self-identified “Martial
Law baby,” is Soledad Kierulf Soliman (or “Sol”), the titular daughter of wealthy arms
traders supplying the U.S.-backed military regime of Ferdinand Marcos, a bookish, budding
historian of the Roman Empire in Late Antiquity. We first meet her (“the girl,” who, at the
beginning of the story, has just turned eighteen) as she arrives in the city of Nice on the
French Riviera, a historical retreat for the European elite in the nineteenth century. She has
come to France, accompanied by her American godfather, her parents’ business partner,
Uncle Gianni, to recuperate in a sanatorium in a tree-lined estate. We learn that she has made
two suicide attempts, first by slashing her wrists, then by flinging herself from a cliff into the
sea. She tells us that reminiscence of her recent past drives her to nervous breakdown. We
learn that she has been diagnosed with anterograde amnesia, a condition that precludes the
formation of new memories following the moment of psychological trauma culminating in
two suicide attempts; this means that her mind is stuck in a past that she struggles to recollect
and revise over and over in order to discover and address the root of her malaise. In time she
leaves Nice for her parents’ Manhattan mansion, a “gilden womb” overlooking the Hudson.
There, as part of her treatment, her attempt to come to terms with the trauma and guilt that
caused her amnesia, she attempts to reconstruct her past (not a mean feat, given that her
remembrances often evoke in her convulsions and hysteria) by writing a memoir, a
talámbuhay.
The primary focus of Sol’s remembrance is a six-month period (June to December
1980) during which her involvement in a Maoist activist student group forces her to question
her life and beliefs, and confront her misgivings about her family, their business, her social
class, and their complicity in maintaining domestic and imperial regimes of oppression. In
this way, Apostol uses the unreliable narrator and the very device of narrative-as-therapy to
dramatize the problems that continue to plague the present. The novel problematizes
71

narrative—autobiographical, ideological, historical—and trafficks in trauma—personal and
political—to ask: what accounts for the sense of stuntedness, of stasis, of political and
economic underdevelopment that characterizes Philippine postwar history? What is the role
of the national elite in Philippine underdevelopment? Against this existing history, a
disappointing continuity, what would “change” consist in?
The first act of the novel details Sol’s one semester at “the local university” (the
University of the Philippines in Diliman or UP), where she joins a Maxist-Leninist-Maoist
student group, an experience that, while traumatic, advances her political consciousness. The
second delves into the history of her subject formation, as well as those of her family,
friends, and social class. The third act chronicles her part in a political assassination that
results in not only the murder of a top American military officer, but also the unintended
deaths of two people dear to her, who were killed so that she may escape accountability. The
novel’s three-act narrative resists linearity, as well as the neatly recursive structure of in
medias res. Instead, within each book part and each chapter, the narrative tends to weave
between Sol’s “present” in Manhattan and her “past” in Metro Manila, often turning
repeatedly to certain events to thicken their telling with previously withheld detail, or to
revise a narrative Sol has deemed to be mistaken. Like the doubled setting (in Manhattan as
in Makati, she lives in a “gilded womb” of a mansion, her every need and whim attended to
by servants), dialogue, descriptions, incidents, and thoughts like mantras tend to recur in
her telling. As her doctors tell Sol, “Repetition is the site of trauma” (emphasis in the
original).167
Autobiographical writing, in the context of Sol’s story, serves a number of purposes,
the most immediate one being the recovery of repressed memory as a path to overcoming
trauma. It is also an attempt to see things more clearly, to correct self-delusions and
dishonesty, especially with regard to her family’s role in abetting state violence under the
dictatorship, their participation in furthering the imperialist agenda of the U.S.’ militaryindustrial complex, upon which her enjoyment of the privileges afforded by material,
cultural, and social capital rest. It is, in Sol’s words, an attempt to reckon with the “split in
my soul.” 168 As a critical mode, autobiography also aids in the (elite, knowledge-producing)
postcolonial subject’s unravelling of the ways in which they have been structured by the
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colonial logics of modernity, especially as the contradictions embodied by the postcolonial
self becomes more manifest in states of disruption, trauma, translation, and dislocation.
In “The Last Colonial: Stuart Hall’s Art of Living,” David Scott, remarks that the
1980s and ‘90s saw the rise of the problematic of identity and diaspora, and of
(auto)biography (or auto-ethnography) as a “paradigmatic device for the analysis of identity,
displacement, mediation,” where displacement becomes a “hermeneutic handle and
theoretical preoccupation, as well as of a primary experience of a habitus, an embodied
experience.” 169 As an example, Scott frames Stuart Hall’s mixed-race, brown middle-class
upbringing in a "well-appointed" house in Jamestown as the locus of Hall's primary sense of
displacement—that of an anxiety-ridden incongruity between his subjective formation as
part of the nationalist middle class, preoccupied with the cultivation of respectability and
good taste as identified with whiteness, and the histories that structured his social experience
as a racial “hybrid,” born of the violence of plantation slavery. This unresolvable tension and
ambivalence about identity, the “divided self,” is what marks brown middle-class Jamaican
identity. This, according to Scott, is “how political economy becomes installed
psychologically—as a libidinal economy—in a mediated, decentered, displaced way.”
Through self-narration, one comes to develop “a reflective consciousness, a perpetually selfquestioning mode of being”, or “a self that experiences itself as never quite corresponding to
itself, attuned to its own historicity and a sense of the self changing in a changing world.” 170
Her doctors tell Sol that “repetition is the site of trauma.” The recurrence of
incidents and characters in Sol’s narrative points to key moments and figures in her
autobiographical history, which, in Apostol’s novel, is intimately intertwined with national
history. Through Sol’s repeated recounting of her personal past, as embedded in a traumatic
period in Philippine history, Apostol offers not only a compelling portrait of subjectivity
formation, social dynamics, and politics among the country’s ruling classes, but also a
diagnosis, so to speak, of the crises and contradictions of elite-driven democracy and
nationalism in the Philippines. Through Sol—who writes in painstaking detail though not
always with self-awareness in her recollections—Apostol shows how the projects of
democratization and nation-building are tied to imperial knowledge production and the
continuing neocolonial relationship between the Philippines and the United States.
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Initially, what draws Sol into the student movement is her attraction to a prominent
couple within the group: Joaquin De Rivera Morga (“Jed”) and Solidaridad Soledad (Soli).
Jed, scion of an influential, old money Spanish mestizo family whose main business is
mining in Mindanao, is someone who moves in the same elite circles as she does, yet unlike
her, is afflicted with angst or “vague martyrdoms” relating to their wealth, “imperial
education,” and “crowd of imperial scum.”171 Their sameness of social position yet
difference of ideological persuasion intrigues Sol, for, she asks, “Did we not share the same
road signs home, a pair of historic anachronisms saluting the wrong side of the revolution:
Admiral George Dewey Drive, parallel to President McKinley Road?”.172 Meanwhile, Sol’s
tokayo (name twin) Soli, whose Marxist ideological fervor and activism leads Sol to confront
her “unspoken misgivings” about her own comfortable existence, becomes a force of
conscientization for the protagonist: “To view my life through her empathy,” Sol muses,
“was like studying my nausea with a ready-made glossary … she gave names to my
unease, though her doing so gave me no comfort. Exhibit A: Here are the Filipino people.
You are the wicked witch beneath its wing. Exhibit B: To enter the gates of your country,
give up your suite of custom-designed rooms and march.”173
Soli encourages Sol to join protest demonstrations, social immersions among the
urban poor, and “teach-ins” with Maoist educators discoursing on imperialism, capitalism,
feaudalism, and the whitewashing of colonial history in education. Thus, the bookish Sol
(who had been educated in the United States and in the elite- and expat-dominated American
School in Manila, and was set to study in an Ivy League university after a semester in the
Philippines) comes to learn the history of the Filipino people from a nationalist, antiimperialist lens174 : “I read in earnest the history I had not been taught as a child … I
discovered that our books of history were invariably in the voice of the colonist, the one who
misrecognized us. We were inscrutable apes engaging in implausible insurrections against
gun-wielding epic heroes who disdained our culture but wanted our land.” 175 It is worth
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noting that Sol aspires to be a historian herself (though her interest lies with a different,
fallen empire, that of the Romans in Late Antiquity), yet in spite of her keen interest in
history, she grew up learning very little about her country of birth, even as she is conversant
in the literatures, philosophies, and cultural histories of Europe.
Ironically, it is her musically trained, artistically inclined, and unapologetically
capitalist American godfather, Uncle Gianni, the one in charge of sourcing weapons for her
parents’ business, who procures the books that Sol requests for her so-called “social studies
group.” Sol reflects on this: “Did I think it odd that I asked Uncle Gianni, on his stopovers
from visiting military republics, to get Marx’s Theory of Revolution: State and Bureaucracy?
I think he thought it was funny, an intellectual diversion before I … was shuttled off to
college in Boston or New York … Anyway, … my job was to be petted and indulged, as
long as I followed in everything else.” 176 Uncle Gianni had come to the Philippines for a
reunion of American World War II veterans on behalf of his dead father, and became friends
and business partners with Sol’s parents. If Sol’s parents represent the “comprador
bourgeoisie,” or local elites who collaborated with and profited from imperialism, Uncle
Gianni represents the affable face of “benevolent assimilation,” “colonial tutelage,”
“patronage,” and “friendship”—tropes for the US-Philippine “special relationship” under
colonial and neocolonial rule. Like the U.S. promising education, civilization, modernity,
development, and mutual aid to its erstwhile colony in the post-“independence” period,
Uncle Gianni is, so to say, Sol’s ticket to the world, the most influential agent in the
formation of her identity and desires, as well as her intellectual and aesthetic development as
a liberal, cosmopolitan subject. With her parents too busy with brokering deals, it is Uncle
Gianni who takes Sol on trips around world cities, to parks, museums, churches, heritage
sites, and sporting events, who recommends books for her to read, who teaches her about
music, art, and film. In the aftermath of her nervous breakdowns and attempted suicides,
both of which resulted from guilt engendered by her confrontations with the inequities of
Philippine society and her own complicity in them, Uncle Gianni brings her to Europe, away
from her depressing country, to recuperate. Small wonder, then, that Sol feels intense love
and loyalty toward her American godfather, despite her knowledge of how their relationship
and its manifold comforts alienate her from the people and the country she also desires to
belong in.
In moments of crisis, where she stands on the brink of resolving the contradictions of
her identity (as a Filipino, and yet also an enemy of “the Filipino people”), Sol is sedated by
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luxury and loyalty into choosing, again and again, her own family and her own class over her
budding nationalist feelings. Because Uncle Gianni is there to care for her, she never has to
“mature” or to claim independence. “Every summer I was in his hands,” she says, “and I was
happy. Already, I felt better. In Uncle Gianni’s world, nothing ever changed. I would always
be a kid, his special harmless pet.” 177 Reading the novel as a metaphor of Philippine
experience, one might see in Sol’s divided self the tension between nation and state in the
Philippines, whose founding story is that it was created in America’s image, and whose
postwar history attests to the persistence of US influence over Philippine political, economic,
and cultural affairs.178 If independent self-rule and national development were the
culmination of the century-long project of “nation-building” in the Philippines, then, like
Sol, the Philippine nation would seem to be in a state of perpetual adolescence. Populist
movements led by “strongman” autocrats like Marcos and Duterte feed on this “wounded”
sense of nationhood, the angst arising from the frustrated promise of the former colonizer
that American tutelage in the ideals of the “free world” would lead the Philippines to stand
among the “best” of the world’s nations, even as the Philippine state, so the leftist cliché
goes, remains a tuta (puppy) of America.
Sol’s access to books lends her a modicum of acceptability among her peers, who
otherwise feel contempt for her cocooned cluelessness as a member of the “damned burgis
[bourgeois].” 179 Unable to empathize with “the masses,” and too ashamed to admit to her
own complicity in their oppression, it is learning this other, repressed colonial history
through nationalist historiography that sustains Sol’s interest in the student movement and
allows her to feel a sense of social relevance. The critical education she emphasizes derives
not from engagement or solidarity with the laboring classes, but from reading a series of
books, by colonists, by Third World intellectuals, by Marx and Mao Tse-Tung. She is
outraged by the production of orientalist knowledge. Sol recounts how she admits to Soli
that the books are what provide “the ballast for my tardy revolt.” 180 This admission becomes
a point of contention for them:
Soli reproved me. Why do history books persuade you but not the world around
you? You live in a puppet totalitarian regime, propped up by guns from America, so
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that we are no sovereign country but a mere outpost of foreign interests in the Far
East. … Obscurantism, she said, does not serve change. The therapeutic couch may
be necessary—at least for some, she said pointedly. But it is not the place for action.
Next time you drive home to Makati, she said, look around: all you need is to look
out your limousine’s window to know that it is a problem to be living the good life
in such bad times. 181
Sol knows this, but knowing is not enough to turn her traitor to her class, or disavow
her affective responses shaped by a lifetime of aesthetic education. Foucault observed that
aspects of existence that are commonly thought of has having no history —e.g. from "the
body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies" 182 to "sentiments, love,
conscience, instincts"183 and "morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts" 184 —are historically
conditioned, and Sol’s narrative excavation of her past, through which one may deconstruct
her identity and lay bare the genealogy of her desires, attests to this. When Soli takes her to
Caloocan, to a funeral for farmers killed by the military police during a protest
demonstration, Sol fixates on the sight of the laboring crowd around her, her revulsion
palpable in her description:
The hero Andres Bonifacio’s tragic monument was now a hawker’s squall,
merchants spilling the guts of the economy on the highway itself—plastic chairs,
pots and pans, bundles of cheap cotton clothes in baskets. I watched the progress of
the city from the jeep, and a melancholy wash, a stab of something beyond my
witness, something wordless, came over me. A slight man carried on his scrawny
back large metallic basins, one heaped over another, while on his shoulders were
also laden a bunch of spatulas strung like vegetables and sheaves of underwear
stacked like books. Sights like this crowded the open highway near Monumento—
this was the harvest of the cry of Balintawak. Aluminum spoils on a spit-grimed
street. The undelivered hopes of mundane lives. It was easy to see how this had once
been a swamp, in which the revolutionaries of the nineteenth century had lain in wait
for signals and gunshots; but I found it hard to see the revolution. Instead, I thought
about worms. Walking around in my brand-new, open-toed leather sandals, I thought
you could get all kinds of poxes instantly on your feet, germs invading the skin,
lacerating your cuticles. … 185
In the funeral home, Sol learns about brazen military aggression in the capital
region, and observes that “military acts in broad daylight were not normal even in
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revolutionary times (extrajudicial deaths, I was told, of course happened out of sight).” 186
She witnesses the mourning around her, knowing that her family had likely supplied the
government with the guns that killed these people. She writes,
I passed one coffin after another and felt this pain in my ears and the odd sensation
of falling apart, though I was walking about looking whole. Death was a bazaar,
multiplied like the merchandise around Monumento. I felt that stifling in my chest, a
familiar horror not quite guilt, not quite sorrow: a numb, hollow, blanketing despair.
A falling sickness, the world pulsating, out of whack.” 187
While she keeps to the sidelines, she watches Soli comfort the bereaved. Unable to
communicate (for Sol does not speak any vernacular languages, only English and some
Spanish, French, German, and Italian) and feeling persecuted by the very sight of the coffins
which seemed to indict her, Sol runs out of the building and pukes on the pavement.
Despite the guilt and shame that Sol feels for her existence, ultimately she finds
herself unable to give up the seductive and sedative luxuries of her world, or even to
challenge her parents and her Uncle Gianni. Eventually, the activist group expels her for
“sexual opportunism” over her affair with Jed. Or, as she put it, she was “Jilted by the
proletariat”:
There I was thinking it was I who was going to quit the group, but it turned out no
one had ever wanted my allegiance. … I was told I was no comrade anyhow …
You have not written your talambuhay. You have not done your class analysis. You
cannot express your class relation to the masses. You cannot envision society as a
creature with genuine warmth or pumping heart. … You are a coward. A moral void
lies in you … You do not have the imagination to possess affection. You have a
cadaverous soul. You have not yet read the PSR. 188 Comrade: one day, we’ll meet
186

Apostol, Gun Dealers’ Daughter, 126.

187

Apostol, Gun Dealers’ Daughter, 126.

188

Philippine Society and Revolution by Amado Guerrero, nom de plume of Jose Maria Sison,
who founded and served as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) in the late Sixties and Seventies. To this day, the PSR remains a foundational text
and standard required reading for members of the myriad organizations under the broad umbrella of
the CPP-NDF-NPA (Communist Party of the Philippines - National Democratic Front - New People’s
Army), its orthodoxies repeated by cohort after cohort of “national democratic” leftists. It expounds
Philippine history, society, problems, and revolutionary solutions from the standpoint of Marxism Leninism-Maoism, the guiding ideology of the CPP-NDF-NPA. According to the author’s
introduction of the book, it “serves to explain why the Communist Party of the Philippines has been
reestablished to arouse and mobilize the broad masses of the people, chiefly the oppressed and
exploited workers and peasants, against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism now
regnant in the present semi-colonial and semi-feudal society. Philippine Society and Revolution can be
used as a primer … by those interested in knowing the truth about the Philippines and in fighting for
the genuine national and democratic interests of the entire Filipino people. The author offers this book
as a starting point for every patriot in the land to make further class analysis and social investigation
as the basis for concrete and sustained revolutionary action.”

78

again. Change is possible—after all, it is what we believe. We hope one day you will
be a part. Ka Noli, the lecturer, did not say things quite like that: I got their drift.189
In a moment of honesty, Sol recognizes that her inability to disavow her class means
that she could not be like Soli, that she could not be part of the revolution, despite her desire
to claim belonging with “the people.” When Jed says that they could still choose to be on the
“right” side of history, she tells him, “We live outside of the country’s rules. We can do
whatever we want. We can commit crimes. We can even play at revolution. We could kill
people … And then in the end we will always get away. We’re cockroaches. It’s we who are
the problem. … We’ll always have our wealth, we will always have our names. … We’ll
outlast even our crimes.” 190
Nevertheless, Jed later prevails upon Sol to be part of the “solution” by aiding and
abetting a political assassination carried out by a renegade unit in their student group. Their
target is Colonel Grier, a soldier and military historian of the Philippine-American war (or,
in US-centric history, the “Philippine Insurrection”), who works for LOTUS, which, as Sol
explains to Jed, is the administrative arm of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group under
the payroll of the Philippine government to provide military and naval advice and training,
and procure arms and technical equipment for the Philippine armed forces. 191 If the effete
and affectionate Uncle Giani is the benevolent face of U.S. imperialism, of the soft power of
liberal education and Western culture mediated by the colonial encounter, Colonel Grier is
the embodiment of U.S. military might and its hold over the Philippine state, which has
depended on the U.S. for defense and security concerns, even as U.S. military bases in the
Philippines have been instrumental in strengthening U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific. Sol’s
description of the colonel emphasizes his brute physicality:
His pink, pumped flesh ripped out of his clothes’ seams. … he looked disgusting, but
compelling—like some reptile that engendered this evolutionary response: my alert
revulsion. … His rank vigor overwhelmed judgment. … I looked at the keloids, the
scars on the Colonel’s arms … he had the broad, wall-like body of a carabao; his
muscles were alarming. He terrified me, frankly … easily his large hands could
break my neck in two. 192

189

Apostol, Gun Dealers’ Daughter, 134.

190

Apostol, Gun Dealers’ Daughter, 138–39.

191

Apostol, Gun Dealers’ Daughter, 178–79.

192

Apostol, Gun Dealers’ Daughter, 151–52.

79

A Vietnam War veteran who specialized in tactics of guerilla warfare and
counterinsurgency, Grier was brought in to train paramilitary units 193 in anti-communist
drives. He is also implicated in the disappearance of political dissenters. Jed explains that
Grier “teaches men how to encircle villages, how to kill specific targets. Specialist killings,
torture. He’s a specialist in methods of counterinsurgency: infiltrating cadres, extracting
confessions, inspiring surrender.”194 What angers Sol about Grier, however, is his white
supremacy; she says that he speaks like old colonists who would exterminate natives in the
name of justice and democracy. This dislike, compounded by the anger her parents and
Uncle Gianni feel for Grier for not cooperating with them in their attempt to secure an
exclusive arms deal, is what drives Sol to assist in the assassination by spying on Grier and
helping Jed steal munitions from her parents’ warehouse.
Plotting the assassination gives Sol a renewed sense of righteousness, belonging, and
relevance: “I felt that the world suddenly seemed clarified … I had always longed to be a
part. It was as if, oddly, I had finally discovered myself. I had found my voice and my value
and my purpose. In making plans for the day, the time, the victim, I acquired, if I recall right,
an almost offensive insight, a scary, concise reasoning, and confidence. It’s true. Plotting a
murder built self-esteem.”195 Yet she also recognized that their youthful adventurism was
folly; that this assassination plot made no difference in the structural conditions that
maintained domestic and imperial oppression: “We had this increasing notion of ourselves,
as if this seedy, pat vengeance gave us dignity. … An inflated notion of virtue infected our
brains. Or maybe it kept us going like the target object (a nail, a mold on the wall) that you
need to stare at in prayer in order to keep from losing concentration and feeling like a
fraud.”196 Here, then, the “nationalist” burgis exemplify the typical socialist criticism against
“liberals”: their espousal of unbridled individualism over more communitarian undertakings.
Until the end, Sol resists Soli’s invitation to join the picket line of workers striking against
exploitation, and instead turns to Jed’s violent “solution.”
After they succeed in killing Grier and evading the authorities, Sol spends the
succeeding days holed up in their Makati mansion, reading American novels and scanning
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newspapers for information about the hunt for Grier’s killers, while her servants packed her
belongings for her upcoming trip to the U.S., an apt image for the thinness of her political
commitment. Eventually she realizes that she and Jed had been able to get away with the
murder because their families had ensured that other people would be framed for their crime:
Sol’s driver and Soli, whose name was so similar to Sol’s, and whose profile as a student
activist and labor organizer made her the perfect scapegoat. True to Sol’s earlier realization
about the protection their family and wealth afforded them, Jed and Sol escaped torture, rape,
and murder in the hand the military police by sacrificing expendable lives to suffer this fate
in their place. Tormented by guilt, Sol attempts suicide, survives, suffers amnesia, and is sent
to France, and later, her family’s estate in New York, where she spends her days roving
around their gothic mansion, waited on by servants, reliving her past and unable to exist
meaningfully in the present.

Jameson postulates that in third-world literature, “the story of the private individual
destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third-world culture and
society."197 Rather than constituting related but separate levels of signification, the “literal”
and the “symbolic,” the “psychological” and the “political,” the “private” and the “public”
form “a set of loops or circuits which intersect and overdetermine each other." 198 Desire is at
once social and individual. This observation is particularly pertinent to Apostol’s Gun
Dealers’ Daughter, where the nascent political consciousness and nationalist commitment of
the protagonist Sol is jeopardized by her overriding desires for sexual gratification, by her
deep love for and gratitude to her American godfather, by the creature comforts and
cosmopolitan intellectual and cultural stimulations of her privileged life. Though her
alienation from her national context by virtue of her class kindles in her a longing to
“belong,” to “become a part” of the struggle of “the people” against both domestic tyranny
and imperial influence, her inability to disavow her family and her class and their significant
collaboration in neocolonial and authoritarian oppression means that she can never be “a
part” of the “solution,” conceived as a socialist, nationalist, anti-colonial project by the
novel’s politicized characters. Thus Sol’s subjective conflicts are not just figurations of
national conflict, but the public and private conflicts in the novel co-constitute each other.
The identification of personal and political concerns in the novel allows the reader to
interpret Sol’s malaise (her amnesia, her nervous breakdowns and suicides) as not just a
197

Jameson, "Third-World Literature,” 69. Emphasis in original.

198

Jameson, "Third-World Literature,” 73.

81

psychological disorder beleaguering a highly sensitive girl, but also as a symptom of an
irreconcilable conflict between libidinal and political interests that shapes the subjectivity of
people like Sol, whose enjoyment of privileges rest on others’ dispossession. It is worth
noting that Sol’s nervous breakdowns can be traced to a moment of political awakening in
her early adolescence, when she overhears her high school teachers talking about her
family’s business and realizes that, by virtue of her parentage and class, she has “blood on
[her] hands, without having done a single thing.”199 This epiphany leads her—and the
reader—to view her very existence allegorically, as "a social and historical nightmare, a
vision of the horror of life specifically grasped through History itself." 200 As she says to her
fellow would-be revolutionary from the elite class, “We’re cockroaches. It’s we who are the
problem, Jed.” 201 Sol and Soli, portrayed in the narrative as inverse reflections of each other,
may also be read as facets of a fundamentally fragmented polity, whose class contradictions
run so deep that the discourse of “national unity” remains a utopian aspiration and a structure
of feeling that may serve as a populist political resource.
The use of allegory as a mode in which to read or create literature presents not just
an aesthetic, but also a political, problem to the third-world cultural producer who uses
narrative and criticism to develop historical perspective, as well as to project imminent,
probable, or desirable futures: "By way of a complex play of simultaneous and antithetical
messages ... the narrative text is able to open up a concrete perspective on the real
future."202 In this light, the conclusion of Gun Dealers’ Daughter may be read as a bleak
projection of the future of the Philippine nation under elite-driven “democracy.” The novel
closes with Sol in New York during the Obama era, meeting an old classmate from college,
who updates her on the events of the past three decades, of which she has no knowledge due
to her inability to form new memories. What Sol—and the reader—realizes from this
classmate’s telling is that nothing much has changed since the fall of the dictatorship: it
seems that the country remains “semi-colonial and semi-feudal,” is still run by the same
“imperialists” and “bureaucrat-capitalists” decried by the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist left in
their half-century of socialist agitation. The supposed “radical break” from the country’s
neocolonial and authoritarian past, and the movement toward “genuine democracy” that the
EDSA People Power Revolution was supposed to portend, are belied not only by the
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restoration of the old elite (displaced with new-rich cronies during the Marcos dictatorship),
but also by the persistence of old economic, political, and cultural patterns that reproduce
great social disparities and maintain the rule of the “post-independence national or
comprador bourgeoisie."203 Apostol’s satire of this class, whose lineages can be traced back
to colonial times, marks not only "the failure of the independence movement to develop into
a general social revolution,"204 but also highlights the role of the country’s elites in
maintaining the very structures of neo/colonial domination that they had purported to rail
against during the pre-war decades of campaigning for independence from the United States
(when “independence” was a populist issue that raked in votes for the Filipino officials of the
Commonwealth government under American colonial rule). 205
The tragedy of Sol’s condition is that though she is, in the end, able to write her
talambuhay—to tell "the individual story and the individual experience” in a way that
involves “the whole laborious telling of the experience of the collectivity itself" 206 —she
remains unable to live meaningfully or take action in the present. Sol’s understanding of
Philippine history stops at Martial Law. In her cognitive map of a third-world national
allegorical novel, then, Apostol creates a portrayal of a whole strata of Philippine society
that, like Lu Xun's sleepers in the indestructible iron house, are stuck in the nightmare of a
static history and their own private subjectivity, in “the poverty of the individual experience
of isolated monads … dying individual bodies without collective pasts or futures[,] bereft of
any possibility of grasping the social totality.”207
Apostol's portrayal of the "collaborative neocolonialism" 208 of Filipino elites, and
the betrayal of the nationalist bourgeoisie of the working-class, brings to the fore the
historical and structural conditions that mold the privileged subject of liberalism, whose
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potential as emancipatory agents in the project of "nation-building" and democratization is
hampered by their individual values and desires, their economic privileges and interests. In
the next section, I examine the implications of this subject's mediation of liberal humanist
values devoid of historicity in apprehending the problems besetting the nation.

Ahistorical Liberalism in Ribay’s Patron Saints of Nothing
In 1959, thirteen years after Philippine independence, the nationalist historian
Renato Constantino wrote a seminal essay titled, “The Mis-education of the Filipino.” The
essay proposes that “Education should first of all ensure national survival” through the
production of citizens who are well-aware of the country’s problems, and strive for
“economic emancipation, political independence, and cultural renascence.”209 What
precluded this, for Constantino, was the enduring character of Philippine educational
institutions as instruments of American colonial policy. Quoting American governors,
Constantino demonstrates how, from its inception, education in the Philippines was central
to the US’ strategy of colonial pacification through social division and the production of a
dominant class of colonials that remained loyal to America. Despite the Philippines’ formal
independence, liberal education and governance continue to intersect with the interests of
American imperialism in the Philippines, and Constantino’s essay remains required reading
for many courses in Philippine history, culture, and society.
Randy Ribay’s third novel, Patron Saints of Nothing (2019) by another title might be
called “The Mis-education of Jason Reguero,” after the name of its amboy (American Boy)
protagonist. Patron Saints of Nothing, set in May 2019 and published in the same year, was
written explicitly in response to the War on Drugs in the Philippines. It centers around
seventeen-year-old Jason Reguero (or “Jay” for short), a second-generation FilipinoAmerican and high school senior whose greatest worry at the beginning of the story was that
he had not gotten into any Ivy League universities—until he learns that one of his cousins
back in the Philippines, Jun, had died.
Jay had been close to Jun, even though they lived in separate continents. Though
Jay, the youngest of three children, had been born in the Philippines to a Filipino father and a
white American mother, his family migrated to the States when he was a year old for better
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educational and economic opportunities. Jay had been to the Philippines only once after
migrating, and did not really keep in touch with the Filipino side of his family, except for
Jun. For years, the cousins had kept up a regular (snail mail) correspondence, which ended
when Jay stopped answering letters, and Jun ran away from home at fourteen. Three years
later, Jun was dead, and none of their relatives would tell Jay what had happened, or why
they denied Jun a funeral. After receiving a mysterious message on Instagram claiming that
Jun had been unjustly killed in the government's anto-drug campaign, Jay, haunted by guilt
and seeking to learn the truth about his cousin’s death, resolves to go to the Philippines to
learn more about the circumstances surrounding Jun's death.
Patron Saints of Nothing has been celebrated for being a “compelling” and “searing”
account and critique of the "drug war" in the Philippines through the eyes of a character who
both did and did not belong to that country. The book, which Ribay has said he wrote
primarily for Filipino-Americans,210 has won or was shortlisted for numerous awards,
including the National Book Award (finalist), NPR Best Book of the Year (won), Publishers
Weekly Best Book Award (won), among many others. It was also well-received among
readers in the Philippines, receiving glowing reviews from publications like Rappler, and
getting included in required reading lists by literature teachers. In a political atmosphere
charged with polarization, the so-called “erosion” of democracy and liberal values, and the
repression of dissent, Ribay’s round criticism of Duterte’s drug war on the basis of its
violation of human rights and its devaluation of the humanity of drug users and sellers
through his novel propelled his work to critical acclaim.
Patron Saints emphasizes patriarchy, superficial religiosity, and a right-wing brand
of nationalism as the structures underlying Duterte’s appeal, and counters these ideological
formations, not by deconstructing patriarchy or religiosity or nationalism in the particular
Philippine context, but by representing the hypervisible and horrific spectacles of the drug
war:
A woman cradling her husband’s limp body. A crowd looking on, emotionless, as
police shine a flashlight on a woman’s bloodied corpse. A couple, half on the ground
and half tangled in their moped, their blank faces turned toward the camera and
sprays of blood on the pavement behind their heads. Sisters gathered around their
baby brother’s body lying in its small casket. A body with its head covered in a dirty
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cloth left in a pile of garbage on the side of the street. Grayish-green corpses stacked
like firewood in an improvised morgue. 211
Though the narrative revolves around Jay and the way in which he is introduced to
the realities of Philippine society, what animates Jay’s character is the spectral presence of
Jun. Born three days apart to two brothers who chose divergent paths, the narrative
constructs Jay and Jun as foil to one another. Jay’s father, a nurse, married an American
doctor and moved to the United States to provide better opportunities for his family. Jun’s
father, a regional chief of police, is a high-ranking henchman in the War on Drugs; a
patriarch and staunch nationalist, he believes that the glory days of Philippine history were
the Marcos years, but that Duterte could prove to be an even greater leader, with his antiAmerican stance and anti-criminal drive. Jun’s father, Tito Maning, resents Jay’s father for
leaving the Philippines, and thinks his Fil-Am nephew unforgivably ignorant of his
countries’ “special” colonial relationship.
The narrative does construct Jay as a “normal” middle-class teenage American boy,
preoccupied with video games, schoolwork, and not disappointing his meritocratic-minded
parents. Before reading about the drug war upon learning about Jun’s death, he makes no
mention of politics. When his white, pothead, best friend Seth says to Jay, "You're basically
white," Jay claims to be offended, but he also does not examine this affective response or
what it means to be a “colored” person reproducing "whiteness." Though he has never lived
in the Philippines, speaks no Philippine languages, does not follow current events, or
communicate with his Filipino family with any regularity, Jay claims to feel a blood-forged
connection to his fatherland. But in truth, his ten-day vacation to the Philippines is his
introduction to that unexplored and un-integrated part of his identity. Throughout the
narrative, he is constantly reminded by other characters, Filipinos, of how little he
understands about this milieu; his character’s main motivation, however, is not so much to
understand this milieu, but to ascertain the injustice of his cousin’s death, and to pin the
blame on his uncle, whom he suspects of having had Jun, his own son, killed.
Jun, meanwhile, is a multiply mediated character whom the reader encounters only
through the letters he sent to Jay, or through other characters’ impressions and memories. He
is represented as being precociously intelligent, philosophical, and empathetic from a young
age. Although he comes from a rich and status-conscious family, he expresses feelings of
solidarity with the poor and questions social inequalities and the hypocrisy of priests who
hide abuses behind holy robes. At fourteen, he ran away from home to escape his
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paternalistic father, who rules his family like a dictator, and according to whose standards of
(macho) masculinity he falls short. Later, he rescues a former sex worker-turned-housemaid,
a victim of human trafficking, from the abusive household she served, and comes to live with
her in an urban slum. There, he takes on construction jobs, befriends drug users, and tries to
help them get “clean,” but ends up becoming a user himself. He also anonymously runs an
Instagram account called GISING NA PH! (Wake up, Philippines!), posting photos of the
bereaved holding photos of their loved ones who were killed as part of the government’s
anti-drug campaign. It is supposedly for this reason—for “showing the world” the human
cost of the war on drugs, and for humanizing its victims—that he was killed by vigilantes
controlled by the police.
Like the martyred messiah Jesus, Jun leaves the comfort of his upper-class enclave,
lives with a prostitute in the world of the underclass, speaks truth to power, and has his life
taken for it. However, he is too abstractly realized, and there is very little that is revealed
about his life after running away from home. Thus the reader is not given an intimate
perspective into that “other” world of the urban underclass, whose denizens remain literally
voiceless in this narrative. In one scene, Jay and his new friend Mia, a journalism student
from the University of the Philippines, go to the slum where Jun had lived, and speak with
Reyna, the woman Jun had loved. As Jay speaks no Tagalog or Bisaya, he hears about Jun
from Reyna through the mediation of Mia, who translates what Reyna says (Reyna is not
given any dialogue herself) and speaks for her. Of his singular expedition to an urban poor
neighborhood, he remarks on the density of the space, the improvised and unstable nature of
the structures, the teeming mass of people "[b]athing, washing laundry, hanging clothes ...
staring at their phones, reading, napping, eating in front of the TV—living their lives almost
entirely on display. ... Doing the same things any of us do—only in smaller spaces with
much less privacy. They’re finding ways to survive."212 In this depiction of mundane
poverty, structures of injustice and the asymmetries of power are effaced. Even as Jay
remarks on the contrast between the gated subdivision where his uncle's family lives, and the
slums in their midst, the normality of this inequality is taken for granted as a harsh Third
World reality. Indeed, it is the backdrop of his poverty and his cousin's willing "descent" into
it that underpins the narrative construction of Jun's heroism and messianic quality.
As a privileged outsider who does not speak the vernacular and who has not studied
about the Philippines, the protagonist's perspective is limited and superficial; the narrative
signposts this all throughout, but this does not preclude Jay from condemning that which he
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does not understand (and does not try to understand, because he has already dismissed it as
simply wrong and “crazy,” a worldview not worth inhabiting). Neither do the other
characters bother to flesh out the contexts of their glib answers to his casual questions (for
example, in one scene, Jay asks his cousin Grace why most Filipino celebrities and models
are fair-skinned, and she just answers, “Colonialism”; in another scene, Jay asks Mia if it
isn’t dangerous to be a journalist in the Philippines, and Mia just mentions the Ampatuan
Massacre, where over 30 journalists were killed in one incident, but makes no mention of its
relation to political dynasties and “warlords” in Mindanao). Except for Jun’s death, which
made him realize that there was this other country, his father’s, that he knew nothing about,
the narrative does not present Jay with experiences deep enough to allow a radical subjective
shift, something that is also improbable in the space of ten days of navigating in the mostly
middle and upper-middle class spaces of the mall, the gated subdivision, a beach resort, and
his grandparents’ ancestral house in the province. Jay’s "guides" to Philippine society are
also all members of upper/middle class civil society: his teenage cousin Grace, the university
student Mia, and his lawyer aunts who work for a feminist organization that rescues victims
of human trafficking.
Another factor that limits Jay's perspective is his unquestioning acceptance of the
imaginary of "America" as a paragon of liberal values, due process, and justice, which he
signals several times, and which reminds the reader of his best friend’s comment that Jay is
“basically white.” Looking at his cousin’s Instagram account and its pictures of those who
were victimized by the drug war, for example, he observes, “The right to due process is so
ingrained in me as an American that I’ve taken it for granted. Up until now, I’ve never fully
understood that such a right is nothing but ink on paper, paper that can be shredded and
tossed in the garbage, paper that can be ignored if people don’t demand its application. And
it doesn’t even take some great evil to do that. The promise of safety is enough.”213 Jay
emphasizes the injustice of Jun's death, but he does not probe into how that killing, and
thousands others like it, was made justifiable. He likewise does not grapple with or question
the structures of injustice in his own milieu, nor does he indicate experiences of racism or
classism; this may be because he can pass for white, or because his family is relatively wellto-do, or because his upbringing emphasized assimilation into the dominant, white American
culture. It is interesting to note that while Asian-Americans as a racial minority population in
the United States predominantly identify with the Democratic Party, among the AsianAmericans who voted for Trump in 2016, Filipino-Americans constituted the largest
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percentage.214 Jay, however, makes no mention of American politics at all, a strange
narrative choice, since as a Filipino-American character, he might have provided a more
comparative perspective.
The primary antagonist in the novel is Tito Maning, Jun’s father, whose character
the narrative uses as a mouthpiece for state policy and rhetoric, and a caricature of
conservative Pinoy machismo. He is gruff, domineering, and judgmental with his family,
servants, and subordinates, whom he expects to unquestioningly follow all of his orders, or
else face verbal and physical abuse. He sermonizes about how women should stay at home
and raise children instead of having careers. He mocks his sister for lesbianism, and his
brother for his traitorous abandonment of the motherland for the former colonial master,
America. His idea of a weekend well-spent is taking his family to the National Museums to
learn about colonial atrocities under Spanish and American rule, and then to Malacañang
Palace (the presidential residence), musing about how Duterte would make the Philippines a
great nation by ridding it of criminality, rescuing the youth from drug use, and standing up to
US intervention in Philippine affairs. He tells Jay, "Our country’s history is full of invading
foreigners who thought they knew us better than we knew ourselves. And many of us
believed them over and over again. Many of us welcomed them with open arms, learned
their language, joined their churches, asked for positions in their crooked governments. ... No
more.”215 He idolizes the Marcoses and thinks that EDSA People Power was a historic
mistake (though Jay—and the reader—is not told why). When he finds out that his son was
taking marijuana, he kicks him out of the house, throws away all of his belongings, and
orders his family to forget that the boy existed; when Jun is killed by vigilantes for using
shabu, his father refuses him a funeral. Tito Maning's character is represented, through Jay’s
perspective, to be so odious and oppressive that even when he is later revealed to have tried
to save his son from being included in the police’s drug watch list to prevent him from being
killed, the reader feels no sympathy for or even a desire to understand where he is coming
from, or how he came to think the way he did.
It is no surprise that such a story is agreeable to an audience that holds the same
liberal-minded, cosmopolitan, privileged perspective that Jay held. Indeed, the novel
exemplifies the ways in which the drug war has typically been represented by local and
214
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international media to global audiences, and this impression is supported by the reading list
that came at the end of the book: articles by The Guardian, The New York Times, The
Brookings Institution, Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism, VERA Files,
Rappler. In the outrage it expresses about the drug war, the novel dishes a narrative that is
palatable and familiar to anyone who has read any international coverage of the War on
Drugs as yet another monstrous violation of human rights under a Third World populist
authoritarian regime. But in reproducing liberal judgments about a milieu that the protagonist
(and the novel’s target market—Americans) do not even seek to understand, the novel does
more to preclude than to invite a critical examination of an unraveling phenomenon. In the
end, the audience is left with a simplistic impression of a messed-up nation.
Jameson proposes two interventions in the study and teaching of third-world texts
in the “first-world” academe from the position of one doing literary and cultural studies in
the “first world,” yet aspiring to the utopian project of socialism, including anti-imperialist
and anti-capitalist struggles in formerly colonized territories. The first one has to do with
historicizing cultural texts and embedding them in an “analysis of the various socio-cultural
situations from which they spring," including "the interrelationship of social classes, the role
of intellectuals, the dynamics of language and writing, the configuration of traditional forms,
the relationship to western influences, the development of urban experience and money, and
so forth."216 The second intervention is the formulation of “a theory of the cognitive
aesthetics,”217 which would allow the cultural producer to recognize the ways in which the
“‘mapping’ or grasping of the social totality is structurally available to the dominated rather
than the dominating classes.” 218 In Ribay's novel, it is the voice of the dominating classes
that we hear, mediated by a protagonist with no access to the world of the dominated. In
making a thoroughly unsympathetic character the primary bearer of nationalist sentiments in
the story, the novel also works to inhibit a more careful examination of nationalist ideology
as a symptom not only of patriarchal “backwardness,” but of the struggles of postcoloniality
and the desire for sovereignty and development—the promise of independence and
democracy—in the context of enduring neocolonial relations. In this light, Ribay's novel is a
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reminder that the recognition of the histories and particularities of territories in the "third
world" remains important in countering “general liberal and humanistic universalism."219

The Diasporic Nation in Castillo’s America Is Not the Heart
The novels by Apostol and Ribay above feature putatively Filipino protagonists who
were largely raised in privileged circumstances in the United States and whose return to the
Philippines in adolescence, at the height of repressive regimes and rising youth militancy,
evoked in them the desire to be a part of the “homeland.” Their claims to and desire for
"belonging," however, is belied by their lack of historical understanding of, and experiential
grounding in, the realities that shape the majority of the subjects of the Philippine nation.
The resulting sense of alienation this lack evokes is complicated by the characters' clinging
to liberal humanist values that are "violated" again and again in their encounters with
Philippine social realities. It is the complexity and contradictions of these realities that Elaine
Castillo’s debut novel America is Not the Heart (2018) engages. Set in Northern Luzon and
Metro Manila in the Philippines and in Milpitas, California in the United States in the 1980s
and early 1990s, America is Not the Heart features a cast of Filipino-American characters
across three generations who sought to escape the Philippines for political and economic
reasons. As they try to make a new life as American citizens, they find themselves seized by
the memories, familial ties, social inequities, and tumultuous politics that maintain their
affective links to their “homeland,” if not to the idea of the nation.
Unlike Gun Dealers’ Daughter, told from the singular voice of its elite protagonist
Sol, who narrates her own tenuous and muzzy recollections through which the reader must
piece together, along with Sol herself, the story, America is Not the Heart, told
predominantly in the third-person limited perspective (except for its prologue, told in the
second person), plumbs into the personal histories of women of various generations and
subject positions. There’s Paz, whose journey from rural poverty in Pangasinan to middleclass respectability as a nurse in Milpitas serves as the prologue of the novel; Hero de Vera,
provincial heiress and medical student turned communist rebel and martial law
desaparecido; and Rosalyn, hair and make-up artist to brown girls around California, and a
closet romantic and lesbian. The use of the limited perspectives of multiple characters to tell
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their stories gives the novel a sprawling, kaleidoscopic quality, privileging the perspective
not of the individual, but of a community.
The characters, who generally find themselves as marginal in their new nation as
they were in the one from which they had recently arrived, represent various ways in which
the “other” or “outsider” to the imagined community of the hegemonic nation is constructed,
how the contours of belonging are limned. As such, they also invite reflections on the
relationships between the Filipino diaspora (and the historical conditions that enabled it) and
the politics of the homeland in the context of the (neo)colonial relationship between the
Philippines and the United States. How is “belonging” conceived by individuals in the
diaspora? How do their conceptions of belonging influence their engagement in political
projects in the “homeland” or in their adopted home? What could an examination of the
narratives of figures who are marginalized on the basis of their race, citizenship, class,
gender, and ethnolinguistic identity tell us about the hegemonic project of “nation-building”?
In his essay “The National Imagination,” Gopal Balakrishnan considers the claim
that the task of the Left is to reinvent a national politics for the twenty-first century, since, it
is often posited, “the springs of political action are ultimately rooted in the pathos of national
membership, for it is only in the form of a ‘people’ that the masses erupt into political life
and make history. In this view, nations are … existentially more gripping and decisive than
class.”220 It is a claim that might be immediately belied by the first character we meet in
Castillo’s novel: Paz, who dug up mud crabs for supper as a child, socialized with American
military servicemen in Baguio Hill Station as a college student, and strived as a nurse to
emigrate to America. Her rags-to-(not-quite)-riches story opens the novel, stridently told in
the second person point-of-view. In relating the reasons for her leaving the Philippines, Paz
muses:
You already know that the first thing that makes you foreign to a place is to be born
poor in it; you don’t need to emigrate to America to feel what you already felt when
you were ten, looking up at the rickety concrete roof above your head and knowing
that one more bad typhoon would bring it down to crush your bones and the bones of
all your siblings sleeping next to you; or selling fruit by the side of the road to
people who made sure to never really look at you, made sure not to touch your hands
when they put the money in it. You’ve been foreign all your life. When you finally
leave, all you’re hoping for is a more bearable kind of foreignness. 221
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For Paz, the primary factor delineating her otherness is her poverty: if implicit in the
notions of “home” and “community” were comfort and security, then her “homeland” was
no home to her. Her ambition, similar to many other Filipinos, then was to make a life
elsewhere, when conditions in the homeland made comfort and security improbable. “As for
loving America or not loving America,” Paz continues, “those aren’t your problems, either.
Your word for love is survival. Everything else is a story that isn’t about you.”222
However, Paz conceives of survival not in individual, but in collective, terms.
Though she may not be animated by the noble abstractions of the hegemonic nation (with
which, as a working-class Ilocana woman, she did not identify), she remains entangled
within “the affective structure of kinship bonds” 223 that ties her to the “homeland.” Her
considerable wages as a nurse in two hospitals in California sustain many more households
than her own; her earnings help support her undocumented relatives in the U.S., as well as
her mother, younger siblings, and their children back in the Philippines. Her life in California
is consumed by the demands of family and work; throughout the novel, the readers scarcely
see Paz in any other context. Her case is no instance of what Benedict Anderson called
“long-distance nationalism,” which involves the carrying out by diasporic populations of
political projects for the homeland. 224 The precariousness of her belonging in her adopted
country and the everyday struggle of making a living for herself and her network of
dependents exhausts her time, thought, and energy, precluding active participation in
political projects of social transformation.
Like Paz, the novel’s other protagonist, Hero, the niece of Paz’s husband Pol de
Vera, is forced to leave the Philippines for survival. The de Veras are a prominent
landowning family in Ilocos, not only old moneyed elite who can trace their genealogy to
19 th century Chinese mestizo traders, but also close cronies of the dictator Marcos. When the
dictatorship fell from power, so did the de Veras. To escape the Philippines, Pol marries the
much younger Paz, who was far beneath him in the Philippine social hierarchy, but who was
by then, a naturalized American citizen. When Pol moves in with Paz in Milpitas, the power
dynamics of their relationship are reversed: in the Philippines, Pol was an acclaimed
surgeon; in California, where he cannot continue his medical practice, he works as a security
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guard. Like Pol, Hero was heiress to the de Vera family’s wealth and status, but during her
stint as a medical student in Manila at the height of the dictatorship, she came to learn of the
horrors of the regime and her own position in it as a member of the provincial ruling class.
She becomes radicalized and comes to join a unit of the New People’s Army, serving as a
doctor to the communist rebels in Central Luzon and becoming comrades to others who saw
themselves as outside of and in opposition to the current dispensation—not just Marcos’
“New Society,” but also the capitalist and imperialist interests that lent it support.
Eventually, Hero is “disappeared” or captured and tortured by state forces. Eventually, after
the authorities learn that she is a de Vera, she is released, her thumbs broken, as is her spirit.
Disowned by her parents, she comes to live with Pol and Paz in Milpitas.
Pol’s and Hero’s escape to the United States illustrates the fracturedness of the
Philippine polity, most obviously along class lines, as these intersect with longer histories of
colonial rule and neocolonial domination. The fictive, totalizing, and unitizing discourse of
nation is belied by actually existing cleavages between different social groups with
conflicting interests, in which political power resides in not “the people” but the faction of
the ruling class (themselves engaged in intra-elite competition) who is able to seize and
dominate the apparatus of the state. These fractures become more evident in Milpitas, a city
filled with Filipino and Mexican immigrants, where the politics of the home country,
primarily its class antagonisms, are starkly reproduced, where upward mobility rests on
incessant hard work and the embrace of all things American, and where the sense of
“Filipinoness” manifests in familial ties, food, superstitions, and fiestas, but not necessarily a
desire to work for and see political “progress” and emancipation in the homeland, to which,
aside from the occasional vacation, they might never return.

In this chapter I have discussed how the dominant imagination of nation, which
derives from Enlightenment modernity as mediated by the ilustrado “mestizoisie,” was
contested by Dutertismo to cultivate broad appeal among “the masses” who are marginalized
by elite nationalism. I focused on contemporary Philippine novels in English as a strategy for
defamiliarizing the notion of national belonging, especially of modern postcolonial subjects
whose worldviews, life experiences, and desires are shaped by their social status, economic
privilege, and the values of liberal democracy and elite nationalism that they imbibe through
humanistic education and access to power, whether they reside in the Filipino diaspora in the
United States, or in one of the affluent, enclosed neighborhoods of Makati or Quezon City.
This exercise is to drive home the point that the unitizing discourse of nationalism and the
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universalizing discourse of liberalism, notwithstanding, all those who claim to belong to the
nation, or evoke the trope of "common humanity" in the face of spectacular violence, do not
belong to the nation or to "humanity" in the same ways. In the succeeding chapter, I examine
how the "War on Drugs" exemplifies the extreme inequalities that underlie the construction
of the subjects of the nation, and the implications of this logic of asymmetry on the
populations that the dominant political discourse figures as the other of the national
community.
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3. THE "WAR ON DRUGS" AND "HUMAN RIGHTS"

Information for Foreigners
In 2010, Dulaang UP (DUP), the University of the Philippines’ official theater
group, staged an adaptation of Griselda Gambaro’s 1971 play Information for Foreigners, a
site-specific piece of immersive and participative theater about desaparecidos—political
dissidents abducted, tortured, or killed—in the years leading up to Argentina's Dirty War (a
period of US-backed state terrorism enforced by a local military junta). The DUP adaptation,
directed by Anton Juan Jr., localizes the text: it not only draws parallels between the 1970s
Argentinian context and decades of continuing state violence against peasants, leftists, and
human rights activists in the Philippines, but also adopts the tone of the perya—a funhouse
fixture in fiestas in Philippine towns, a pop-up carnival that often features theme park rides,
ambulant food vendors, a horror house, freak shows with midgets and amputees, “mermaids”
and magicians, gambling tents, game booths, beauty pageants, musical performances.
Gambaro’s stage directions recommended that the play “be performed in a house or
warehouse. The audience is split into groups, each of which has a Guide who takes us from
scene to scene. The order in which the scenes are observed by the groups is aleatory until the
final scene, where all the groups converge.”225 DUP staged the play in my college building.
Over the course of two or three hours, the audience members (divided into groups of six and
given flashlights) are led by their cabaret-costumed, horn-tooting and shouting guides
through the dark, crowded, and muggy corridors of the College of Arts and Letters (CAL),
into halls and classrooms transformed into prison cells and torture chambers. Every now and
then, an audience member is asked to participate in torturing a “captive.” Every now and
then, an actor posing as an audience member is seized and dragged away, screaming. As
actual news reports of abductions and killings are read out or played from a radio, as family
members of disappeared activists come forth to tell their stories, the guides and actors
repeatedly tell the audience not to worry, it’s just a play, it’s only pretense, it’s not real. In
the course of 20 scenes, the play explores the dynamics of violence, repression, and
complicity, and ends with a roar echoing in the CAL Atrium: “Welcome to the Philippines!”
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A piece that sought to demystify violence rather than to fetishize it by implicating
the “foreigners”—audience members, witnesses and bystanders—in the theater of torture,
Information for Foreigners was one of my more unsettling artistic encounters in UP. I think
of it now when I hear statistics rattled off in the news to qualify the popular support for the
“war on drugs,” when I watch countless feature films, documentaries, and photographs
produced about the “war,” when I read Facebook and Twitter comment threads debating its
desirability, or deploring that Philippine society “has come to this.”

“Theater State of Terror": Tokhang and the War Imaginary
The killings that herald the Duterte administration’s anti-drug campaign, officially
called Oplan Double Barrel or “the war on drugs,”226 have become a mundane feature in
densely populated urban centers in the Philippines. “Tokhang”—meaning “knock and
plead,” denoting the nationwide police strategy of “visiting” the residences of alleged drug
pushers and users in their jurisdictions and convincing them to surrender—has entered the
popular lexicon, and is more often used to designate not its official meaning, but the
summary execution of alleged “drug personalities.” With estimates of “drug war” casualties,
whether by vigilante attacks or police shoot-outs, reaching tens of thousands,227 the figure of
extrajudicial killing (EJK)—a body, sometimes tied-up and wrapped in packaging tape,
dumped on a pavement with a damning cardboard sign alleging drug dealing and addiction,
or lying in a pool of blood beside a gun and a packet of crystal meth—has become common
in domestic and even international mediascapes. To hold an image of the tokhang victim,
one need not reside in one of the depressed neighborhoods usually targeted by police
operations, pass by wakes on the way home, or stumble into a corpse in a narrow alley at
dawn. Such images proliferate in the 24/7 news cycle, feature in the front pages of
226 After the U.S.-led global military campaign to counter the illegal drug trade in domestic
markets embedded in global networks.
227 There is no established and readily verifiable number for deaths in the “war,” whether by
police operations or summary executions by unknown armed assailants, who are widely believed to be
connected to the police. According to official data released by the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), 5,903 persons have been killed as a result of police anti-drug operations from the
period of July 1, 2016 (when Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency) to September 30, 2020. Rights
activists estimate the number of drug war-related deaths to be more than five times the official
numbers, including extrajudicial killings. The accuracy of numbers is immaterial to the “war on
drugs,” however, insofar as the invocation of a drug menace conjures a permanent national emergency
that justifies the practically limitless use of executive emergency powers, especially as these involve
military and policing strategies — even if the president initially promised to rid the country of illegal
drugs within three to six months of the “war.” For more statistics from PDEA see
https://pdea.gov.ph/2-uncategorised/279-realnumbersph.
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broadsheet dailies, show up as reports or memes on social media feeds, and win prestigious
international awards for photographers and journalists. In recent years, these images have
even appeared in a number of zines, comic books, theater plays, TV dramas, feature films,
gallery exhibitions, and journal articles. These constellated texts and practices constitute
what Chouliaraki calls a “war imaginary”: “a configuration of popular genres through
which ... war is regularly imagined as a taken-for-granted part of our public life.”228 Such an
imaginary is captured by one of the most popular social media accounts that seek to
document “the world’s alarming culture of impunity ... highlighting the Philippines”:
@everydayimpunity.229 It is this imaginary that the discourse of Dutertismo both draws
from and engenders in its use of the metaphor of war to reinforce the necessity of killing and
the inevitability of “collateral damage” as part of drug interdiction.
It is worth noting here that torture, summary executions, forced disappearances,
arbitrary arrests and detentions, and other forms of extrajudicial punishment, especially of
activists, journalists, lawyers, progressive clergy, and members of leftist organizations are
not new in the modern history of political violence in the Philippines, especially since the
anticommunist purges during the Cold War. Under the military dictatorship of Ferdinand
Marcos, an estimated 70,000 political dissidents were incarcerated, 35,000 tortured, 3,257
killed, and 737 “disappeared” between 1975 and 1985. Of those killed, “some 2,520, or 77
percent of all victims, were ‘salvaged’—that is, tortured, mutilated, and dumped on a
roadside for public display.”230 The historian Alfred McCoy observes that the “exceptional”
nature of political violence, in both “quantity and quality” under Marcos, the graphic nature
of the tortures conducted by the military and police, and the visibility of the mutilated
remains of the “salvaged” created “a theater state of terror.”231
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The trauma of the martial law period was such that the succeeding administration,
brought to power by the EDSA “People Power” Revolution carrying the promise of
(re)democratization under the leadership of the Liberal Party, crafted the 1987 Philippine
Constitution with a view to strengthening the system of checks and balances among the three
main branches of government, and preventing the emergence of another dictatorship. It also
provided for the creation of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), an independent
national agency primarily tasked to investigate “human rights violations against
marginalized and vulnerable sectors of the society, involving civil and political rights,”
monitor the government's compliance with international human rights treaty obligations, and
promote “universal human rights principles and standards.”232 Despite these measures, the
failure of the post-dictatorship transitional government to prosecute many of the cronies and
officials of the military regime for corruption and human rights abuses, instead allowing, by
inaction, their eventual return to power, has contributed to the present culture of impunity in
the Philippines.233
Philippine presidents since Marcos have all been hounded by criticisms from human
rights groups for a continuing a “policy of neglect” in addressing the enabling conditions of
impunity, which include the state’s failure (or refusal) to investigate government officials for
criminal offenses, disband private armies of local “warlords” and “strongmen,” and protect
of witnesses234 —all of which point to a compromised justice system and the absence of the
“rule of law.” According to the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, the Philippines
ranks well below the regional average when it comes to systemic issues such as
governmental checks and balances, transparency, regulatory enforcement, the absence of
corruption, the protection of fundamental rights, order and security, and civil and criminal
justice.235 Although the Philippines’ score on this index has been slipping since Duterte’s
rise to the presidency, 236 its weak showing is also not new. As human rights lawyer Romy
Capulong was quoted as saying by the Human Rights Watch 2007 Country Report, “It’s a
Republic of the Philippines Commission on Human Rights, “About
Us,”http://chr.gov.ph/about-us/
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complete breakdown of the rule of law. Civilian rule has been replaced by military rule. The
courts don’t function. The prosecutors don’t function. The investigative agencies don’t
function. Lawyers are threatened.”237 During his campaign, Duterte echoed popular
frustration with the stark injustices of Philippine society and with slow, ineffective, or
inaccessible mechanisms for delivering justice, and capitalized on it by promising to cut
through the red tape and punish criminals, secure law and order, and penalize oligarchs.
Impunity and state violence may be longstanding problems in the Philippines, but
what distinguishes the Duterte administration is its open adoption of extrajudicial executions
as a national policy, or what the political scientist Peter Kreuzer calls “official police
vigilantism.” 238 Unlike Marcos, who as a celebrated lawyer still “maintained a facade of
legality and spoke with pride of his ‘constitutional authoritarianism,’”239 Duterte, confident
in the support of his allies in the military and police, both houses of congress, and the
judiciary, has routinely breached constitutional provisions and flouted due process to silence
critics and political opponents, reward supporters with political favors or government
sinecures, and pursue his administration’s principal program of “war.” State violence (i.e. the
illegitimate use of force by state agents in violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights)
under Duterte is also distinguished by its scale and systematic nation-wide
institutionalization. Not only have instances of police vigilantism sharply risen nationwide,
but what were once localized cases of police violence and extrajudicial executions by “death
squads” became nationalized, a process that has also transformed the institutions of
policing.240 I will return to this point about policing and violence in the analysis of “drug
war” films later in this chapter.
The persistent application of military metaphors does not only help legitimate the
use of lethal force in addressing what may otherwise be more benignly construed as a public
health concern. The legitimation of the "War on Drugs" rests on a system of justifications
Human Rights Watch, “Scared Silent: Impunity for Extraju dicial Killings in the
Philippines,” Human Rights Watch Country Report Volume 19, No. 9(C) (June 2007),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/philippines0607/philippines0 607web.pdf.
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promoting the idea that the social costs of violence are significantly less than the costs of not
enacting it.241 A key element in this justificatory system is the social devaluation of the lives
and bodies of the drug pusher or addict, the targets of tokhang.
Within Dutertismo, images of EJKs function as signifiers of moral degradation and
criminality, and of the state’s authority to inflict violence in the name of justice and security,
discipline and development. Central to this operation is the evocation of horror, fear, and
awe as affective responses to the “war,” whose efficacy is signaled by the proliferation of
EJK images, especially in the first few months of Duterte’s presidency, of signposted dead
bodies dumped in public places, often killed and mutilated elsewhere, and later aesthetically
composed for discovery in a manner akin to body horror. Describing the typical EJK scene
in 2016, journalist Patricia Evangelista writes:
… there was at least one body – the naked curve of the back and the denim
waistband showed just under the crumpled pile of garbage bags. What might have
been another body was curled on the sidewalk, swathed in the same black plastic.
The head was bound tight with a crosshatch of packing tape … A sheet of paper
had been left under the first body … [with the words] Nagmahal [fell in love].
Nasaktan [got hurt]. Nagtulak [dealt drugs]. Namatay [died]. … A corner [of the
paper] had been dipped in blood. …
The investigators cut through the plastic bags, struggling through the
stretched tape. The bag torn open to show the bound legs in the khaki shorts, the
grimy soles, the bloodstains on the gray shirt. … His head, once freed from the black
plastic, had been wrapped in packing tape. The investigator ran a cutter under his
chin. The eyes were closed, but his mouth was wide open, lips folded inward over
the teeth in what looked to be a futile attempt to breathe. They found more of the
garbage bags down his throat. The investigators reached in, and uncoiled the ropy
length of plastic from the dead man's mouth. …
The first reported summary execution in this fashion – the head wrapped in
tape – was in early July [2016] … The cardboard sign called the dead man a dealer.
In the months since, there have been at least 3,841 extrajudicial killings, outside of
the over two thousand killed in police operations. Many of those murdered by
unknown assailants were found with cardboard signs propped beside their bodies,
calling them addicts, pushers, dealers. 242
The aesthetic of the EJK anticipates and encourages the production and viral
circulation of its image—it is not enough that an alleged drug-related death be recorded; it
must arouse fascination in the economy of attention. The spectacularization of death and the
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reproduction of its images by journalists and citizens serve not just to record the war; the
images are themselves part of the “war,” and serve a number of functions in its continuation.
It not only “others” the targets of killing, i.e. the designated “social enemies,” by figuring
them in a state of humiliation and brutalized lifelessness, justified by allegations of their
involvement in drug use or dealing; the spectacle of the dead body also conveys the political
message of the power of Duterte’s speech, and his regime’s efficacy in delivering his
promise of “justice” by any means, judicial or otherwise. 243 Thus, the EJK image is at once
an indictment of the dead accused, a “proof” of their guilt (given the widespread, if
contested, assumptions that only those on “drug watch lists” would be targeted, and that the
information on such lists are legitimate), as well as a palpable exhibition of swift
punishment, a show of executive power. By inciting fear and awe in the public imagination,
EJKs are supposed to deter would-be criminals, cow existing drug users and pushers into
submission and reform, and assure the safety of the general, presumably law-abiding, public.
Killings are so central to the current regime’s claim to legitimacy that the fact of there being
a total of 20,322 “drug personalities” killed from July 1, 2016 to November 27, 2017 was
highlighted in a 2017 year-end government report listing the president’s “key
accomplishments.”244
Scholars like Vicente Rafael have pointed out the complex effect of the proliferation
of drug war photographs and their links to the colonial practice of the “gruesome display of
the dismembered remains of enemy bodies … see, for example, the photographs of dead
Filipino fighters during the Filipino American War, the corpses of Sakdalistas in the 1930s,
or those of the Huks peasant and communist insurgents, the Muslim rebels and New People’s
Army fighters, from the 1950s to the present.” 245 On the one hand, these images serve to
expose and render hypervisible the brutality of the drug war, possibly rousing the public to
challenge state narratives. On the other hand, they contribute to Duterte’s “necropower” by
reinforcing the efficacy of tokhang as “a form of public torture and the death penalty by
other means.”246 Similarly, Danilo Reyes writes that the dead body of the drug war victim,
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commodified in the form of photographs, serves as a vehicle of political messages: “Those
who lived at the margin – the poor, and the criminals whom Duterte calls living in ‘lowlives’ – have their bodies made into text by placing placards on them and parading them in
public and on marking their corpses when they are killed.” 247 This objectification of the
body is a form of humiliation and social exclusion, which not only sanctions killing, but also
communicates a “credible threat … that those who breached the law have actually been
punished. The killing of criminals in police operations, public spaces and in their homes
makes Duterte’s threats very real.”248 Meanwhile, that hardly any of these cases are
investigated supports Duterte’s message to the police that they need not worry about being
held accountable for the casualties of the drug war.
In this light, the proliferation of EJK images in the traditional print and broadcast
mass media as well as online channels rapidly normalized police and vigilante killings in the
popular consciousness. The tendency by the press to identify these “deaths under
investigation” with the “war on drugs” in a way bolstered the Duterte administration’s lawand-order narrative of delivering swift “justice” through the mass extermination of “social
enemies” who are concurrently demonized as criminals of the most deplorable stripe (e.g.
child rapists and murderers) in public discourses. The dominant way in which EJKs are
represented—bodies in plastic garbage bags, dumped like trash, abject and horrific—also
reinforce the idea that tokhang victims’ lives are not valuable, that they are expendable and
monstrous, less than human. As Duterte put it in a speech to the soldiers of the Eastern
Mindanao Command (EastMinCom), “Sabi ko nga [Like I said], crime against humanity? In
the first place, I’d like to be frank with you. Are they humans? What is your definition of a
human being? Tell me. Human rights. Use it properly in the right context, if you have the
brains.” 249
Thus objectified and turned into statistics and spectacles for reproduction, mass
consumption, remediation, and meme-fication, the body of the EJK victim is used to inscribe
a narrative that is central to the production of consent for the “war on drugs”: that of the
disposability of the lives it takes.
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In a 2017 speech addressed to the Philippine National Police, Duterte encouraged
police officers to do their duty of protecting the nation by eliminating criminals, saying,
“I’ve always told you that if you have to shoot, shoot them dead. … shoot them in the heart
or in the head. That’s the end of the problem.” In the same speech, he assured the police not
to hesitate or worry about the legal repercussions of killing, because as president, he had the
power to pardon them should they be convicted. What was more important, he said, was that
they fulfill their responsibilities of safeguarding the youth against the lure of illegal drug use,
and resist corrupt narco-politicians who may attempt to stop them from carrying out
justice.250 This speech is representative of the scores of “dangerous” speeches Duterte made
as the state’s commander-in-chief. Meant to consolidate support for the Duterte regime and
build a structure of justification for its flagship campaign against drug-related crimes, these
speeches, primarily addressed to the police and the military, “contain (1) explicit and
implicit orders to kill and (2) statements that endorse impunity, or assurances that law
enforcers responsible for the killings could be pardoned, to enjoy amnesty, if sued and found
guilty.”251 They also justify the use of lethal force in policing by emphasizing the gravity of
the drug problem, and the impossibility of following “due process,” given the lack of
resources for proper investigation, case-building, and criminal rehabilitation upon
conviction, as well as the corruption of the legal system and powerful politicians involved in
the drug trade.
That presidential speech, especially emanating from a figure so widely popular,
carries the weight of policy is amply demonstrated in the fatalities resulting from the “war on
drugs.”
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disseminated in traditional mass media (television, radio, print) by state agencies or members
of the press, and shared in social networking sites, thus engaging online publics in a country
where two-thirds of the population access the internet primarily through Facebook. 253
According to a study by Chua, Labiste, and Rara on Duterte’s anti-Catholic Church rhetoric,
even before the president’s speech is over, government radio, television and online
journalists are already recording it. Recordings of the event are almost immediately
publicly available through their official social media channels as well as within the
PCOO website. The PCOO accredits online influencers who report on the
president’s actions, the most vocal of whom are Margaux “Mocha” Uson, Sass Sasot
and RJ Nieto. With followers counting in the millions … these influencers regularly
engage their audiences, often using the same kind of strong language used by
Duterte to inspire reactions. 254
This constant engagement with digital publics, effected through emotionally
triggering (and emotionally exhausting) forms of expression and compounded by the news
media’s tendency to reproduce such expressions through its 24/7 news cycle, ensures that the
images and messages of Dutertismo maintain a constant presence in the mediascapes
frequented by Filipinos, whether they reside in the Philippines or abroad. Such is the
ubiquity of Dutertismo’s logic in Philippine mediascapes that attempts to enact forms of
counter-speech, be it by challenging the facts and “fake news” presented by pro-Duterte
propagandists, or extolling the value of human rights, remain trapped in the frame of the
agenda and arguments presented in the discourse of Dutertismo. The sociologist Nicole
Curato, referencing Benjamin Moffitt’s work on the rhetoric of populism, explains this
phenomenon as a function of “communicative hyperabundance,” by which a populist leader
exploits the contemporary acute scarcity of attention, seeking to dominate public
consciousness through the bombardment of messages using all available channels. The
constant incitement of emotional responses, and the emotional investment in an event that
this cultivates, for Curato, explains the “theatrical” underpinning of Duterte’s political style.
The dramatic tensions and “plot twists” that characterized his campaign trajectory, the
continuous and swift enactment of controversial policies, his penchant for offensive behavior
justified by his “authentic” personality—all these served to manifest Duterte’s visceral
repudiation of the elite-dominated status quo. Central to maintaining Duterte’s power is the
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continuous performance of spectacles of crisis, which justify the need for a strongman to
save the people from urgent, impending dangers in an unstable world. 255

“Makinarya”: The Bureaucratic Rationalization of Executive Speech
The mechanisms by which Dutertismo as a discourse of power operates to control
the narratives that shape public culture, especially the agenda, vocabulary, and tenor of
public discussions, is the subject of the song “Makinarya,” the opening track of
KOLATERAL (2019),256 a hip-hop concept album by Sandata, an artist collective founded by
playwright Mixkaela Villalon, rappers BLKD and Calix, and conflict and development
scholars and workers Abbey Pangilinan, Ica Fernandez, and Tanya Quijano. Drawing on two
years of research, including reviews of policy instruments (government memorandums,
circulars, reports, and executive, administrative, and mission orders) and media reports, as
well as key informant interviews with government personnel and those victimized by the
“drug war,” the album’s twelve tracks interrupt state discourse and retell the dominant
narratives of the “war on drugs,” privileging the stories and everyday experiences of those
who bear the brunt of the campaign—from an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) worrying
about their family back home (“DISTANSYA”), to young men feeling too scared to play
basketball in the streets after dark, for fear of being randomly targeted by the police to meet
their kill quota (“BOY”), to a woman mourning her lover, a victim of tokhang, while
cradling his dead body (“HAWAK”), to a child recalling how the police shot their father on
his bed (“PAPAG”). Insisting that “mga tao rin kami” (we are humans too) in the face of
dehumanization in a “blind war” (“GIYERA NA BULAG”), the album builds toward a
resounding call for popular resistance and rebellion against the “fascist regime” in its closing
track, “SANDATA” (weapon).
“Makinarya” is of particular interest because of the skill with which it lays bare the
“machinery” employed by Dutertismo, the ways by which Duterte’s speech, simultaneously
amplified in circulation and downplayed in impact by presidential spokespersons,
propagandists, and supporters as mere “joking,” bypasses “due process” while assuming the
trappings of legality, resulting in dangerous outcomes for targeted groups. In this way, it
Nicole Curato, “Doing Digong: Politics in the Wake of EDSA” (roundtable discussion,
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, August 2, 2016).
255

256

Kolateral, KOLATERAL, June 29, 2019,
https://oplankolateral.bandcamp.com/album/kolateral.

106

demystifies the operation of Duterte's "populism," showing that the power of Duterte's words
does not only emanate from his personal "charisma," but also from the bureaucratic
institutions that operationalize his speech. In the words of Kolateral, the song traces
the flowchart of accountability from the President’s decrees, down to the national,
regional, city, and street level government institutions. … The track begins with a
sound clip of one of President Duterte’s pronouncements wherein he encourages
policemen to execute drug addicts in the streets [the “shoot them dead” speech
quoted above]. The song’s initial beat is modeled after the sound of knocking, which
is derived from Operation Tokhang (a contraction of the Visayan words Katok and
Hangyo, to knock and plead. This is when police operatives knock on the doors of
suspected drug users and plead for them to surrender), the official operation of the
Drug War.257
Though the order "shoot them dead" emanates from above, the implementation of
the government’s drug interdiction campaign relies heavily on the cooperation and discretion
of low-level government workers (police and barangay/village officials) on the ground, who
must be persuaded to carry out unconstitutional directives from the chief executive in their
communities. Whose names are included in “drug watch lists” and how, which
neighborhoods are subjected to heightened surveillance and routine police operations, in
which cities the “war on drugs” can operate as mayors turn a blind eye to potentially abusive
operations carried out by local police who are answerable to them—“grassroots” agents play
a decisive role in determining how the campaign is carried out, but their collective actions
and decisions, the micropolitics of tokhang, as it were, are often overshadowed by the
ubiquitous presence of Duterte in discussions of the drug war.
“Makinarya,” in three movements, illustrates how Duterte’s speech comes to take
the force of official policy. The first movement assumes the perspective of Duterte as “Tatay
Digong,” the charismatic father of the nation, thanking his “children” who are the engines
that keep the “myth” of the “drug war” running, the myth that maintains that the deaths of
social undesirables (“salot na lango,” which can loosely be translated as “intoxicated plaguecarrying vermin”) are a small price to pay for the achievement of social order, progress, and
peace. Addressing Digong’s “children” and emphasizing the agency of rhetoric and
persuasion in this “war,” BLKD sings, “Kayo nang bahala kung paano ang galaw / Matayog
ang pangako, mababa ang tanaw / Tira lang ng tira 'gang walang matira / Bubusalan ang
mga mag bibida” (It’s up to you to actualize / My lofty promises and low vision / Just keep
shooting ‘til no one’s left / Silence those who dissent). In this “spectacle of war” (“Ito’y
Kolateral, “MAKINARYA [LYRIC VIDEO],” Facebook, April 12, 2019,
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=344969372809939 .
257

107

digmaan, ito ang pasinaya”), the law, the state budget, and news reports of thousands of
deaths (i.e. unresolved murder cases) serve as the “bullets” of the campaign, while the
president pulls the “trigger” of the “gun,” which are his words: “Ang aking salita ang siyang
magiging armas / Ang aking salita ang siyang magiging batas” (“My words will be your
weapon / My words will be law”). The first movement concludes with an instruction: My
children, promulgate my orders; don’t be afraid to drown in blood, for my words are your
weapon, and no one will be spared from my words. It is these words that, according to the
Philippine Commission on Human Rights, are “enabling … the brazen violation of human
rights in the country.” 258
The second movement explores the shadow bureaucracy underlying the “drug war.”
While Duterte’s speech is the “trigger” of the machinery, it operates with the coordinated
actions of government bureaucrats who translate Duterte’s autocratic speech into official
policies. Although in theory the bureaucracy of a democratic government is founded on a
system of checks and balances of power, in reality various offices of the Philippine national
government are not institutionally robust; the chief executive’s power to appoint many highlevel bureaucrats and determine the distribution of resources is just one example of deep seated structures of nepotism and patronage in government that often overrides official rules
and protocols. The song, however, is less concerned with the official bureaucracy, and more
with the informal economy of law enforcement, which is an essential cog in the drug war’s
complex system of rationalization. In this informal economy, the police are given “kill
quotas” which are proportionate to the inflated numbers of estimated drug addicts in the
Philippines. The fulfillment of these “kill quotas” entail corresponding monetary rewards; in
his speeches, Duterte speaks of this bounty, and the disbursement of funds for drug-related
killings by the police and vigilantes are well-documented in investigative reports. 259 By
countering the image of Duterte supporters and foot soldiers as mindless, emotion-driven
fanatics and bringing to the fore the rational system of government resolutions,
memorandums, marching orders, and monetary and security incentives for all those who
cooperate in the government’s campaign, “Makinarya” demythicizes the drug war and
exposes the banality of its “incomprehensible” “evil.”
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The third movement of the song takes the perspective of a police officer in the midst
of a tokhang operation. The police enter a community after notifying the village leader to
ensure their operation won’t be disrupted. As they are about to execute a target, the officer
voices hesitation to his senior officer: Sir, what about possible witnesses, the man’s wife and
children? They are not on the drug watch list. What is our protocol? The senior officer
silences him: “Wag mo na intindihan yan / Trabaho mo'y gawin mo nalang / Di mo ikakaasenso / Saka wala silang bilang” (Don’t mind them, just do your job, asking questions
won’t get you anywhere, and in any case, their deaths won’t be counted as part of the quota).
The final verse concludes with the victim/target protesting his innocence before being
gunned down, and then the sound of wailing, sampled from a recording of a woman crying
over her husband’s coffin, jolting the listener to the visceral reality of death and grief visited
by tokhang on families and communities.

Nightcrawlers: The Consumption of the Dead Body as Spectacle
The role of images in galvanizing support or condemnation for the “war on drugs” is
the subject of a critically-acclaimed documentary produced by National Geographic titled
The Nightcrawlers (2019).260 Juxtaposing the experiences of the nocturnal, non-state
participants of the drug war—the hired mercenaries who carry out two-thirds of drug-related
killings, and the band of photojournalists who follow the drug war beat and document the
killings and their aftermath—the documentary asks what allows “vigilantes” to kill with
impunity, and what the drives the journalists to continue producing images of this protracted,
violent campaign at great personal cost, despite seeming public tolerance of what, before
Duterte, was supposedly unacceptable. In doing so, the documentary yields insight into the
divergent structures of justification and motivation that divide the proponents and opponents
of Duterte’s policy and rhetoric.
The film opens with an idyllic shot of islands, mountains, and the sea at sunrise as
introduction to “the Philippines.” This idyllic isle and secret cove, however, is revealed to be
the hideaway of hired mercenaries, where they discuss and make plans for assassination
operations and train with firearms. “Bato,” the leader of a mercenary group having 87
members, says that when he kills, he imagines that he is St. Michael the Archangel, whose
role is to conquer and vanquish evildoers from the world. He says, “Ang pananaw ko lang
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naman sa buhay, hanggang may masasama, walang uunlad. Kaya dapat ang masasama ay
maubos, para umunlad ang mahihirap.” (My worldview in life is that, as long as there are
bad people, nothing will progress. That’s why we have to get rid of all the evildoers, so tha t
the poor can flourish.) Echoing Duterte, he asserts that drug use is a plague to society, and
that’s why he feels no remorse in killing drug users and pushers; instead, he feels gratified
that he’s able to help the government and contribute to the general welfare of society by
purging it of the “salot” (plague) of illegal drugs. He is far from alone in this view. He said
that his group of 87 vigilantes—a cell in a large organization of drug war mercenaries
allegedly numbering more than six thousand—rapidly grew in membership because
Duterte’s message resonated with many of them, since they or their families were personally
victimized by some drug addict. They also found strength in each other as a collective. One
of the members of their group, a young woman whose role is to infiltrate a targeted
community and familiarize herself and the group with its geography, the entrance and exits,
the habits of their targets, said that as a girl, she had been raped by a drug user, and so
helping in the government’s campaign is her way of avenging herself and preventing others
from suffering in a similar way. She says, “Para po sa akin, tama yung ginagawa ko. …
Hindi ako natatakot mamatay kung ang pinaglalaban ko naman po ay para sa kabutihan.”
(In my opinion, I’m doing the right thing. … I’m not afraid to die because what I’m fighting
for is the greater good.)
Complementing their more idealistic motivations is the attractive monetary
compensations of being a hired gun. The vigilantes interviewed in the documentary
repeatedly use the word “trabaho” (work/job) in talking about their missions. Bato says that
though he works as a tourist guide around the island, he earns more money from his
nighttime side job, for which he sometimes travels from his provincial residence to Metro
Manila. He is paid by his police handlers after every kill; he doesn’t ask where the money
comes from, but it goes a long way toward supporting his family. His family doesn’t know
that he kills for a living.
That the documentary begins with the perspectives of these anonymous foot soldiers
of the drug war is interesting to me, for they demonstrate how supposed “antagonists” are the
heroes in the stories that they tell. They thus provide a foil to the actual protagonists of the
documentary, the titular “nightcrawlers”: the band of journalists who stake out in Manila
Police District Stations every night, waiting for reports of killings that they can cover, then
rushing to various locations in Metro Manila to document crime scenes before the police can
take away the bodies. The film valorizes these journalists as courageous watchdogs who,
despite the threat of personal trauma and government repression, continue to record the
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nighttime killings usually hidden from the sleeping public and seek to counter the
government’s narrative of valiant cops vs. violent drug dealers and pushers. Foremost among
these journalists is the photographer Raffy Lerma, whose Inquirer front-page photo of a
woman in a dark street, cradling the dead body of her lover who was killed in a tokhang
operation became iconic for humanizing the victims of the war on drugs.

Fig. 3.1. "La Pieta": Jennilyn Olayres and Michael Siaron.
Photo by Raffy Lerma, retrieved from Raffy Lerma, "The Story Behind the Viral Photo," Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 31, 2016, https://opinion.inquirer.net/96101/the-story-behind-the-viral-photo.

Dubbed “La Pieta” for its visual resemblance to Michaelangelo’s representation of
Virgin Mary holding the prone body of Jesus in her lap after he is taken down from the cross,
the image sparked public outcry from the Catholic Church (who, earlier, was circumspect
about releasing official statements of condemnation of the drug war, wary of antagonizing a
popular president) and other sectors, prompting Duterte to attack the image in a national
address as being melodramatic. As one of the early iconic images of the war on drugs, this
photo has also served to attract international attention to the drug war, with one Atlantic
writer musing, “Can This Photo End Vigilante Killings in the Philippines?”261 The short
answer is, of course, that it did not; as the Atlantic writer himself observes, “since Lerma
took his photo, the killings have increased from 10 each day to 13.” 262 Yet, what this
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question brings to the fore is the righteous impulse that drives photojournalists to document
the "carnage" of the "war," even at the cost of their own security and sanity.
In Nightcrawlers, Lerma says that though covering the killings “chips away at your
humanity,” his purpose as a photojournalist is to document unfolding history. He says, “We
have a president who’s instigating that it’s okay to kill. And now, everyday, somebody is
going to get killed … we have to actively challenge what’s happening, because we know it’s
wrong. We know it’s wrong.” Nowhere in the documentary, however, do any of the
interviewed journalists articulate what exactly is wrong with the government’s campaign;
they do not have to, this is not asked of them, because the many clips of grieving families,
the photographs of bloody bodies on the pavement, are meant to speak for themselves and
communicate the present regime’s “immorality” and “injustice” (from the normative
perspective of liberal humanism). It is those who support the drug war who must explain and
justify their actions. There is a moment in the film, however, where the righteousness of the
journalists is questioned. In a human rights event in Bangkok, where the Nightcrawlers were
invited to exhibit their photos and give talks about their experiences in covering the war on
drugs, a Duterte supporter from the audience speaks out in the crowd. He asserts that the
photos exhibited don’t tell the story behind the drug war, that they decontextualize the
killings, presenting only images of casualties and not the reasons for them, nor why, despite
the violence, the majority of Filipinos continue to support the president. He says, “Narratives
will always be narratives. But the point here is this: the Filipinos are divided about the kind
of thought that they have about the president. … These people here [the journalists] they
have the one-sided thought, saying all these negativities. … The story behind all these, give
us sufficient data.” Gesturing around the exhibit hall and the drug war photographs, the man
keeps repeating, “these are all negativities,” but the journalists and other audience members
just laugh awkwardly at him, not deigning to respond to his impassioned objection. In raising
the issue of photography as a political and politicized medium, however, the man gestures
toward the contradictions that characterize competing representations and interpretations of
the drug war. In choosing to ignore such scruples and challenges to the principle of inherent
human rights, what material realities and social experiences does civil society also willfully
and conveniently ignore?

The “Slum Chronotopes” of Entrapment and Mobility in Buybust and Alpha, the Right
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In my conversations with those who support such policies as the war on drugs, or the
eviction of squatters, the demolition of informal settlements, and the arrest of street vendors,
what recurs is the moral-aesthetic notion of “cleanliness.” The killing of criminals, like the
relocation of slum dwellers even if it means depriving them of their livelihood, is about
“cleaning up” the city. In the section below, I discuss two cinematic representations of the
“war on drugs”: Erik Matti’s BuyBust (2018) and Brillante Mendoza’s Alpha, The Right to
Kill (2018). My interest in these feature films derives from their central preoccupation with
the slum as the site of tokhang, and thereby also a site of contestation, where the idea of
tokhang as justified “social cleansing” can be problematized, even as both filmic narratives
are told from the perspective of law enforcers. Furthermore, these films productively lend
themselves to readings that attend to the “intertextuality between cinema and geography,
particularly in terms of place and representation,”263 given that the “war on drugs” is an
urban-centered phenomenon, 264 while “the city is film noir’s setting of choice.”265 Set in
particular locales, they serve not only as cinematic records of the present, but also suggest
underlying histories that give credence to the scripts of the “drug war.” Lastly, as aesthetic
objects, they function as “configurations of experience that create new modes of sense
perception and induce novel forms of political subjectivity”266 by mediating popular
understandings of the social factors that justify state-sponsored mass killing. I contend that
foremost among these factors is differential access to what Arendt called “the right to have
rights,”267 which prompt both those included in, and those excluded from “humanity” and
“citizenship” to rely on violence to make or secure claims to the protection of rights.
I focus on these films’ depictions of the slum as a site of policing and political
action, as a “chronotope” of mobility and entrapment,268 where tensions between what
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Rancière calls the order of “policy” and the politics of “emancipation”269 are dramatized.
My objective is not to assess the films’ effectiveness in criticizing the “drug war”; rather, I
propose that reading these films through the lens of the slum chronotope allows us to trouble
liberal conceptions of justice and rights, which are too often taken for granted in political
analyses of Dutertismo. This implies the necessity for developing a critical perspective and
language that do not take the ontological status or normative desirability of so-called “liberal
democratic values” for granted.
In her discussion of film noir as a mode of contemporary Philippine urban cinema,
Katrina Macapagal observes that while the debate over whether film noir is “a genre, style,
or movement remains unsettled,” 270 given that the meanings attached to it change over time,
the specific themes evoked by its use as a discursive construct give it heuristic value. First of
these themes is the element of darkness. Preoccupied as it is with crime as characteristic of
urban modernity, noir scenes often happen in nighttime, which is associated with isolation,
moral degradation, and danger. As Macapagal put it, the “city in the shadow of the slum
chronotope is configured as a space where crime lurks at every corner, and is an experience
that is part of the everyday.”271 The darkness of film noir is also suggested by its narratives
of urban dystopia, that is, “a utopia that has gone wrong, or a utopia that functions only for a
particular segment of society.”272 For Macapagal, “The ‘noir-ness’ of the urban space in
slum cities like Manila ... are the flipside of industrial urban dystopias. ... In slum noirs, the
darkness of the future is not cast by imposing skyscrapers or flying cars as signs of extreme
urban modernity; instead, the darkness of slum noirs derive from the overwhelming presence
of slums.”273
The noir vision of the city privileges the world of the urban underclass, whose
spaces and temporalities seem out of sync with what Tadiar calls the “standardized
kinesthetic sensibility” of connection and circulation that characterizes the trans-territorial
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metropolis.274 In “City Everywhere,” Tadiar conceives of Metro Manila as emblematic of
“capital cities of the postcolonial Global South”275 that serve as “subaltern driver[s] of
global capital expansion” through the logic of “uber-urbanization.”276 This logic of liquidity,
which promotes flexibility and mobility in the pursuit of the “metropolitanist dream to be
‘world-class,’” 277 is exemplified by expressways, which link zones of economic productivity
and facilitate the flows of labor, commodities, money, information, and technologies.
Against this imaginary of the city as a globalized network of platforms and channels of
capitalist development, “the universe of film noir, with its harassed working-class
protagonists, petty criminals, seedy gambling joints, ramshackle urban neighborhoods, and
threatening skyscrapers, seems akin to a modern vision of purgatory.”278
The rise of Metro Manila slums can be traced to histories of colonial occupation that
underlie the urban development of the capital region. In the sixteenth century, during the
Spanish colonial period, the “walled city” of Intramuros in Manila was established as the
political, economic, and military center of the Spanish Empire in Asia. Intramuros (Latin for
“within the walls”) separated the Spanish colonial rulers from the non-Europeans who lived
outside the walled city. Beyond the walls, the inhabitants of Extramuros were likewise
racially segregated: indios (Filipino natives), Chinese, and Japanese occupied different
streets.279 This logic of segregation and ordering persisted through the American colonial
period, when the architects Daniel Burnham, and Pierce Anderson proposed, in 1905, "to
configure Manila under a 'City Beautiful' plan, which 'focused on the creation of a strong
central civic core, from which radiated an enlarged and ordered city linked by grand radial
and axial boulevards and embellished by plazas, fountains, parks, and playgrounds'
(Alcazaren et al. 2011 p. 5). The plan arguably 'sought to portray the colonial capital as an
ordered, hierarchical, formal, and therefore a civilized city' (Cabalfin 2014)." 280

Neferti X.M. Tadiar, “City Everywhere,” Theory, Culture & Society 33, nos. 7–8 (2016): 60,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276416675676.
274

275

Tadiar, “City Everywhere,” 61.

276

Tadiar, “City Everywhere,” 76.

277

Tadiar, “City Everywhere,” 59–60.

278

Edward Dimendberg, Film Noir and the Spaces of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004), 4.
279

Macapagal, “The Slum Chronotope,” 29.

280

Macapagal, “The Slum Chronotope,” 30.

115

While Manila underwent infrastructure development to cater to the commercial and
lifestyle requirements of Americans who took up residence in the city, migration from other
parts of the country to the capital steadily rose, leading to crowding and the rise of slum
settlements especially around the port area of Tondo, which today remains the largest and
densest of Manila’s sixteen districts. The American colonizers identified these settlements as
a social threat for being “breeding grounds for disease, crime, and sedition,” and attempted
to clear and relocate slum communities. 281 However, these efforts were interrupted by the
advent of war; the month-long Battle of Manila in 1945 between American and Japanese
forces razed the city. The postwar “independence” years, marked by rapid industrialization,
population growth, and uneven regional development further spurred migration from the
provinces to the capital. Slumification and the criminalization of informal settlers were
consolidated under the Marcos dictatorship. The Marcoses prioritized debt-financed
infrastructure modernization (including the construction of spaces of leisure and affluence,
such as theaters and hotels) aimed at attracting foreign investments and patronage at the cost
of displacing the urban poor, even as declining economic conditions drove disenfranchised
agricultural workers to Metro Manila to seek employment as stevedores, drivers,
construction and factory workers, waste pickers, etc. This differential urban development,
which privileges the rights of the dominant classes to the city, has persisted through the
history of Metro Manila’s urbanization. For instance, an investment guide by global financial
consultant KPMG released during the term of former president Benigno Aquino notes that
the administration’s development of transport systems is to “provide efficient connectivity
among markets, factory districts, residential communities, shopping areas, business districts,
recreation areas, schools and hospitals, ports and airports”282 —privileged spaces of economic
activity prioritized in the state and civil society’s visions of modernity.
With the growth of slums that accompany urban expansion came the emergence of
Manila noir as a cinematic genre. 283 Film noir, concerned with the representations of urban
space—including forms and means of mobility, communication and personal interaction, the
geographical distribution of resources, the organization of neighborhoods and the
segregation of populations—provides its audiences, in the words of Nino Frank, the
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“impression of real life, of lived experience, and—why not?—of certain disagreeable
realities that do in truth exist.”284 Through noir’s mediation of the realities of “this dirt, this
raw and dead-tired proletariat, craftily paid, craftily placed on the conveyor belt,” one might
discern what Ernst Bloch called “the genuine hollow space of capitalism.” 285 More than
serving as background for the action, the metropolis in film noir functions as a determinant
of mood, an element in narrative causality, and a metaphor of social reality, allowing
audiences a visceral means of recognizing and understanding their fragmented experiences
of urban life.286
The two films this section considers are set in Metro Manila slums that we know
about but hardly visit, whether physically or imaginatively. Though such places exemplify
the extreme inequality and squalor that characterize many global cities in both the North and
South, they are often kept out of sight of the cosmopolitan and mobile urban middle and
upper classes, their images scrubbed clean from state reports on economic growth. Similarly,
the inhabitants of slums are often shunned in modernizing projects by the state and
corporations. Instead, they are constructed as targets of moral repudiation and
criminalization, eviction and elimination. Nevertheless, these lives that gather underneath
flyovers and bridges, around waterways and landfills, are vital to the functioning of the city.
Slum-dwellers constitute a huge informal economy, provide cheap labor for globalized
markets, and sustain capitalist accumulation by dispossession.287 Films noir, in depicting
peripheral zones, not only illuminate alternatives to a universalizing vision of urban
modernity, but prompt us to consider the histories that underlie its dystopic conditions.

For Rancière, “the political” consists in the tension between the forces of “policy,”
defined as an order "of governing ... [that] entails creating community consent, which relies
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which is a process of "equality ... [that] consists of a set of practices guided by the
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supposition that everyone is equal and by the attempt to verify this supposition.”288 Between
these forces of dominance and democracy, “political subjectivization” occurs when those
who are marginalized by the exclusionary and governmental practices of policy defy the
ruling order by denying the identity (e.g. inhumanity, criminality, non-citizenship) accorded
to it by the other and staging “a polemical commonplace for the handling of a wrong and the
demonstration of equality.” 289
In the following sections, I focus on cinematic moments that allow each movie to
stage scenes of subjectivization in dialogue with the discursive formations of “rights” and
“justice.” I find that BuyBust demonstrates an understanding of rights as an object of
emancipation—the struggle for which often necessitates violence given the uneven terrain of
the political. In the words of Partha Chatterjee, “the emancipatory promise held out by the
idea of universal equal rights” is to “change unequal and unjust social differences of race,
religion, caste, class, or gender” maintained by structures of power. 290 This sentiment
resonates Balibar’s understanding of “human rights” as “both as the language by which
exploitation is masked, and that in which the class struggle of the exploited finds expression:
rather than a truth or an illusion, then, we are dealing here with the object of a struggle.”291
Meanwhile, Alpha: The Right to Kill presents a conceptualization of rights that is predicated
on hierarchy—that is, the order of policy, which finds expression in the film as a form of
necropolitics, or power that is located in “the right to kill,” to decide who may live and who
must die, wielded by state actors as agents of institutionalized racism.292

BuyBust, an action thriller co-written and directed by popular “genre” filmmaker
Erik Matti, revolves around the attempt of an elite anti-narcotics squad from the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) to capture the elusive drug lord Biggie Chen with the
help of a mid-level drug dealer-turned-informant named Teban initiating a buy. The
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undercover operation goes wrong. The buy-bust is revealed to be a setup not for Biggie
Chen, but for the law enforcers, and the PDEA agents find themselves trapped in the drug
lord’s stronghold: Gracia ni Maria, a fictional, maze-like shantytown in Tondo. Hunted by
Biggie Chen’s men led by Chongki, as well as by Gracia residents fed up with being the
victims of violence by both state forces and drug syndicates, the PDEA agents must fight
their way out of Gracia in the course of one rainy night, knowing that “Hudas,” or a traitor
from their ranks sold them out to be slaughtered.
Crucial to the film’s narrative is the looban as a slum chronotope of entrapment. The
“chronotope,” in the literary theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, “refers to spatio-temporal
configurations in literary texts through which narrative meanings are created and derived.”293
Appropriating Bakhtin’s concept to discuss Manila noir, Macapagal proposes the concept of
the “slum chronotope” as “the privileged structuring artistic expression that enables narrative
unfolding in Philippine urban cinema,” serving as “the mediating form that bridges the real
and imaginary worlds of slums” by taking “specific configurations only when located in
historically-specific urban contexts.”294 The looban (literally meaning “inside”) as a feature
of Metro Manila slums refers to a congested inner-city area that is hidden from the view of
those not from the looban. It is a spatial order that literally and visually separates slumdwellers from the other inhabitants of the city.295 While the looban is produced by and
productive of the hierarchical segregation of space and people, and maintained by
governmental practices of border-keeping and policing, the looban could also be a space
where those who are “thrown out” of the global city may exercise agency in their everyday
lives, following an order different from that of state policy.
This is highlighted when the PDEA agents descend upon Gracia ni Maria. A slum
teeming with “informal” residents eking out a living beside a public cemetery and the tracks
of the Philippine National Railway, prominently featuring a mosque as well as a brothel cum
beerhouse, Gracia is described by Teban as a pit of contradictions: “Labo-labo dun,
karambola ng mga sanggano at santo.” The official subtitles translate this sentence thus:
“It’s a free-for-all there, where sinners and saints collide.” But “malabo” literally means
vague, unclear, while “labo-labo” could mean chaotic, disordered, contradictory, unpinnable.
It connotes a world out of joint, beyond knowing, ungovernable. Following the PDEA agents
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as they move within the confines of Gracia, one immediately apprehends that it is not the law
enforcers who are laying siege and bringing order to this supposed hotbed of criminal
activity; it is they who are besieged by it. Rule of law not only does not apply in this zone of
informality; it is upended and displaced by more paradoxical forms of conduct. At the
entrance to Gracia, guarded by Biggie Chen’s men, led by Chongki, the undercover agents
posing as Teban’s hired guns surrender their firearms. Completely unfamiliar with the place,
they are led in circles by Chongki through Gracia’s labyrinthine passages. They walk down a
crooked, narrow, slippery-looking alley with the sign “Daang Matuwid” overhead. “Daang
Matuwid” or “The Straight Path” is the slogan of the previous administration of President
Benigno Aquino, whose vaunted achievements in combating corruption and spurring
economic development is little-felt in places like Gracia. Meanwhile, a second team of
agents crouch in the shadows, trailing the first group, cradling M16 rifles, lost but for the
sounds of Teban making conversation.
The characters’ movement within Gracia allows the audience to visualize the social
costs of heightened policing under the war on drugs: children carrying knives for selfprotection, funerals for the murdered becoming frequent and commonplace events in the
neighborhood, residents shutting themselves indoors after dark. Caught in constant clashes
between the police and the drug dealers in their midst, ever under threat of tokhang, the
people of Gracia have found it impossible to lead peaceful lives. Even getting a good night’s
sleep is a tall order, intensifying social tensions. The maze-like alleys of Gracia, containing
too many bodies in too little space, create a feeling of always being surrounded, by makeshift
walls threatening to collapse and close in, and by people; this feeling of inescapable, ambient
intimacy is heightened by the soundscape of steadily pattering rain, the neighbors’ domestic
quarrels, dinner conversations, and TVs blaring news reports or budots (local EDM) music.
The agents who find themselves entrapped are much like the people inside Gracia
who are also trapped by their circumstances. As Solomon—a community leader, who
spurred Gracia residents to attack the PDEA agents as well as Biggie’s men—says to their
“guests,” “Tingnan niyo ang pinagdadaanan namin dito sa araw-araw. Kung nahihirapan
kayo, paano pa kami? Ito na ang buhay namin.” (Look at what we have to suffer every day.
If this is difficult for you, what more for us? This has become our life.) As the agents serve
as the audience’s avatars in Gracia, Solomon might as well be addressing all those who
spectate and condone tokhang from a safe distance afforded by privilege.
The film suggests that the redress of wrongs through the application of rules depends
on the social distribution of power, rather than on any presumption of inalienable rights. The
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residents of Gracia, designated as non-humans and non-citizens, surplus populations
characterized by dominant classes as disposable, have no hope of recourse to law in the
context of a political and economic field skewed against them. In order to redress the wrong
committed against their community, then, they must, as it were, take matters into their own
hands as a direct enactment of an equality that is accorded to them by law but is not
substantiated in fact. Thus, they decide to defy victimhood and participate in the fray
between the crime syndicate and the state, slaying as many as they could, just as they have
been decimated by extrajudicial killings. Far from being “empty” and “senseless” violence,
the concerted action of Gracia residents is a spontaneous combustion of long-burning
resentment over the experience of continuous injustice. It is a revolt against the status quo.
This revolt also dramatizes a crisis for the focal character, PDEA agent Manigan, as
she realizes how she has been complicit in the same system that killed the comrades she has
been seeking to avenge. The futility of looking to the state for the redress of wrongs is
highlighted in the final confrontation between Manigan and Biggie Chen. At this point, all of
Manigan’s comrades have been killed, Biggie is poised to escape Gracia with the help of
high-ranking law enforcers in his payroll, and all Manigan wants is to know who Hudas
really is, so she can take her revenge. This is the only part where the film, which has been
characterized by predominantly commentary-free action, indulges in polemics. Biggie’s
revelations to Manigan, delivered with barely reigned-in anger and sneering disdain for her
naive faith in the institution she serves, emphasize two points: one is the nexus between drug
lords and public officials, and the other is the political economy of the illegal narcotics trade
under Duterte’s drug war.
The first point is seemingly simple, embedded in the common sense as a variant of
the Dutertist claim that the Philippines is a “narco-state”: high-ranking public officials
maintain commercial interests in drug trafficking and use their power to protect their illicit
businesses, while members of law enforcement agencies, including the military, the police,
and even the PDEA, are involved in protecting drug lords. Thus, ultimately, the “war on
drugs” is futile, a ruse even, because many of its executioners, if not its architects, are
complicit in drug trafficking, whether directly as drug dealers themselves, or indirectly, by
providing protection to drug cartels. The second point concerns the expanded opportunities
for police profiteering afforded by the existing culture of impunity further abetted by the
government’s anti-drug campaign. These include extorting money from drug suspects during
arrest or detention, stealing victims’ belongings during tokhang operations, demanding
money for ransom after the abduction of drug suspects, receiving “bonuses” or cash rewards
for every “drug personality” killed, and getting commissions from funeral parlors where the
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bodies of the slain are taken after police operations. 296 But Biggie goes beyond pointing
fingers at “corrupt” individuals among the police pursuing their self-interest and leveraging
the virtual immunity to sanctions that the “war on drugs” affords them. Instead, in
emphasizing the political economy of drug trafficking in the Philippine context, he presents a
critique of social inequality and systemic corruption; this critical perspective is often absent
in the Dutertist characterization of the drug problem that focuses on individual depravity and
the need to “cleanse” society of such “bad apples.” 297 When Biggie reveals that “Hudas” is
PDEA Director Alvarez, who also reports to someone above him in the chain of command,
the color drains from Manigan’s face.
After a final skirmish, Manigan is able to capture Biggie. Morning comes. Dragging
him out of Gracia, she meets the residents who had been hunting them. In a quiet moment of
mutual humanization so different from the frenzied fighting of last night, she pleads with
them to let her pass and take Biggie with her, saying that even if they were to kill him here,
another drug lord would just take his place. They ask her if arresting Biggie would make a
difference. She says, It may or it may not. But everyone needs to know what happened here
last night. The residents step aside. Outside Gracia, she finds Director Alvarez waiting for,
then hugging her in commiseration, lauding her as a hero. We finally got Biggie Chen, he
says. This is why we really must continue the drug war. Manigan only stares at him blankly.
In this moment, Manigan looks so lost, as if realizing that all that has happened might be for
nothing, that no prosecution of Alvarez would ensue. As they get into the police vehicle,
Alvarez speaks on his phone, addressing the person on the other end as “Sir,” and assuring
him that No, Sir, you won’t be hit by any fallout from this. As he ends the call, he draws his
gun and shoots Biggie Chen dead. Aiming the gun at Manigan, he asks, Are you with us? In
response, Manigan wrests the weapon from him, kills Alvarez, shoots herself in the leg,
places the gun in Biggie’s hands, and takes Alvarez’s cellphone as evidence. Asked by other
officers to explain what happened, she gives the usual police excuse, deployed in
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détournement, articulated as covert resistance: “Nanlaban yung suspek.” (The suspect fought
back.)
The ending scene epitomizes the critical-pedagogical intent of BuyBust. While for
most of the film, the cinematography focused on eye-level and low-angle shots, medium
shots and close-ups, training the audience’s eyes on Manigan’s expressions, close-quarter
combat scenes, and the way the cramped spaces of the slum teem with bodies and constrain
their movement, now the camera takes the perspective of a bird’s eye, or of god, flying high
above the shanties of Gracia to the sound of morning birdsong. The film ends with a long
aerial shot, revealing hundreds of corpses choking alleys and lying splayed on rooftops down
below.298 It is a powerful image that concretizes the numbers and statistics rattled off in
reports about the drug war. What does thirty thousand dead look like? One can imagine the
destruction and fatalities in Gracia ni Maria done thirty times over. Meanwhile, in voiceover
we hear a news report about the encounter in Gracia. The broadcaster lauds the “success” of
the drug war in the capture of Biggie Chen, restates Duterte’s congratulations to PDEA, and
says that according to the police, a total of only thirteen people, including pushers, agents,
and local residents, died in the encounter.
The final scene not only drives home the social costs of a unilateral “war” whose
“combatants” consists of the most vulnerable class, a “war” that continues to be justified by
the systematic erasure of victims’ narratives through misinformation seeded in the media.
The drone footage also depicts a stark demarcation between the slum community and,
beyond the river bordering it, the upper- and middle-class neighborhoods in the city, which
are not visited by the kind of tragedies that routinely afflict places like Gracia. The final shot
is that of the Manila skyline, featuring steel and concrete towers against a background of
bright, open skies. In this way, BuyBust shows the divide between the ghettoized slum—a
zone of illicit activity, erased histories, and death hidden from view—and the fair spaces of
legitimacy, capitalist order, liberal choices, and economic productivity. What this depiction
of stark contrast obscures is how the two worlds are linked: how the word of order, choice,
and productivity depends on the ghetto.
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Alpha, the Right to Kill, by acclaimed independent filmmaker Brillante Mendoza,
likewise features a buy-bust operation, conducted by a SWAT team of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) in cooperation with a district police officer, Sgt. Moises Espino, and
his “alpha” or informant Elijah. Unlike in BuyBust, the sting operation here is successful: the
drug lord, his men, and a few others are killed in a shootout, arrests are made in Barangay
San Miguel, a slum in Mandaluyong City, and packets of shabu are confiscated by the
police. In the midst of the commotion, Sgt. Espino steals a backpack full of money and
methamphetamine from the dead body of the drug lord Abel, and instructs Elijah to turn the
contraband into cash: Gawin mong pera yan ah, Espino says as he hands Elijah the packs of
shabu. Elijah makes very little money for himself off of this trade; the policeman takes
almost all of the profit. Elijah does as he is told because he has to buy milk for his infant
daughter, and Espino threatens every now and then to put him back in jail. After a number of
drug deals, Elijah is able to deliver a hundred thousand pesos (almost two thousand US
dollars) to Espino. Espino deposits the money in a bank, and then goes to the house of his
police chief, discreetly, to deliver a small crate.
The film explores the dynamics of the illegal drug trade, implicating not only bigtime drug lords and enterprising drug runners from the slums, but also police officers who
reap substantial profits from drug trafficking. In contrast to BuyBust, Alpha is concerned less
with portraying a human drama of death, resistance, and disillusionment as configured by the
looban as a slum chronotope of entrapment, and more with depicting the strategies employed
in small-time drug running within the slum setting as a chronotope of mobility. The slum in
Alpha is more complexly represented than that in BuyBust; while the latter was shot on a set
constructed from scratch, the former, shot on location, evidences Mendoza’s commitment to
physical realism, or “the filmic presentation of the built environment of slums and urban
spaces (especially the kind of reality produced through and because of contingencies while
filming).” 299 This complexity is reflected in the physical structures of the slum, as well as
the composition of its inhabitants, who include “not only the un- and underemployed and
members of the informal sector but also major segments of the middle classes such as
policemen, teachers, nurses, office clerks, sales personnel.”300 In Alpha, we see not only
eskinitas or narrow alleys winding down densely crowded and dilapidated shanties beside an
estero or smelly canal, but also a church, a public school, a wet market, and a police
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station—features of a typical barangay in the Philippines. What marks this setting as a slum
area are practices of heightened policing, border-keeping, and surveillance: CCTVs, roaming
police personnel, and local volunteers performing body searches are a constant presence in
the film’s rendition of space, as if everyone who inhabited the barangay posed a threat to
public security and order just by being there. Driven to practices of informality, such as
street-vending, squatting, or trading in contraband, the characters in the story occupy, to
varying extents, zones of illegality, their social positions always precarious and contingent.
Early on, the film depicts a minor buy-bust operation, a prelude to the bigger sting
operation in the evening. In a public market, at high noon, a fruit vendor is slicing overripe
mangoes and slipping small packets of shabu into the slits. Sgt. Espino, dressed in plain
clothes, watches as Elijah approaches the vendor to try to buy drug-filled mangoes. After
Elijah walks away with a plastic bag of the goods, Espino runs after the vendor around the
market, finally catching him, and brings him to the police station. As the commotion of the
chase subsides, market activities continue, business as usual.
This scene illustrates the hierarchical relationship between Espino and Elijah, as well
as the parallels between them: Espino directs Elijah’s activities, but where Elijah goes (to the
market, to the church, to a drug den, to a dumpster), Espino is soon to follow. Both Espino
and Elijah are depicted as loving “family men,” devoted to their wives and caring to their
offspring, who strive to fulfill their domestic responsibilities to the best of their abilities;
both are held in esteem in their respective social groups. Both have day jobs (Elijah is
employed as a janitor in the police station where Espino works) and deal drugs on the side;
both answer to a superior who decides whether they could live or die. Despite the relation of
dominance between them, then, they are quite similar, and mirror each other in their “sins”
and “pieties.” While they both have a foot in the zone outside of legality, what distinguishes
them is class difference: as a subaltern subject, Elijah is dependent on his boss for survival,
and subject to constant suspicion and surveillance; Espino, relatively safeguarded by his
authority, uses Elijah to displace risk and better his middle-class life. The film uses the slum
chronotope of mobility to illustrate how different characters move through time and space
differently on the basis of their social position. While Elijah’s time is continuously
interrupted by security checks and calls from his boss, his movement through space impeded
by physical markers of his class (bleached hair, tattoos, ragged clothes, slippered feet),
Espino has a wider ambit of movement, a master of his own time. While Elijah is generally
confined to the garbage recycling facility where he lives with his wife and child, the police
station, and the streets, Espino drives around town, goes to church, attends parent-teacher
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meetings, deposits money in the bank, and reports to his chief in the latter’s poolside
residence.
The market scene in the beginning also marks a prime preoccupation of the film: that
of drug trading as a commercial enterprise, which, illicit as it is, demands of its purveyors
innovation and cunning—or, in local parlance, diskarte, a trait that always has a positive
connotation, even if it is expressed in acts of impropriety or illegality. To be madiskarte is to
employ stratagems to outwit opponents or overcome obstacles to one’s aim. Given the
differential mobilities of characters in the narrative, successful drug running involves ruses
like using homing pigeons to deliver drugs, or taping packets of shabu into the inner lining of
a baby’s diaper to avoid detection in an environment of heightened surveillance.
Such emphasis on drug running as a market activity undertaken by both the scraggy
street urchin and the uniformed man in public office, rather than a health problem or even a
public security crisis, allows the film to capture the ironies and contradictions of Philippine
capitalist society. For example, in a scene immediately succeeding one where he commits
murder, Espino goes to church and sings hymns with his family. No evidence of moral
conflict torments any of the characters involved, whose struggles for survival leave no space
for such scruples. Rather than a shared notion of the common good or collective rights, what
binds characters in Alpha are ties of patronage, business, and family. The only act of charity
depicted is when Elijah comes to a drug dealer’s house to sell shabu, bringing his little
family as cover. The drug dealer, finding Elijah’s baby “cute,” hands him a thousand-peso
bill.
Decoupled from the Dutertist discourse of the immorality and animality of those
involved in its trade and use, narcotics become an everyday matter of business, formal or
otherwise: people buy and sell and resell shabu not because they wish to destroy society, or
because they are drug-addled and depraved, but simply to make a living in a world that
constrains their options for other ways of making do. It is notable that not one of the
characters portrayed in the film embodies the popular stereotype of the crazed meth addict
who rapes and pillages and kills. The dealers and runners portrayed in the film are calm and
level-headed, even jovial, “ordinary.” Violence only comes to play with the interdiction of
an illicit substance; otherwise, drug trafficking, as a market activity, feeds into other market
activities: it spurs the sales of materials used as drug paraphernalia, its proceeds go to the
purchase of essential commodities like food and baby diapers, it pays for rent and children’s
education, it earns police bonuses for kills, it leads to huge cash deposits in the bank
accounts of public officials.
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What distinguishes film noir from the crime drama is that the former privileges the
perspective of the “ordinary citizen” who commits crime, allowing us to understand how
events in his milieu might have led him to violate the law; given this subjective experience
of criminality, the determination of wrongness, guilt, and justice becomes an issue not only
of legality.301 Alpha dramatizes the way in which whatever value is accorded to principles
like patriotism or the protection of human rights is paid for in lip service. For example,
before the SWAT-led sting operation, the police chief tells his men that they are doing this
for their country and for the next generations. What they do is kill ten civilians (aside from
the drug lord Abel and his armed henchmen) and take ten more into police custody. Upon
being questioned by the press about the human rights of the suspects and casualties, the
police chief says that while killing is often inevitable during encounters, they ensure that
they protect human rights and do things “by the book.” When a reporter asks why there are
so many dead, the chief of police replies, What else would you expect from a “war”? The
dialogue suggests that the police take it for granted that the proper approach to the drug
problem is violence; nowhere in this exchange does one get a clear idea of what human
rights are about, why they are important, what it means for the state to uphold them, how the
protection of rights is concretely manifested, or what sort of claims people can make on the
basis of these rights.
Instead, the film conceives of “rights” as founded on not inherent “humanity,” or
even legality, but hierarchy. The “right to kill” derives from the cinematic fact that everyone
is implicated in corruption, criminality, and sin. Mendoza takes pains in Alpha to depict how
everyone in the community is culpable in proliferating drug use: the crowded shanties house
or surround drug dens, the neighborhood sari-sari stores sell aluminum foil used to burn
crystal meth, drugs are peddled in the tiangge or flea market. The constant checks by
volunteer law enforcers from the community also reinforce the idea that everyone in the area
is potentially guilty, and needs to be policed. Hence, in one way or another, in the film's
narrative logic, all deserve some kind of punishment. Who gets to mete out such punishment,
and how severe it must be, is determined by differentials in power. In this sense, political and
economic resources, influence, and vertical relations of patronage (kapit sa padrino) are
necessary for the exercise and protection of supposedly inalienable rights, as well as for the
violation of the rights of others without accountability to the law. That is to say, the
recognition of rights becomes a function of power.
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In the patron-client relationship between the alphas and their handlers or superiors as
represented in this film, we recognize the dynamic of asymmetry that persists in multiple
levels and domains of Philippine society—a dynamic that the film naturalizes with the
techniques of documentary and realist cinema, such as the use of stock footage, handheld
and shaky cameras, gritty textures, sepia-toned lighting, aerial shots of the city, and the
reenactment of journalistic representations of the drug war. Alpha begins and ends with
scenes of police parades. Despite its purported indictment of the institutional corruption of
the police force, Mendoza’s film nevertheless serves the order of policy by perpetuating the
narrative of deserved or inevitable victimhood.
BuyBust and Alpha use the slum chronotopes of entrapment and mobility to
dramatize the tensions between the order of policing and the politics of emancipation,
arriving at differing conceptions of rights. While BuyBust suggests that the process of
emancipation is underpinned by the notion of rights as an object of political struggle, Alpha
shows how one’s claim to rights is enabled by a system of domination that allows differential
access to the very right to have rights. What is apparent is that both of these notions of rights
are rooted in the historical failure of the state to safeguard the rights of its citizens equally.
This failure may be traced to the persistence of colonial logic that selectively applies
ascriptions of humanity or rights-bearing citizenship on the basis of social segregation (along
the lines of race, class, gender, religion, or ethnolinguistic identity) and hierarchy. It is also
underpinned by material factors that prevent the state from fulfilling its pastoral functions,
that is, its end of the social contract, especially in spaces of informality, which are
characterized by the retreat of state governance. Such conditions give rise to the paradox of
rights and violence. If violence is to be understood as the violation of norms, rules, and
rights,302 it is paradoxical that violence (as civil disobedience or revolt against repression) is
often necessary in the process of making a claim to rights, and thereby to justice.

While liberal democratic discourse emphasizes the supposed inalienability and
universality of human rights, it is clear that in practice, “humanity” as a biopolitical and
moral category, as well as “personhood,” “citizenship” and attendant rights as legal
constructs, are selectively applied. In the discourse of Dutertismo, those who commit crimes
(or are accused of doing so) lose “humanity” as an ascribed status, and thereby also the right
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to have rights. Constructed as enemies of the nation—as threats to social order, public
security, and national development in the context of a country with scant resources for
welfare services, much less for criminal rehabilitation—their lives are deemed worthy only
of the prize for, the money made or saved in the process of, their elimination. In the
succeeding chapter, I discuss how Dutertismo’s war imaginary is enabled by the
normalization of the “disposability” of undesirable populations in the public consciousness,
and justified by the dream of development that the extermination of these populations is
purported to serve.
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4. DEVELOPMENT AND DISPOSABILITY

“Criminals Have No Humanity”: “Garbage Humans” in the Slums
In a media interview with Duterte in Cebu in March 2017, concerning his alleged
culpability for crimes against humanity, he avows, “If you kill criminals, it is not a crime
against humanity. The criminals have no humanity.”303 Such sentiments echo his earlier
justifications for killing suspected drug personalities: “You must remember that those who
are already in[to] shabu [crystal meth] for almost one year, they are dead. They are the living
walking dead. They are of no use to society anymore. And yet we have to sequester [funds]
for them. We have to feed them because they are human being[s]. And we need money [for
that] and where do we get the money [for that]?”304 Such statements, routinely reproduced
by state propagandists and Duterte supporters, circulated in mass media, and translated to
policing strategy, effectively decouple the human and this being’s entitlement to rights, a
relation that is socially determined and evaluated, predicated on the being’s perceived
humanity (morality) and utility to society (capitalist productivity). In this context, it matters
not that these rights are assured by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, made legally
binding under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as
Philippine law. These legal instruments and obligations are swept aside because of material
considerations, a move that is hardly shocking to a public well-aware that the “equal” rights
and protections supposedly guaranteed by the law are unequally distributed in practice.
The targets of Oplan Tokhang (the official name of the “drug war”) and the places
often visited by vigilante killings are telling: “in all but one of the cases investigated by
Human Rights Watch, the victims of drug-related killings by the police or unidentified
gunmen were poor … and many were suspected drug users, not dealers at all. Almost all of
the victims were either unemployed or worked menial jobs, including as rickshaw drivers or
porters, and lived in slum neighborhoods or informal settlements.”305 Etienne Balibar uses
Republic of the Philippines PCOO, “Media Interview with President Rodrigo Roa Duterte
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the phrase “the ‘death zones’ of humanity” to refer to those places that contain “what some
Latin American sociologists provocatively call población chatarra, ‘garbage humans,’ to be
‘thrown’ away, out of the global city.” These “garbage humans” include “populations which
are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always already superfluous, and
therefore can be only eliminated either through ‘political’ or through ‘natural’ means.”306
Whence come these garbage humans? Postwar reconstruction, rapid industrialization in the
1950s, population growth, and uneven regional development spurred migration from the
countryside to the city. The ballooning of the population in urban centers meant increased
demand and competition for scarce employment, space, and other means of subsistence.
Zygmunt Bauman asserts that “an inevitable outcome of modernization, and an inseparable
accompaniment of modernity,” with its mechanisms of “economic progress,”
“globalization,” and “order-building,”307 is the generation not only of industrial waste, but
also of “human waste”—that is, “surplus populations” comprising redundant laborers and
flawed consumers who lack the means to actively participate in the processes of production
and consumption in a market society.308 Though the problem of superfluous and undesirable
populations, “weigh ever more heavily on the … consumerist culture of individualization,”309
to these “wasted lives,” Bauman relegates a number of social functions: one, they constitute
an expedient “object of … resentment,” “the target on which the anger” and anxieties of the
relatively secure yet threatened citizens in the social order may be unloaded 310 ; two, their
confinement and segregation from the “useful” members of the population lends the policing
state an appearance of legitimacy amidst its helplessness in the face of unregulated market
forces, and; three, they are the rubbish collectors of a consumerist society obsessed with the
gratification of insatiable desires for commodities, but reluctant to deal with the refuse of
material accumulation.311 In this ruthless logic, it makes sense that unwanted people take
care of unwanted things. Ghettoed and hidden from view, “garbage humans” are, at best,
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objects of charity and pity, often ignored, usually targets of criminality, criminalization, and
scorn.

My interest in “disposability” as a framework for understanding the effects of
globalization, modernization, capitalism, and neo/colonialism in structuring Filipino lives as
expendable derives from two experiences: visiting the community around Smokey Mountain,
a dumpsite in Manila, and reading F.H. Batacan’s Smaller and Smaller Circles, a crime
novel set in Payatas, a dumpsite in Quezon City.
Smokey Mountain is an old garbage slum in the port district of Tondo, an area
whose “slum problem” dates back to the early 1900s, when rural-urban migration to Manila
spurred by international trade, shipping, and commerce met the intransigence of insufficient
housing. Though it was officially closed by the government in 1995 after 40 years of
operation, Smokey Mountain endures as a site and symbol of poverty and social inequality in
the Philippines. It began in the 1950s as an unplanned dumpsite, and was n amed as such
for the fumes and fires that regularly broke out in the landfill, where the decomposition of
organic material produced combustible methane gas. The Pacific War of the previous decade
had resulted in massive infrastructure destruction (especially in the capital city of Manila,
which was bombed by US air forces in 1945 to drive out Japanese soldiers hiding in
buildings), the disruption of the agricultural economy in the countryside, and social
dislocation. Amid postwar rehabilitation—facilitated by war payments and economic aid
disbursed by the United States to its former colony in return for the right to continue
exploiting the country’s natural resources and maintaining military bases in the
archipelago—peasants from the provinces came to Manila seeking work, settling in slums,
finding livelihood in the elaborate garbage economy. The city’s trash thus became a major
source of income for trash pickers or mangangalahig, garbage collectors, recyclers, and junk
shop operators.
Smokey Mountain came to global attention in 1987, when James Fallows, writing
for The Atlantic about (re)democratization in the Philippines following the flight of the
Marcoses in 1986 after 14 years of dictatorship, used it as the very image of the degradation
of Philippine society. In his infamous essay, “A Damaged Culture,” Fallows “offers a dark
view of a nation not only without nationalism but also without much national pride” and
explains how Filipino culture, “heavily shaped by nearly a hundred years of the ‘Fil-Am
relationship,’” has made “a naturally rich country poor.” Using Smokey Mountain to
illustrate the extremes of wealth inequality in the Philippines, where the rich live behind high
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walls and gated estates guarded by rifled marksmen, while the masses eke out a liv ing in a
decaying metropolis and "say they feel lucky to do so." 312
In 2013, a friend working for GIZ, the German agency for international development
cooperation, invited me to a field trip to Smokey Mountain with his colleagues, German and
Swiss consultants working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Republic of the
Philippines’ Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Department of
Health (DOH) . Except for another woman in our group, a Filipina fashion designer who had
studied in Milan, all the other participants in our party of eight were foreigners working in
international development aid, which, since the 1980s (and the structural reforms mandated
by the IMF and World Bank), has been essential in helping address “governance gaps”
between public welfare demands and the austerity-oriented state’s inability to meet them.
Our excursion was facilitated by a tourism agency called Smokey Tours, whose
signature activity was the “slum tour” in Smokey Mountain.313 Smokey Tours was founded
by Juliette Kwee, a Dutch woman who had been living in the Philippines and doing
volunteer work for NGOs. Talking about why she founded the tour, Kwee echoes the image
of normalized inequality depicted by Ribay's Patron Saints of Nothing, discussed in Chapter
Two, which obscures the exploitative relations that underlie poverty, and frames acts of
"helping" the less privileged within the humanist logic of charity. She says, “I went to
Smokey Mountain and I was so touched by the community. But I also sometimes go to this
posh park in Makati and I was shocked. [They’re] only half an hour from each other. I
started thinking, ‘how can we connect this [sic] two worlds?’ … We organized a
photowalk and called some photographers to take photos of the children and to show the
resiliency [sic] of the community.” She then put up a photo exhibit about Smokey Mountain
to send “a powerful message that one could be happy without material things as long there is
love, food, and the opportunity for education.”314 In establishing Smokey Tours, she got
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Chris Way, the British co-founder of Mumbai-based Reality Tours and Travel, which
organizes slum tours in Dharavi, on board as consultant. 315
On the day of the excursion, one Saturday morning, the four of us who lived in the
same village took a cab from Quezon City to Tayuman, in northern Manila, where our guide
met us and brought us to the slum community called Barangay Happy Land (a common
designator for garbage slums that plays on the Visayan word hapilan, meaning “dumpsite”).
As we alighted from the vehicle, our local guide gave us rubber boots to wear and reminded
us not to take any photographs as we walked through the community’s alleys, out of respect
for the residents. Of the experience, I wrote in my journal in August 2013:
Today I learned how the people of Smokey Mountain eke out a living on a toxic
swamp of mud and garbage, breathing methane from waste and smoke from charcoal
pits, scavenging in mounds of trash dumped there every day by barges and trucks
from all over the metropolis, looking for paper, plastics, tires, or metals. Women sell
leftover food scavenged from the waste bins of restaurants around Manila, rinsed,
ground, coated in batter, and deep-fried. After the mangangalahig [“chicken
scratcher,” a term for scavengers] sort through the trash to extract materials that can
be sold or recycled, the remainder is burned or dumped into the sea. The residents
exist in the most execrable living conditions. I've been to slums before, but Smokey
Mountain is of a different league. This land was reclaimed from the sea with the
dreck of decades. Nothing on the "ground" but black, bubbling mud, rubbish, and
excrement. Large flies buzzing on every imaginable surface, turning nylon
clotheslines black. The air so foul I wish I could stop breathing. Children running
around covered in soot, bathing in the polluted estuary. Fly-ridden bananacue and
other street food sold right beside the garbage dump. The charcoal pits seemed like
something out of Dante's Inferno, but in a shack in the village square, children were
singing Christian hymns.
On a rest break, I chatted with one of the children, barely ten years old, making
charcoal. He told me that he used to attend lessons in the community school (run by religious
charities and other Christian-oriented NGOs, which explained the hymn-singing), but it was
more important for him to make money, especially now that their community was being
relocated by the government to a socialized housing project in Montalban, in the province of
Rizal, northeast of Metro Manila. He said his family had already been moved to the
relocation site, but that they had come back to Smokey Mountain to work in the dump again;
there was no work for them where they were relocated. I asked him why there were men
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walking around Happy Land carrying rifles, patrolling a relatively cleared-up area in the
dump. He said that “over there” was somebody’s private land, and that trespassers were shot.
What I remember most from that day is a woman leaning against the doorway of her
shanty, across from me, as our guide, standing beside her, explained how residents in the
slum live day to day without access to basic utilities like electricity, piped water supply, and
sanitation, without even being able to light candles in the night for fear of spontaneous
combustion. As our guide described how the people in front of us shit on the ground on a
piece of newspaper, and dump the waste into barges or the water in the bay, I watched the
woman in the doorway. Her face was emotionless, gaze steely. I tried to imagine what she
thought of us. I felt deeply ashamed to be there, to be in the company of foreigners working
for agents of ethical liberalism providing international aid, and to realize that, in a sense, I
was a foreigner to this world myself.
According to their website, Smokey Tours aims to: “Bridge the gap between people
from different backgrounds,” “Raise awareness about social issues and concerns,” “Inspire
individuals to bring about societal change,” and “Use proceeds to improve the living
conditions in underprivileged communities.” Smokey Tours claims that all proceeds from the
slum tour are invested in the local community for the development of talent and
livelihood.316 That their target clientele are Westerners is obvious from the fact that tour
package costs are quoted in Euros. The tour is rated five stars on Tripadvisor, and is
predominantly described as “a unique experience” and “eye opening.” 317 As one GermanItalian travel blogger put it,
seeing poverty fascinates me. I'm not used to it, we simply don't have that back
home… We're complaining about BULLSH*T every day and having no idea how
lucky we are to have a shelter, a bed to sleep, clothes to wear and something to eat in
the fridge. … I thought about the children I met at Smokey Mountain. They don't
have a future. But they laugh. They run around with their dirty faces and worn out
clothes and they seem happy. Seeing their joyful faces has changed my mind and
enlightened me. Happiness has nothing, absolutely nothing to do with wealth.
Humanity shines even brighter amidst poverty.318
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That people manage to laugh, however, does not mean that they are happy, if
happiness is a state of well-being and fulfillment, a reprieve from violence, hunger, and
suffering. The above sentiment of gratitude for one’s own good fortune, however, is a
common one among the privileged who participate in charity, which is predicated on the
maintenance of vertical relations between the beneficent donor and the poor beneficiary, and
believe in the gospel of upward mobility in the imaginary of meritocracy. Though the
Smokey Slum Tour aimed to “raise awareness about social issues” and “inspire societal
change,” I exited HappyLand with little to no understanding of why and how this community
came to be this way.
This romanticized view of poverty by civil society stands in contrast with Jewel
Maranan’s Sa Palad ng Dantaong Kulang / In the Claws of a Century Wanting (2017), a
documentary set in a port area slum, and screened during the 2019 Hong Kong International
Film Festival. The documentary, in cinema verité style, runs for two hours, depicts residents
of Tondo in various stages of life (childhood, parenthood, old age), and explores their
relationships to the place as a religious community, a neighborhood, and a source of
livelihood in the midst of the government project of land reclamation and the relocation of
communities. During the post-screening Q&A, Maranan said that she had filmed Sa Palad
from 2010 to 2016, staying in Tondo for three to four months at a time, embedding herself in
the community and the daily lives and spaces of her film subjects. Thus her approach was
ethnographic, and she treated the protagonists of her documentary as collaborators. Prior to
making the film, she was also a social worker in the community for two years. The resulting
film presents not so much a narrative but an atmosphere, a situation, a context for living and
action.
During the Q&A, Maranan also mentioned that she made no decision to
“distinguish” her work from other films that tackle poverty in the Philippines and that are
often charged as being “exploitative.” But she did try to show how poverty in certain areas is
a corollary of economic development and “progress” in other areas in the age of
globalization. That was why she chose Tondo, the busiest global trading port in the country,
yet also one of the poorest districts in the capital city. She also said that she sought not to
merely represent the condition of the poor, but to show a bigger narrative of systemic
injustice. She added that it’s a pity that there’s a stigma attached to films about poverty,
because she believed that it remains salient for us to continue interrogating the persistence of
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poverty in the Philippines, which may reveal something of the underlying conditions in
many other places in the world, whose stories are left out of certain other narratives about
progress and globalization.
In 1995, when the landfill in Smokey Mountain was officially closed, many of its
residents moved to Payatas. Barangay Payatas is an urban poor community located near
Batasang Pambansa (House of Representatives) in the northeast part of Quezon City. A
chartered city planned according to the principles of the City Beautiful Movement that
emerged in the United States, Quezon City was the capital of the newly independent
Philippines from 1948 to 1976, and remains the largest and most populous city in Metro
Manila. It also has the highest concentration of informal settlers in the National Capital
Region, with over 35% of the city population living in informal settlements, many in danger
zones.319 Payatas used to be “a ravine surrounded by rice paddies and farming villages
shaded over with the remnants of the rainforest canopy”320 until postwar reconstruction and
rapid industrialization spurred labor migration from the countryside to the city. The
ballooning of the population meant not only truckloads of household waste, but also
increased demand for scarce employment; as the ravine in Payatas became a hill of garbage,
a “local economy was built on a sort of Trash Rush.” 321
The Payatas landfill, which opened in 1973 and finally closed in 2017 for
environmental reasons, used to be the biggest dumpsite in the country. More than 80% of the
residents of Barangay Payatas are informal settlers, with annual incomes below the official
poverty threshold, and many of them subsist on the garbage economy. 322 Before the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (Republic Act 9003) was passed in January 2001,
which mandated that all open dumps be closed and rehabilitated and that a stricter system of
managing waste be enforced, Payatas was a barely regulated zone. Garbage trucks drove into
the dumpsite and simply heaped new garbage on top of old garbage while someone logged
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the amount of trash deposited that day. Children as young as five years old sifted through the
dump to collect plastic, metal, paper and glass. Trash pickers and residents alike were
susceptible to diseases from infectious medical and human waste, and leachate, a toxic soup
of dangerous contaminants including lead, nitrogen, arsenic, heavy metals, and hazardous
organics, that seeped into groundwater. Landfill gas contains methane, which is explosive in
certain quantities, and the dump itself was also highly unstable, with some of its parts
collapsing in heavy rain. Indeed, what prompted the promulgation of the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act was the Payatas Tragedy of July 10, 2000, in which “garbageslides” (like landslides, but composed of garbage) levelled shanties and broke out in fires,
killing around 270 people. Scores of bodies remain unretrieved from the mountains of trash
to this day.
Payatas is the primary setting of F.H. Batacan’s Smaller and Smaller Circles, the
Philippines’ first crime novel, which was initially published by the University of the
Philippines Press in 2002, revised and republished in an expanded, international version by
Manhattan-based Soho Press in 2015, and adapted for the big screen by director Raya Martin
in 2016.
Set in 1997, the narrative follows two Jesuit priests teaching at a university 323 —Fr.
Gus Saenz, a forensic anthropologist, and Fr. Jerome Lucero, a clinical psychologist—as
they are enlisted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to help solve a string of
brutal killings of prepubescent males. The victims, all trash pickers from Payatas, killed in
monthly intervals and mutilated in the same manner—face flayed, heart eviscerated, genitals
cut off—belie the common-sense belief that there are no serial killers in the Philippines. As
one character reasons, “Our neighborhoods are too congested, our neighbors too nosy, our
families too tightly knit for secrets to be kept and allowed to fester. We have too many ways
to blow off steam—the nightclub, the karaoke bar, the after-work drinking binges with our
fun-loving barkada. We’re too Catholic, too God-fearing, too fearful of scandal.”324 This
belief, however, is discredited by the novel’s scathing depictions of police corruption,
laziness, incompetency, and even collusion with criminal elements. The narrative suggests
that insufficient manpower, technology, archives, and other resources of law enforcement, an
inefficient bureaucracy influenced by patronage politics, and the public’s lack of trust in the
police force and in the entire justice system are what hinder the detection and capture of
323
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serial murderers, rather than any essential “Filipino” qualities. Their lack of experience and
expertise in scientific detective work and incentives for capturing the killer of poor, faceless,
initially nameless boys, are such that the police are directed to turn over the reins of the
investigation to private citizens, to members of the news media, academe and clergy.
The narrative’s demonstration of the failure of state actors in carrying out their
mandate is compounded by its representations of public indifference amidst the literal and
symbolic effacement of marginalized characters embedded in organizations rife with
everyday violence and corruption. The news media, the Catholic Church, and civil society
groups doing charity work in the slums are shown to be as corrupt as government agencies.
In this novel, public officials are bribed to release confidential information and policemen
force false confessions out of suspects to quickly close a murder case; reporters and news
anchors prioritize sensational, celebrity-oriented stories that spike ratings over matters of
public interest; the Archdiocese of Manila tolerates an influential priest’s misappropriation
of organizational funds and sexual abuse of orphans in his care; and members of the elite
finance charities only to manifest their wealth and social prestige in the performance of
piousness.
The literary critic Cristina Pantoja Hidalgo observes that the novel’s “whodunit
structure ... is just a device for exploring the novel’s central concern, which is not crime so
much as … the problems besetting the nation.”325 As one reviewer has noted, “The red
herrings are obvious and the killer’s identity is predictable.”326 What kindles and sustains
interest in the narrative is the insight the novel provides into the social climate of the
killings: “the complex interactions between power, poverty and crime”327 that allow the
indignities and deprivations of “the sort of existence that the country’s poorest live from day
to day … with such apathy and resignation.” 328 Seen in this light, the novel presents a
damning critique of the manifold “hypocrisies” or contradictions of Philippine society: the
gap between religiosity and ethical conduct, between acknowledgment of public interest and
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the pursuit of private gain in governance, between a liberal worldview and cosmopolitan
tastes founded on privilege and the exploitation of the lower classes.
Today, Tondo and Payatas persist in the public imagination not only as dumpsites,
but as sites of death under the present administration’s ongoing and now normalized drug
war. Tondo, where Smokey Mountain is located, is the site of the first recorded drug-related
extrajudicial killing; the victim was found at around three in the morning on July 1, 2016,
hours after Rodrigo Duterte's inauguration as president. “The killing held the rough elements
of what would be a pattern of deaths across the rest of the country in the next 7 months.
Blotter number 1675 noted the ‘body found’ of ‘a male person alleged victim of summary
execution.’ The unidentified victim, between 25-30 years old, about 5’3 tall, had been left
with a sheet of cardboard over his body. It read, ‘I am a Chinese Drug Lord.’” 329 Among the
17 regions of the Philippines, the majority of extrajudicial killings (39%) occur in the urban
poor neighborhoods of the National Capital Region.
In 2017, news agency Rappler mapped the extrajudicial killings in Quezon City
using police records between July 1, 2016 and January 30, 2017, the first seven months of
the war on drugs. In Quezon City, Payatas registers the highest number of casualties. Patricia
Evangelista writes,
This is Quezon City, a metropolis of teetering shanties and gated
communities, where the word “privilege” is much beloved by real estate agents and
condominium developers. 68 Roces, in Diliman, is advertised as “a new address of
privilege and security.” Golfhill Gardens in Capitol Hills Village is a “prime real
estate offering for the privileged few.” … That same promise of privilege is fulfilled
in the pattern of killings across the first seven months of President Rodrigo Duterte's
war against drugs.
There were no shooting incidents reported along the tree-lined lanes opening
into Horseshoe Village, or in Ayala Hillside Estates, where celebrities with Gucci
shoe collections live. The walled compound of Talayan Village remained safe from
masked gunmen. The dead were found outside, in the slum communities of
Masambong and Tatalon.
Of the 495 total fatalities Rappler reviewed, more than a third were killed
under the area of responsibility of a single police station, Batasan Police Station 6,
whose territory covers the slums of Bagong Silangan (17 dead), Old Balara (24
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dead), Holy Spirit (28 dead), Batasan Hills (32 dead), Commonwealth (46 dead), and
Payatas (68 dead). 330
Like Tondo, Payatas is a place everyone knows about but outsiders hardly visit,
whether physically or imaginatively. Though these sites epitomize the extreme inequality
and urban squalor that characterize big cities in the Philippines, they remain out of sight of
“civil society,” their images scrubbed clean from state-endorsed reports on progress and
economic growth (even as they fill the annual reports of the likes of WHO and ADB, USAID
and JICA). Spheres of affluence and poverty, spaces and means of consumption, modes of
transport, cultural tastes, and even life-times can be so neatly fragmented and segregated in
Metro Manila that with enough privilege, one could, if one wanted, live in this megalopolis
one’s whole life without having to see the numerous inner-city slums and squatter colonies,
watch the local TV shows and films that sometimes use them as setting or backdrop, or
worry about getting killed as part of the government’s anti-drug campaign. In a way, public
tolerance for the war on drugs does not come as a surprise. Fatal violence has long been dealt
through structures of segregation and precarization in the city.
In Moral Politics in the Philippines: Inequality, Democracy and the Urban Poor,
Wataru Kusaka characterizes the trajectory of “democratic” politics in the Philippines since
the Marcos dictatorship primarily in two ways. First, he describes the shift from “interest
politics,” concerned with resource distribution in a highly stratified and unequal society, to
“moral politics,” concerned with notions of good and evil, and how such notions structure
antagonistic relations in society, and constitute “the people” and the “enemy,” “citizens” and
“non-citizens,” “us vs. them.” Such a shift, according to Kusaka, happened when “a
discourse on civil morality is superimposed upon class disparities,” transforming “class
conflict from a clash of interests to one framed as good versus evil.” 331 Second, he describes
how such a shift was constituted by, and is constitutive of, the formation of “dual public
spheres,” which consist of a “civic sphere” of the elite and middle class sectors, and a “mass
sphere” of the impoverished classes, which compose the majority of Philippine society. This
schism, rooted in the “language, education, media, and livelihood gaps that exist between the
two classes,” 332 has resulted in widely different political and moral discourses and practices
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in the two spheres, despite having some overlap in certain “contact zones,” for example, in
urban poor spaces where grassroots development or religious NGOs operate. While the civic
sphere is dominated by “the interests of the growing middle class, in alliance with that
section of the business elites which has publicly sought to distance itself from patrimonial
politics, advocating instead modernist principles of free market capitalism, meritocracy, and
legal-bureaucratic order,” 333 the mass sphere is dominated by the poor and their often
“informal” or “illegal” practices for survival; rather than the “rule of law,” the mass sphere is
concerned with the recognition of the poor’s rights to livelihood, housing, and an adequate
standard of living.334
However, the poor’s socio-economic interests, actualized through informal/illicit
practices such as street vending, illegal logging, poaching, and fishing, squatting, electrical
tapping, gambling, prostitution, and petty crimes, often conflict with the interests of civil
society. This has resulted in what Kusaka calls “the moral division of the nation,” in which
the enforcement of laws has “worked against the interests of the poor.”335 In the context of
urban governance, the “moral division” of society manifests in antagonism surrounding
highly publicized issues, like jeepney modernization (pitting jeepney drivers’ right to
livelihood against the campaigns of environmental activists and urban planners for
ecological sustainability), forced evacuation of informal settlers (which has often involved
arson), the demolition of informal settlements, or the “illegal” occupation by the poor of
unused housing units (pitting the rights of “squatters” to housing against the owners’
property rights), street vending (livelihood vs. “law and order”), and even the criminalization
of loitering (“tambay,” which has connotations of idleness, intoxication, and resultant
unruliness) in public spaces like streets, which is a common sight in depressed communities
with a high incidence of unemployment and too little space in the home. This constellation
of issues and policies, engendering “moral discourses that uphold civic values paradoxically
justify marginalization, criminalization and elimination of those who have been framed as
‘immoral non-citizens.’”336
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While Kusaka admits that the antagonism between the civic and mass spheres may
be mediated and deliberated in “contact zones,” such zones are limited by the effectiveness
of class segregation in the country, which permeates all aspects of daily life, from media
consumption, to spaces of work and residence, to modes of transportation. That the masses
who engage in practices of informality constitute an “unruly,” even “criminal” majority
which poses a threat to the security of the upper classes in the minority further exacerbates
social divisions along class lines, as the upper classes take steps to secure themselves and
their enclaves from the “hoi polloi.”

Abjection in Khavn's MondoManila
In spite of the civil society perspective of scorn or romanticism for the urban
underclass, and their responses of criminalization or civilization of the poor, is the writer,
musician, and filmmaker Khavn's Mondomanila (2012), an adaptation of Norman
Wilwayco’s novel of the same name, about life at its seediest in the most impoverished parts
of town. Working in the filmic languages of dark comedy, mockumentary, crime drama, and
MTV, it is a work that defies easy genre categorization or aesthetic consumption. Bookended
by found, real footages of natural and man-made disasters—a deluge and a demolition—
Mondomanila opens with a harelipped, toothless narrator clad in “Americana” attire (suit,
tie, and Uncle Sam-style top hat), cackling and promising the spectators, presumably
outsiders to this world, a view of “never-before-seen-footage” of “dangerous,” “horrific,”
“creepy,” “nauseating,” “terrifying” things as darkness descends on Mondomanila. His tone
is that of a showman, a circus master, a mad hatter, a tour guide. Prefacing this cinematic
“tour” is a quote from Claire Danes, graffitied on a dirty wall, for which she was declared by
the city government of Manila in the late 1990s as persona non grata 337 : “MANILA IS A
GHASTLY AND WEIRD CITY. IT JUST FUCKING SMELLED OF COCKROACHES.
RATS WERE EVERYWHERE. THERE’S NO SEWAGE SYSTEM. AND PEOPLE HAVE
NOTHING THERE, PEOPLE WITH NO ARMS, NO LEGS, NO EYES, NO TEETH.” In
the next frame, this statement of contempt from an outsider is splattered with black ink, a
gesture of defiance. And then a series of “ghastly and weird” caricatures of Mondomanila
characters fill the screen: graphic, lurid cartoon images of sex, drugs, and violence.
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Fig. 4.1. Screenshots from the opening sequence of MondoManila.
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With its title and opening sequence, the film establishes its formal and thematic
connection to the tradition of “mondo” (an Italian word meaning “world”) films that became
popular since the 1960s. Using techniques of documentary cinema, mondo films attempt “to
show the audience something it has never seen before, usually by titillating or nauseating
them … [with images of] events and places that are intended to shock or arouse.”338 Often
these images consist of "compiled camera footage of murders, suicides, accidents,
assassinations, and other real-life disasters ... and close-ups of dead bodies."339 The
popularity of mondo films are said to be “symptomatic of a growing obsession with death
and mutilation as glossy entertainment”340 especially for Western audiences hungry for
“bizarre” practices and occurrences from “exotic” places and cultures. For this reason,
mondo movies have often been dismissed as exploitation films. However, a "closer
examination of the mondo film reveals a cultural critique of otherness in its appropriation
and exploitation of western concepts of primitivism, modernism, authenticity, representation,
gender, class, race, and identity. The mondo film extracts, shuffles, and reinserts Others back
into the mainstream of western popular culture and imagination."341
While internationally produced mondo films have been set in the Philippines,
featuring practices like dog-eating and tribal rites, 342 it is not a genre that Filipino
filmmakers, whether “mainstream” or “indie,” tend to work in; rather, their treatment of
poverty is often melodramatic or realistic, intended to evoke moral feeling rather than to
shock. Nevertheless, charges of exploitativeness also haunt Philippine cinema, especially
with advancements in digital filmmaking technology resulting in a spike in the production of
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low-budget “indie” films since the early 2000s. Many of these films center the world of the
underclass, whose stories are left out of the typically romantic-comedic narratives of
mainstream Philippine cinema. These films, often accused of being “poverty porn” that
fetishize subaltern experience for the voyeuristic consumption of international audiences,
had become such a staple of indie filmmaking that they were lampooned in the widely
popular Ang Babae Sa Septic Tank / The Woman in the Septic Tank (dir. Marlon Rivera,
2011), a satirical comedy about three filmmakers who set out to make a movie about Payatas
slum-dwellers for the sole purpose of touring the international film festival circuit and
winning awards. In planning their film (within a film), the three debate the merits of various
conventional ways of executing their screenplay: as “a gritty, no-frills and neo-realist film, a
glossy musical, an over-the-top melodrama and a docu-drama using non-actors.”343
This is the context that Khavn’s film may be thought to respond to and intervene in,
by inhabiting the perspective of the abject, literally “that which is thrown away.” Neither
subject or object, “It is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one
does not protect oneself as from an object. … what disturbs identity, system, order. What
does not respect borders, positions, rules … a terror that dissembles.”344 In other words,
the abject is that which is rejected by or disturbs the communal consensus that underpins a
social order, what evokes disgust—the part of the self that the self does not want to
recognize. Mikita Brottman argues that the mondo film can be "understood as catalogues of
nervous disorders and psychotic symptoms," the "repressed complexes" of society.345 "In its
terrifying carnivalization of the site of the body, the spasm of death, and of that moment in
which horror merges with laughter, the mondo movie—for those able to appreciate its
progressive nature—fulfills all the functions of the sanctioned horror film narrative, but more
explicitly, more offensively, and more defiantly." 346 Though ironically signaling its ties to
mondo movies, Mondomanila represents a departure in that it privileges not the perspective
of the perversely fascinated outsider looking in, but the ones who live, love, work, eat, shit,
fuck, fight, and die in the slum.
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Life in the looban 347 is introduced to the audience by the prepubescent Tony D.,
sitting on a cement footbridge over a dirty creek, spouting anger and bitterness at civil
society: “They think we have no ambitions, no plans. Irresponsible, drug addicts, bums,
dorks, freaks, perverts, bastards, dickheads, fuckers, devious, gossips, thieves, shameless,
good-for-nothings, demons. But we’re happy, even if we’re hungry. Even if we’re dirt poor.
Even if no one knows we exist in this congested, dirty, stinking world of ours.” 348

Fig. 4.2. Tony D from MondoManila.

Interspersed with his harangue against the putanginang “motherfucking”
government, politicians, church, and rich people are scenes of children playing in mounds of
trash at sundown, and a nighttime drinking session among members of his clique, the
Tropang Praning (Paranoid Squad—“praning” in this context is synonymous with
“adik”/drug addict). Shot in black-and-white within a cramped and crowded, gritty and
graffitied space, featuring close-ups and randy dialogue, these drinking scenes evoke an
intimate perspective, drawing the audience into the everyday world of these characters as

“Looban” (which may loosely be translated as “that which is inside”) refers to a congested
inner-city slum that is often hidden from the view of those not from the looban. It is a spatial order
that physically and visually separates slum -dwellers from the other inhabitants of the city. The looban
is produced by and productive of the hierarchical segregation of space and people, and it is maintained
by governmental practices of border-keeping and policing. The looban could also be a space where
those who are “thrown out” of the global city may exercise agency in their everyday lives, following
an order different from that dictated by state policy. That is to say, rule of law championed by civil
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they roast rats for pulutan (fingerfood), get drunk, get high, make fun of the neighborhood
“faggot,” and spy on midget neighbors engaging in twincestuous lesbian sex.
The conversations of Tropang Praning reference other members of their community;
when a name is mentioned, the scene cuts to a description of the character flashcard -style,
and shows a scene of the character in action. There’s the central figure Tony D. in his DIY
punk-style pants and “Baby Jesus” shirt, and his best friend, the balut-peddling muscular
midget Mutya; Tony’s licentious mother Mary, Tony’s little brother Dino, and their
landlady, the usurer and habitual gambler, Lovely Paybsix; squatterpunk Patotok, always
chasing pussy; afro-haired and tattooed Dugyot, who rapes a goose in a cockroach-infested
bathroom before slitting its neck; the always-horny Ungay, who sells coal and gets orgasmic
just by pedaling his bike around the slum; the town rapper and street food vendor Ogo X;
Mutya’s father Hardcore, a blind man addicted to porn; Naty the delightfully campy only
(gay) son of the macho ex-police officer Sgt. Pepper; the arsonist Shoeshine Pablo; the onearmed breakdancing midget and child pimp Iskong Bugaw; and the Ku Klux Klan-cardcarrying, piano-playing pederast Steve Banners, a.k.a. “Whiteboy,” who thinks Filipinos are
more akin to animals than humans, but likes to sodomize their children.
The descriptions of these characters tend to focus on their sexual deviance, moral
perversions and physical deformities, suggesting that everyone here is “sick” in some way—
but “sick” according to whose perspective? Within the space of the looban or the inner-city
slum, MondoManila’s cast of characters are not aberrations, but the norm. Indeed, save for
Tony’s spite for the righteous judgments of the well-fed, there is little in this film to suggest
an alternative moral order to govern lives in the looban. Here, life is cheap, nasty, brutish,
short. In Mondomanila, drinking, gambling, fornication, and drug abuse are not the vices that
they are in “civil society,” but the residents’ means of surviving a harsh existence, of
enduring hunger and disease, of numbing the fury and the pain from the certainty of
foreclosed futures, the apathy of the government, the hostility and stigmatization they get
from “civil society.” Here is no aspirational mantra for upward mobility, no sense of
incremental progression in linear time, only the striving to get by, day by day, where one day
is pretty much the same as the next.
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Fig. 4.3. MondoManila's garbage slum

The film, however, refuses the flattening narrative of its characters' disposability.
There is a grungy glamor in Mother Maria’s sequined organza dress and pearls, in Naty’s
neon costumes. There is talent and creativity overflowing in a one-armed man somersaulting
and breakdancing while pumping water from a well, in a rapper singing about drug addiction
and existential despair, in a shoeshiner playing a DIY drum set made of metal basins and
plastic gallons on a rooftop. The music video-like sequences and soundtrack infuse the film
with a sense of vitality, speaking truth to power from the perspective of those whose lives
and stories are often hidden and silenced.
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Fig. 4.4. Top: Mother Maria washing clothes. Bottom: Shoeshine Pablo playing drums.

Even so, the film does not stray into romantic / melodramatic territory, even in the
treatment of tragedy. When the little boy Dino comes home with a bag of instant noodles to
feed his family, having paid for this meal by getting himself prostituted to an old, pedophilic
white man, his mother only inspects his bruised behind and drags him off to see the
community health worker. No tearful wailing here, only exasperation that such a thing
happened. Tony seems not to care much at first, but that evening he seeks out his brother’s
one-armed midget pimp, beats him to a bloody pulp on the ground, and then saws off his
other remaining arm. Through all this, Iskong Bugaw does not resist; he keeps a smile
plastered on his face and taunts Tony, as if he wanted the latter to keep pummeling him, to
take out his anger and resentment on a concrete target, even if the real “culprit” here is not
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the pimp who procured the sexual services of a child, but a society that drove a child to
prostitute himself for a pack of instant noodles. This violence, it seems, is what justice means
in a space of lawlessness.
The vignettes and brief sketches, abrupt cuts, and motley of visual styles that
characterize the first half of the film defy the linearity and logic of moral narratives. Even the
second half, which is driven by a revenge plot, is frequently interrupted by startling, surreal
images: Shoeshine Pablo lecturing his own corpse in a coffin about the proper way to do
arson to “clean” the slum with fire; cockroaches creeping out of a bald head. The murder of
Whiteboy in his own bathroom while thrusting into a moaning Naty, the image of his
exploded skull and dribbling eye, blood splattered on white tiles, is the stuff of nightmares;
we see this sequence as if through a dark glass, reinforcing the film’s dream-like quality,
distancing the audience from the reality of the situation, even as the film asks them to look
closely.
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Fig. 4.5. Scenes from a revenge and robbery heist.

After their heist, Tony gives his mother a bag full of cash that he and his friends had
stolen from Whiteboy’s house on the night they murdered the latter. As a man sent by their
landlady Lovely Paybsiks comes to rip the roof off their rented house, Mother Maria takes
the money and her children and prepares to leave. The film ends with a brightly colored and
lively song-and-dance sequence, with Tony, Dino, and Mother Maria carrying upturned
umbrellas, prancing their way out of the slum, singing goodbyes to the manifold deprivations
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of poverty while their neighbors dance along with them. This cheerful number, however,
barely erases the awareness that this little family paid for their ticket out of the slum by
murder, theft, and a friend’s suicide (for it was Tony who led Naty to Whiteboy, which led
Sgt. Pepper to kill his son’s lover, and his son to kill himself). The sense of delight, freedom,
and ease evoked by the dreamy image of the family playing in the ocean is belied by the
closing footage of the violent demolition of shanties in the looban, drawing the viewers back
to the reality of the order of policy recolonizing the squatter colony, dispossessing its
inhabitants for the interests of capitalist development—a structural violence enabled by
property rights and legality which frames the everyday violence in the slum.

Davao, Discipline, and the Desire for Development
In his study of two Martial Law-era films that depict the Philippine capital city in a
time when urban development embodied the state's project "to modernize the nation in the
name of a teleological, transnational future,"349 Roland Tolentino writes that since the
Marcos administration, "Manila has been projected as dying and in need of resuscitation.
The project of wholesale transformation of Manila envisaged by the Marcos regime and
initiated in the form of the MMC [Metro Manila Commission] was predicated upon a desire
to clean the city of its literal proliferation of refuse and to cleanse it of its 'scum'—that is,
prostitution, pornography, graft, and crime,"350 associated with the proliferation of squatter
colonies in the city as discussed above. Compounding this image of "undesirable"
populations as a bane to urban and national development are "deteriorating infrastructures:
roads, postal services, railroads, power generators, and land lines," 351 whose maintenance
the state has taken less and less of a role, especially in the post-structural adjustment period
focused on austerity, liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. Vicente Rafael, writing
about the ouster of President Joseph Estrada by popular uprising in 2001, discusses how
"these broken, state-run infrastructures," inasmuch as they represented "government
ineptitude" and "corruption" were a factor in galvanizing a critical mass of people,
communicating and coordinating through cell phones and text messages, "to overcome the
349 Rolando B. Tolentino, "Cityscape: The Capital Infrastructuring and Technologization of
Manila," Cinema and the City, edited by Mark Shiel and Tony Fitzmaurice (Blackwell Publishing Ltd,
2001), 159.
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crowded conditions and congested surroundings brought about by the state’s inability to
order everyday life" and "bring about a new kind of crowd that was thoroughly conscious of
itself as a movement headed toward a common goal ... moving in concert with [the crowd],
filled with its desire and consumed by its energy." 352 This uprising, which also congregated
in the major thoroughfare of EDSA, has since been dubbed the "People Power Revolution II"
or EDSA Dos. Fifteen years after this social movement, the desire for urban development
and dignified everyday life in the city, especially for the majority of working-class residents
and commuters in Metro Manila, who waste tremendous amounts of hours and energies
stuck in traffic, waiting in interminable queues for scarce buses and trains, wading in flood
and mud during monsoon seasons, fearing robbery or sexual harassment and assault in dark
streets.
The desire for mobility, efficiency, security, and public services by the majority of
the city's inhabitants, which had remained unfulfilled during the Aquino administration
despite its much-touted record-breaking economic growth, is something the Duterte
campaign capitalized on to great success. In a series of "leaked" political advertisements, 353
they peddled the image of Davao, where Duterte has ruled for over thirty years, as a model
city. Showing Duterte riding a motorcycle on clean and well-maintained roads, unhampered
by congested traffic, and cheered by ordinary people against the backdrop of trees, schools,
skyscrapers, and roadside sari-sari stores, Duterte's voiceover narrates the "open secret" to
Davao's development: discipline, determination, and the courage to stand up to those who
would break the law and oppress the powerless. At stake is the vision of a vibrant city, where
jobs abound, children go to school, and families are happy. The advertisement closes with
the provocation that the "Davao model" could be nationalized, if Filipinos elected that city's
current mayor to the presidency.354
This fair image of Davao is contrasted with decaying and crime-ridden Manila. In a
companion political advertisement for Duterte claimed to be paid for by its actor, the action
star Robin Padilla walks in a dimly lit street while addressing the audience. This sequence
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interspersed with shots of urban infrastructure: overcrowded trains and stations, potholed
roads, cars submerged in flood, the EDSA highway inundated with vehicles, vehicles and
public buildings plastered with the faces of politicians printed on tarpaulins. Like the
previous advertisement, Padilla says that what Filipinos need is "discipline," in the form of
trains that run on time, roads that are properly constructed instead of routinely flooded,
decongested throughfares, airports that don't serve as a national embarrassment, policemen
who capture criminals, not commit crimes themselves, public servants who don't abuse their
power but serve their constituents, lawmakers who follow the law instead of considering
themselves above it, a president who leads rather than neglects its duty, a government free
from corruption, and a citizenry free from fear. "Lahat po iyan, puede!" (All of this is
possible), Padilla tells the audience. "But only if we cultivate discipline." After all, he
reminds the audience, "Aanhin natin ang tuwid na daan kung tinutunton lang ng iilan?"
(What use do we have for the high/right road, if it can only be trod by the few?" 355 In this
script we see the ingenious braiding together of diverse issues: an inadequate transportation
system comes to stand not only for everyday commuting indignities, but the indignity of the
nation itself; crumbling physical infrastructure metaphorizes the corruption bureaucracy;
both are represented as productive of underdevelopment and a people living in trepidation of
crime, of road accidents, of joblessness (a real possibility when traffic often leads to chronic
exhaustion, anxiety, and tardiness at work). The antidote of more "discipline," embodied in
both advertisements by the figure of Duterte, makes sense in the context of Duterte's
"Punisher" image and the modern history of Davao as a city fraught with violence among
communist and Muslim insurgents, right-wing civilian militias, local warlords and their
private armies, illicit businesses, and the police and military. It was Duterte's iron-fisted rule
over the city, so the story goes, backed by the shadowy Davao Death Squad (what the
acronym "DDS" originally meant), that turned Davao, the biggest and most developed city in
conflict-ridden Mindanao, into "one of the Philippines’s safest, most prosperous urban
areas." As Sheila Coronel wrote in her portrait of Duterte and Davao in the 1980s,
To Duterte and his supporters, Davao ... is living testament to this take-no-prisoners
approach. Duterte has staked his presidency on the presumption that if Davaeños
were willing to pay such a steep price for law and order, most other Filipinos will be
as well. You can think of Duterte, then, as the bastard child of Philippine democracy.
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If he is to be understood at all, it’s as a product of the bloody, messy democratic
transition on Mindanao, the country’s conflict-torn southernmost island.356
Here then is another dimension to the "Bisaya"/"Mindanaoan" pride for Duterte: the
superiority of his well-ordered city in the marginalized south to the national embarrassment
that is "Imperial Manila."
There is another layer to this law-and-order narrative, one that links "development,"
"discipline" and less-than-democratic rule in proximate "tiger economies" in the region,
which seem to have realized the Philippine dream of being "world-class": the Asian "world
cities" of Singapore and Hong Kong, which figure significantly in the discourse of
Dutertismo. As the top destinations for OFWs in Asia, 357 Hong Kong and Singapore have a
sizeable population of Overseas Absentee Voters (OAVs), and consequently have been sites
of transnational electoral campaigning by Filipino politicians. As discussed in Chapter 1, the
majority of the OAVs in these countries voted for Duterte in the 2016 presidential elections.
With their remittances, which sustain several relatives across multiple households in the
Philippines, they may also influence the voting behavior of their families back home. 358
These transnational populations, through their experiences in their host counties, their calls
with their families and friends in the Philippines, the stories and photos they post on social
media, and other forms of communication, mediate images of postcolonial modernity and
progress, and thus develop a comparative perspective between the Philippines and Hong
Kong or Singapore (or Japan, Taiwan, Beijing, or Kuala Lumpur). Often this awareness
comes in the form of perceptions of "lack" and "failure" in the home country, which in turn
cultivates a greater desire for national development and resultant national pride, probably
sharpened by encounters with racial or class discrimination in the host country. Writing
about Singapore, for example, the journalist and medical anthropologist Gideon Lasco
muses,
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Singapore, too, inhabits a place in our politics: a vision of what could have been—
and what the future can be. We have the same tropical climate, and similar colonial
and wartime pasts, but why did our political and economic outcomes turn out to be
so different? Walking under the shadow of the Supertrees in the futuristic 'Gardens
by the Bay,' I cannot help but revisit that question. ... we admire the island-country
for what we perceive to be its cleanliness, efficient public transport, disciplined
people, meritocratic government, overall economic success, and, of late, fast internet
speeds.359
No wonder, then, that during the 2016 campaign period and the early days of the
presidency, Duterte supporters often likened Duterte to Lee Kwan Yew, Singapore's
"founding father," a comparison Duterte himself encouraged with his frequent anecdotes
about how urban discipline in Davao is similar to that of Singapore, emphasizing both cities'
anti-crime, anti-smoking, anti-littering, and anti-chewing gum campaigns.360 Such "petty"
policies of urban governance, signified by the discourse of "discipline," are also harnessed to
Lee's and Duterte's paternalistic and authoritarian developmentalist images, strengthening the
comparisons between the two in public consciousness, and supporting the idea that as Lee
Kwan Yew "modernized" Singapore, so can Duterte do the same for the Philippines. While
there is no comparable modern political leader in the Hong Kong context, Hong Kong's
culture of public orderliness (as captured by its valorization of queuing) and bureaucratic
efficiency, and provision of welfare services also imaged what modernity and development
could and should be like for the Philippines—even at the cost of more discipline/autocracy,
and less freedom/democracy.

Through my discussion in Chapters Three and Four of the "War on Drugs," its
representations and structures of operation and feeling, and of the chronotope of the slum,
which is the drug war's usual site of execution, I have attempted to elucidate the structural
and discursive production of the disjunction between disciplined “citizens” with a right to
make a claim to rights, and “non-human” “criminals” that deserve to be exterminated to
protect the rights of the former. Against liberalism’s fantasy of equality, and in contrast to
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the tendency of “necropolitical” analyses to focus on Duterte and the state, I propose the
concept of “disposability” to understand the processes that construct certain kinds of lives
not only as expendable, but as the necessary price to realize the dream of “development” and
security through discipline, order, and the rational calculations of realpolitik. More than
documenting killing, or provoking humanist moral feeling, what the spectacularization of the
“war” achieves is recovering from erasure and obscurity the structural processes that produce
“surplus” populations under the regimes of neoliberal and neocolonial globalization.
The inability of the state to develop and secure human capital for national
development is most evident in the phenomenon of the large-scale migration of Filipino
workers to serve as cheap labor for the engines of global capitalism. To provide a
counterpoint to the discourses of elite nationalism, liberal democracy, and developmentalism
that I have examined in the preceding chapters, the concluding chapter draws on field work
among migrant Filipino domestic workers in Hong Kong, which has been a regional hub for
Filipino contract workers since the 1980s, to examine how an alternative politics,
characterized by activism and long-distance nationalism, emerges among overseas Filipinos
in positions of much greater precarity than the sort of Filipino émigrés discussed in Chapter
2, who have access to rights that come with naturalized citizenship or permanent residency in
their host countries.
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5. MIGRANT ACTIVISM AND THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED

The DH
Joshua Lim So’s short story, “Feasting,” first published in the anthology The Best of
Philippine Speculative Fiction 2005-2010 edited by Dean Alfar and Nikki Alfar, is a text that
invites Filipino readers—many of whom usually have at least one OFW in the family—to
reflect on the repercussions of the country’s long-standing phenomenon of overseas labor
migration as a national development strategy and a collective social aspiration. Set in a
fictional fishing village called Balay (literally “home” or “domicile”), presumably in the
southern Philippine province of Davao, 361 the narrative revolves around a young man named
Makaon (literally “food” or “edible” in Bisaya) who is induced by a white-skinned stranger
in a top hat to fly across the ocean (the limit of the villagers’ world in this story) to work in
exchange for meat. There is no meat in Balay, only vegetables and fish. The villagers have
heard of meat but have never tasted it; in their minds it was more precious than gold, than
oil; it was all that could be desired. Makaon is not told what sort of work he is to do in the
country across the sea. He is a fisherman, as was his father before him, but his father had
died in a storm, and Makaon has a mother and a wife and a newborn baby to feed. So he
goes. Every quarter of the year, his family in Balay receives a pound of meat. With the first
such parcel came a letter:
Greetings in Peace.
I am very happy here. I have found work immediately. The people in this
land are very kind and friendly. The work they gave me is hard, but I will manage. I
miss you all. I feel very sad, but I have new friends so I don’t feel lonely.
I am sorry you had to wait so long. I am paid in meat, but I don’t get to eat
it. They will immediately send the meat to Balay. You’ll be rich in no time. Don’t
worry about me, they have given me a free place to live in and they feed me
regularly.
Please send my love to all.362

361 The hometown of the author, who is better known in the Philippine literary scene as a
playwright. The characters in the story also speak in a variant of Bisaya common in Davao.
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Makaon’s wife, Sisita, rejoices. She throws a feast for all the villagers, carefully
rationing the meat to share. Once shunned by their community for being haughty and halfMoro, Sisita becomes a favored member of Balay. The meat she receives generates enough
wealth for her to build a new house, to buy fancy clothing, to feed herself, her son, and her
mother-in-law for seventeen years. Until one day, the package of meat does not arrive.
Instead, the people of Balay spot a wooden crate floating in the sea. As it lands on the beach,
they see that in the crate is a skull, a pile of bones: “the skeleton was not intact. Everything
separated, and every bone was stripped of flesh, as if bleached. … On top of the pile of white
bones were two hands, palms up, as if begging, fully intact with flesh. The muscle was cut
razor clean just below the wrist…” In a corner of the crate of bones was a letter: “Greetings
in Peace, Services no longer required. Please enjoy.”363
“Feasting” is commonly read as a provocative allegory of the Filipino diaspora,
which consists overwhelmingly of overseas contract workers (OCWs, subsequently
rebranded OFWs or Overseas Filipino Worker to emphasize the export’s country of origin)
relegated to “low-end,” “unskilled” labor in destination countries. Popular representations of
the OFW include: the “Bagong Bayani,” or the laboring modern-day hero who remits money
back home, thus driving domestic consumption and shoring up the economy; the
“Balikbayan” (nation-returnee), a permanent émigré, often a naturalized American citizen,
who occasionally visits the homeland for vacations, bearing “stateside” gifts for the extended
family, bankrolling holiday spending, and maybe purchasing properties or other investments.
But these “heroic” figures, valorized in state discourse and Christmas commercials for cured
ham, sweet spaghetti, and queso de bola, exist in the popular imagination alongside more
shadowy, significantly feminine characters: the Japayuki (a Japan-bound “entertainer” or bar
hostess, often associated with sex work),364 the mail-order bride (usually sent to and paid for
by men in North America, Europe, Australia, Japan, Korea, and China), the caregiver (often
for the elderly members of wealthy families in EuroAmerica), and the domestic helper (often
bound for Hong Kong, Singapore, and Gulf countries). These female figures, tenderers of
devalued reproductive labor (or performers of “non-essential auxiliary tasks,” as a Greek
dictionary notoriously defined “Filipina”365 ), more than the thousands of other kinds of
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workers that leave the Philippines each day, have come to image the Filipino diaspora. That
is to say that on the global stage, migrant Filipinos are most often seen as cheap, expendable,
flexible, and often sexualized laboring bodies for “3D” (dirty, dangerous,
demanding/demeaning) jobs.
The Filipino domestic helper (DH), in particular, is imaged in a certain way. In
theater plays, films, fiction, and essays, what is often highlighted is her sacrifice (in the name
of family, of nation) and victimization, the predations and lacerations visited upon her body,
and her death—the vehicle taking her back to the homeland often an urn or a casket. One
example is the renowned trilingual chamber opera Mila (produced by the Asia Society Hong
Kong in 2018 and since staged around the world), about a Filipina DH who works for a
biracial couple on the verge of divorce. Distressed by her emotionally abusive employers,
her suicidal adolescent ward, and memories of her own child whom she lost, the titular
character jumps from the balcony of her employers’ 53rd-floor apartment. In Jose Dalisay’s
novel Soledad’s Sister, shortlisted for the 2007 Man Asian Literary Prize, the DH arrives at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport from Saudi Arabia as a corpse. The trope of the dead
DH whose vitality has been appropriated to support others’ living (that of the family she
serves, and the family she left back home) is also the controlling idea of Alex Tizon’s
biographical essay “My Family’s Slave” (The Atlantic, 2017), which begins:
The ashes filled a black plastic box about the size of a toaster. It weighed
three and a half pounds. I put it in a canvas tote bag and packed it in my suitcase this
past July for the transpacific flight to Manila. From there I would travel by car to a
rural village. When I arrived, I would hand over all that was left of the woman who
had spent 56 years as a slave in my family’s household.
Her name was Eudocia Tomas Pulido. We called her Lola. She was 4 foot
11, with mocha-brown skin and almond eyes that I can still see looking into mine—
my first memory. She was 18 years old when my grandfather gave her to my mother
as a gift, and when my family moved to the United States, we brought her with us.
No other word but slave encompassed the life she lived.366
Tizon’s essay is notable not only for tracing the roots of Lola’s half-century
servitude to colonial hierarchies and traditions of slavery that persist in modern Philippine
society, but also for bringing to the fore the ways in which better-off Filipinos, who are often
quick to decry the abuse of their compatriots abroad, also participate in and benefit from the
same institutions of “modern slavery” that structure global divisions of labor. As Tizon
writes, “Today even the poor can have utusans or katulongs (‘helpers’) or kasambahays
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(‘domestics’), as long as there are people even poorer. The pool is deep.”367 Just as migrant
domestic workers experience vulnerability as non-citizens in destination countries, the local
workforce in the Philippines, the majority of which work in conditions of informality and
precarity, are also “thrust into labour relations similar to the relations of domestic labour …
which [are] characterized by low wages, long hours, no security of employment, and no legal
protection.” 368
The prototypical DH figure is Flor Contemplacion, hanged in Singapore in 1995 for
allegedly killing a fellow Filipina DH and the latter’s child ward. The case sparked social
movements both in the Philippines and abroad, for there was little evidence to indict
Contemplacion save for her confession (one she was coerced into making, said a witness),
leading then Philippine President Fidel V. Ramos to plead with the Singaporean government
for clemency. Contemplacion was sentenced to death anyway. Her story has since inspired
much cultural production, some reinforcing state discourse about the heroism of OFWs,
others challenging this narrative and holding the Philippine government to account not only
for its failure to protect the rights of the most vulnerable of its transnational citizens, but also
to ensure sufficient employment and wages at home, such that workers would not be pushed
to seek more livable wages abroad. Still other cultural productions, like the recent Hong
Kong-based documentaries Sunday Beauty Queen (dir. Baby Ruth Villarama, 2016) and The
Helper (dir. Joanna Bowers, 2017), seek to humanize, that is to individualize and give names
and faces to, a migrant population that is usually homogenized on the basis of race, gender,
and class, by spotlighting their participation in activities (such as choir singing or mountain
climbing) beyond the requirements of contractual work and familial obligation.
Contemplacion’s case and the global protests it gave rise to is also significant for
instigating the establishment in 1996 of Migrante International (MI), the foremost
transnational Filipino people’s organization committed to the promotion of the rights of
migrant Filipino workers.369 Positioning itself as a “progressive,” that is, militant leftist
organization, MI counters not only the Philippine state’s labor export policy and its attendant
legitimating discourses of sacrifice and heroism, but also the “liberal” tendency to
romanticize migrant workers’ inherent humanity by celebrating “exceptional” individuals
367
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who rise above their circumstances, as it were, to achieve great things (as Liza Avelino,
mountaineer and migrant domestic worker, does in Joanna Bowers’ The Helpers). Instead,
MI surfaces the structures of exploitation and exclusion in both origin and destination
countries that make oppressive systems not only durable but constructed as integral to the
functioning of those societies. More importantly, MI resists the predominant narrative of
migrant workers’ victimization and helplessness by striving for collective empowerment
through grassroots organization, education, resource-sharing, mutual aid, practices of care,
solidarity-building across classes and communities, and lobbying. Generally operating in an
oppositional relation to state power and hegemonic nationalism, which it sees as agents of
migrant workers' oppression, MI—in particular its chapter in Hong Kong, MIGRANTE HK, and its allied organizations in the constant struggle to lay claim to rights—represent a
valuable case study of politicization and democratization from below, that is, the formation
of political society.

Kalampagan Sundays: Migrant Subjectivity and Political Society
What I recall from my very first encounter with Filipino migrant domestic workers
(MDWs) in Central on a Sunday was the shock I felt at their mass and their liveness, the
bright colors, loud sounds, pungent smells, and flurry of activity that marked their presence,
in stark contrast with not only the posh environment of Hong Kong’s central business
district, but also the images of dead, victimized, hidden, or otherwise silenced women that I
had grown up with. I was five years old when Flor Contemplacion was hanged; we were
shown movies about her and others like her in school. My siblings and I had grown up with a
series of helpers at home too, and they always deferred to my mother, who liked it when they
did just as they were told and then kept themselves out of the way; save for Yaya Thelma
who raised me until I was in primary school, I do not remember any of their names.
It was on July 4, 2016, during the two-week Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Summer
School held at Lingnan University. One of the fellows, a Japanese graduate student named
Naho who worked with an NGO in Tokyo that assisted Japayukis and their children, said she
wanted to go to Central to see and possibly chat with MDWs, and asked me to come along.
So we went. In the train I rattled off statistics about the Philippines’ migrant population, their
contributions to the GDP. As we emerged from the MTR station, I was still struck by the
sheer numbers of Filipinas occupying the length of Chater Road, laying on cardboard mats in
the middle of the street beside suitcases and makeshift tents, under overhead bridges
connecting luxury malls, effectively blocking pedestrian traffic as they chatted and fanned
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themselves over containers of shared food. We followed the road to Statue Square, where
booths and a stage were set up. On that day there was, apparently, a celebration of the 31st
anniversary of the United Filipinos in Hong Kong (UNIFIL-HK), founded in 1985 (thus
predating MI, with which it is now allied) to raise local awareness about social issues faced
by migrant Filipinos in Hong Kong and their families back in the Philippines.
The anniversary celebration foregrounded the “People’s Agenda for Change,” which
was collectively drafted by the representatives of the over 150 organizations allied with
UNIFIL, and addressed to the newly installed administration under President Rodrigo
Duterte, as much as to other MDWs. The celebration emphasized that the gains of the social
movement of migrants in Hong Kong, especially the expansion of workers’ rights, did not
come “like manna from heaven” (said Dolores Balladares, the UNIFIL chairperson) but were
the products of more than three decades of political agitation and lobbying with the
Philippine government and Hong Kong officials. Like any struggle, she said, it needed the
energy of the workers’ solidarity to continue to press the Philippine government to make
good on its mandate not only to protect OFWs but to build conditions that would end the
trend of “forced” labor migration that began with the Marcos regime.
The program featured folk and contemporary dances, singing, even a taekwondo
exhibition. Yet the cheerful performances were undercut by a darker current: there was a
contemporary dance by members of the feminist organization GABRIELA-HK dramatizing
the pains of forced migration and labor exploitation, including violence against domestic
helpers; there was an a cappella performance of songs about how migrant workers were
forced to serve the very institutions that oppressed them, but that their duty was not to simply
bear the suffering (like what they were often told in church) but to change the social
conditions that perpetuated it. In the media, it’s often abusive bosses who are singularly
demonized, but the problems that UNIFIL-MIGRANTE-HK emphasized were more
systemic, more pervasive and workaday, from the labor placement agencies that the Hong
Kong and Philippine governments continue to allow to operate despite unscrupulous and
predatory practices, to employers who’d call their helper to wash the dishes past 11 p.m.,
when she’d already retired to bed.
My initiation proper into the lives of migrant Filipino activists in Hong Kong began
in the third week of June 2020, when I began attending their weekly kalampagan (noise
protest) in Chater Road, Central. As Hong Kong showed signs of recovering from the first
wave of COVID-19 infections and relaxed social distancing measures in the summer of
2020, Filipino migrant workers, including activists, began spending their Sundays off work
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in Central again. Months of staying cooped up in their employers’ houses, forbidden from
going out on their days off for fear of viral transmission, had left them hungering for not
only the warmth of the company of their friends and comrades, but also the heat of political
agitation and collective action.
One of the first things that struck me as I walked to the protest site in Chater Road
was the contentiousness of its soundscape. As I emerged from Exit K of Central MTR
Station, I could hear people chattering, buying and selling, singing, dancing, looking for one
another. Lining the pavements between Prince’s Building (housing luxury brands) and Statue
Square (fronting the majestic Court of Final Appeal) were cheap merchandise like clothing,
plastic toys, drinks and street food, accessories, and various bric-à-brac heaped on sheets laid
on the street. People were also huddled on cardboard or cloth sheets on the ground, selling
and sharing home-cooked food, eating, drinking, napping, dancing, chatting, playing cards,
gambling, singing with portable karaoke machines, talking with their loved ones on video
call, painting their fingernails, or buying underwear, linen, earphones, or tableware from
Tagalog-speaking hawkers of mostly South Asian descent. These sounds of living and
loitering merged and clashed with speeches and singing, calls for political agitation and
noise-making, which made up the protest program.

Fig. 5.1 The field site. The areas marked in purple are where the activists I join regularly gather. The
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area marked in green is where pro-Duterte groups sometimes congregate. The pro-Duterte groups are
seldom visibly there.

In the road between The Cenotaph and the Mandarin Oriental was a semicircle of
people. Unfurled on the ground or strung along sidewalk railings were tarpaulins expressing
myriad social demands addressed to the Philippine government: the scrapping of mandatory
PhilHealth insurance membership and other “state exactions,” the junking of the “Terror
Bill,” the upholding of human rights. In front of these tarpaulins were activists holding
microphones, rehearsing call-and-response chants and protest songs, distributing placards
and leaflets with lyrics, preparing the sound system, holding up the flags of the various
activist organizations under or affiliated with the umbrella group, UNIFIL-MIGRANTE-HK.
Many of them were wearing “campaign shirts” in red and violet and green, with slogans like
“Serve The People,” “Trabaho sa Pinas, Hindi sa Labas” (Work in the Philippines, Not
Outside), and “Makibaka! Wag Matakot!” (Join the Fight! Don’t be Afraid!”).
I scanned the crowd for familiar faces—those whom I’ve watched speaking in
“Migrante Talks” (weekly webinars, streamed on Facebook Live, discussing issues relevant
to migrant workers) or in protests that are broadcast through Facebook pages. I asked around
for my contact, Leah,370 a labor leader, the friend of a friend of a friend, and somebody
pointed her out. After introductions, she told me to stick around after the protest program for
an interview with her and another labor leader, the chairperson of a migrant workers’ union.
Meanwhile, she said, I could observe the protest and take photos. It seemed that many of the
activists already knew that I was going to be there to do participant observation and conduct
interviews. The day before, Leah had already asked me to send her a brief of my research, as
well as my interview questions, which she circulated among other activists across various
organizations affiliated with UNIFIL-MIGRANTE. I would come to learn the importance of
my presence there being known to and sanctioned by the activist network: in Hong Kong, as
in the Philippines, political dissidents and critics of various ideological stripes left of center
(from “liberal” to “socialist”) are “red-tagged” by Philippine government agents or Duterte
supporters as “communists,” “criminals,” and “terrorists,” their organizations, names,
photos, and videos circulated in offline and online spaces and labeled enemies of the state. In
the Philippines, prominent environmental, labor, and human rights activists have often been
killed. In Hong Kong, they are subject to insults and petty harassment from pro-Duterte
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factions, online and offline. As a result, they have become suspicious of strangers taking
photos and videos of protest events.
Leah gestured across the street, toward a group of three local undergraduate
students, saying that I could join them. They’re our interns, she said. Also in the crowd were
journalists filming the protest, scribbling in their notebooks, interviewing people. Other
protest participants also filmed the program using their smartphones, to be uploaded to
Facebook. As the program proceeded, I noticed that one of the activists was translating what
was being spoken (mostly in Tagalog) for the interns. Another activist approached me and
started to translate the proceedings for me as well, until I spoke in Tagalog and said that I
was Filipino. I would be mistaken for a Hong Kong local many more times after this initial
encounter, even when I didn’t have my face mask on; later, they would tell me it was
because my skin fairer and smoother than was usual for a migrant domestic worker, and I
dressed and carried myself differently.
Meanwhile, in the periphery of the protest circle in Chater Road, dance practices,
karaoke singing, rowdy drinking, gambling, and chattering proceeded apace. Every now and
then, police carrying banners and loudspeakers blasting government COVID-19 advisories
(in Cantonese, English, and Tagalog) would walk by to ensure that the people in the crowd
were maintaining social distancing or else face a fixed fine of 2,000 HKD. Members of the
activist groups, megaphones in hand, did the same, walking around and conveying the
advisories in Tagalog for their fellow MDWs, many of whom disregarded social distancing
rules when there were no police officers around. I understood why, although the protest
circle was rather small (no more than thirty people that day, it seemed), they used no less
than four speakers/amplifiers and numerous microphones: their messages and speeches and
songs had to be heard over the din of the motley crowd. The people around us may not look
like they’re listening, but maybe they are, the activists would later tell me, in various
iterations, in Tagalog. We try to be as loud and visible as possible, so that they might hear.
The protest program concluded with a two-minute kalampagan: the speakers
enjoined the crowd to make noise to register their dissent against state repression and
exploitation. People beside and behind and in front of me started shouting slogans and
panawagan (demands) at the top of their lungs, banging metal pots and pans, vigorously
shaking plastic bottles filled with pebbles coins, striking drums and gongs and metal sheets,
drowning out all other ambient noise.
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The issues that the labor leaders spoke about on that day were issues we would
continue to speak about in the following months of my engagement with them: the plight of
Filipino migrant workers in the time of COVID-19, the need to abolish unnecessary and
extortionate forms of “state exaction,” the end of “forced migration” and the state’s labor
export policy, the struggle for “pro-people” national development, the dangers of the AntiTerrorism Bill, the discontinuation of the current administration’s War on Drugs and the
extrajudicial killing of the poor, indigenous people, and activists, the upholding of human
rights, especially social, political, economic, and cultural rights, the struggle for just and
lasting peace, the ouster of President Duterte. Although some of the demands of these
activist groups, such as wage increase and welfare support in pandemic times, are addressed
to the Hong Kong government, most of their demands are addressed to the Philippine state,
as well as to fellow migrant Filipinos and sympathetic locals, who might be provoked into
joining the struggle to initiate reforms in their home and host countries. Hong Kong in this
regard functions as a relatively safe space for the articulation of political demands and
dissent — a function that Hong Kong has served since the nineteenth century for “longdistance” nationalists and political dissidents from various places in the region who have
come to the formerly British-ruled territory for safe haven.
Indeed, many of the activists I spoke with said that it was in Hong Kong—not in
Singapore or the United Kingdom or the Middle East, where some of them had worked
before—that they became politicized. One reason is that the Filipino community and the
network of labor unions, activist organizations, and NGOs working for migrant rights is
long-established, strong, well-connected, and visible in Hong Kong. There was also
something about the density of the spaces migrant workers had to share, the commonality of
their experiences and everyday- and life-times as domestic workers,371 and their
simultaneous distance from and proximity to the home country that kept sectoral and
political issues at the forefront of their consciousness. As one of my interlocutors remarked,

Ben Highmore, “Doing Time: Work Life,” in Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday
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Most MDWs have the same day off work (Sunday), and congregate in a designated vehicular
traffic-free area in Hong Kong island on that day. For these reasons as well, it is easier for them to
organize and mobilize for political demands (made to either the Philippine state or the Hong Kong
government), unlike in other destination countries like Singapore or Gulf states, which have greater
restrictions on public assembly, especially for domestic workers. Even now, when Beijing is
restricting the right to assembly and political expression in Hong Kong under the National Security
Law (NSL), migrant workers are able to continue their activism, since they are not seen as a threat to
China's sovereignty. It is the activism of local Hong Kongers that is m ore constrained under the NSL.
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in Europe or North America, the lives of Filipino migrant workers can be relatively
comfortable, but in Hong Kong, “Ramdam mo ang hirap” (You feel the hardship).
“Lahat tayo nagkukuskos ng kubeta dito!” (We all have to scrub toilets here!) one of
the activists shouted to the surrounding crowd that, at first glance, seemed indifferent to the
protest event that afternoon. This expression was something I would hear often from the
activists in relation to the recognition that though migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong
may be divided by ethnolinguistic, religious, and political identifications, age, educational
level, and professional qualifications, and length and variety of overseas employment, as
domestic workers in Hong Kong they shared the same sectoral challenges and cultural
experiences. Many of them, for example, have had to deal with predatory employment
agencies, apathy or disdain from the Philippine Consulate and Overseas Labor offices in
Hong Kong, discrimination at home and in the host country, precarious or exploitative
working conditions, and the difficulties of long-distance relationships and parenting. Many
of them have had to come to terms with becoming maids despite holding college degrees in
return for thrice the wages they might earn as professionals in the Philippines.
“When my employers found out that I was a teacher in the Philippines, they asked
me, why did I come to work as a helper in Hong Kong?” 372 said Leah, who proceeded to
explain how she barely made the minimum wage as a primary school teacher in a provincial
municipality, how she'd wanted to ensure a bright future for her daughter (“my princess”) but
couldn’t because she and her husband, a tricycle driver, always struggled to make ends meet,
how she couldn’t get promoted because she didn’t have the time and money as a full-time
teacher and mother to pursue graduate education. “Sino ba’ng may gustong maging utusan?”
(Who would want to be a servant?) she said. “I decided to work here for the higher
wages.” 373
Rina, another of my interlocutors, chimed in with an account of how other MDWs
chide her and her comrades for their activism: their fellow MDWs tell the activists, “Bakit
kayo nagrarally? Problema yan sa Pilipinas. Bakit niyo dinadala rito? Bakit niyo dinadala
rito ang mga basura? Mga basura! Nagkakalat na naman kayo dito. Yung mga problema sa
Pilipinas dinadala niyo rito sa Hong Kong!” (Why do you hold rallies here? Those are
problems in the Philippines. Why are you taking them here? Why are you bringing the trash
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here? You trash bags! You’re littering here again. The problems in the Philippines, you’re
taking to Hong Kong!) Rina added, They call us “mga baliw, mga salot” (crazies, pests)
and “panget” (ugly); They say, “Para kayong tanga” (You’re like fools). Rina retorts,
Ano lang yan eh, hindi ba kayo Pilipino? Saan ba nakatira ang pamilya mo,
hindi ba sa Pilipinas? Saan mo pinapadala ang sahod mo? … Saan ka uuwi? Di ba
sa Pilipinas? … So bakit mo ilalayo ang isyu sa Pilipinas sa isyu ng migrante? Eh
sa puno’t dulo, kaya naman tayo lumalabas dahil sa problema sa Pilipinas. Dahil
wala tayong mapasukan na trabaho. Ang daming college graduate dito. Madaming
nurses, teachers. Ako, Fine Arts!
(But the thing is, aren’t you also Filipinos? Where do your families live,
don’t they live in the Philippines? Where do you send your wages? … Where will
you come home? Isn’t it the Philippines? … So why would you separate the social
issues in the Philippines from the issues faced by migrant workers? When you come
down to it, the reason we go abroad is because of problems in the Philippines.
Because we can’t get jobs there. There are so many college graduates here. So many
nurses, teachers. Me, I’m a Fine Arts graduate!) 374
Rina's remark speaks volumes about issues usually tackled in the rich literature on the
Philippine state’s labor export program, which began in the 1970s, during the Marcos
dictatorship. In May 1974, Marcos signed Presidential Decree 442 (Labor Code), creating
state agencies (e.g. the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen
Board, and the Office of Emigrant Affairs) specifically to facilitate the employment of
Filipino workers abroad. The OEDB, for example, was mandated “to undertake … a
systematic program for overseas employment of Filipino workers … through a
comprehensive market promotion and development program,” securing “the best possible
terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers on a government-togovernment basis” and recruiting and placing “workers for overseas employment on a
government arrangement.”375 The law also includes a ban on direct hiring, mandating that
all overseas contracts be brokered and authorized by the Department of Labor and
Employment, and requires overseas Filipino contract workers to remit a portion of their
foreign exchange earnings to their families and other dependents in the Philippines. The law
thus formalizes the role of the state in brokering overseas employment for its citizens, and
then ensuring that these overseas workers, emphatically constructed as Filipino citizens
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wherever in the world they may go, continue to fulfill the state-imposed obligation to send
dollars home, to support not only the needs and wants of migrant workers’ families, but also
the state’s vision of export-oriented, debt-driven, foreign-capital-dependent “development.”
The state’s program of providing global capitalist engines with cheap, mobile,
flexible, contingent, and skilled labor able to deliver “world-class” service at Third World
prices, was initially conceived as a temporary solution to political-economic crises. At the
time of the Marcos regime, the state required dollar remittances to help offset trade deficits,
finance ballooning public debt, and maintain social stability in the face of worsening
poverty, unemployment, depressed wages, repressed political liberties, and crony capitalism
and corruption siphoning funds from state coffers. However, through successive
administrations that continued to promote this policy as a means of alleviating or foreclosing
domestic crises (including communist insurgency), labor export has become a seemingly
permanent feature of Philippine political economy and culture. With it have come
legitimating official discourses that herald overseas workers as “bagong bayani” or the new
heroes of the nation, 376 and construct their departure as heroic sacrifice in the name of
family and country.
It is this discourse of legitimation for the exploitation of Filipino workers within the
country and abroad that militant leftist organizations like Migrante contest. Time and again, I
have heard my interlocutors use terms like “taga-kuskos ng kubeta” (toilet scrubbers),
“utusan” (servant, literally “one who takes orders”), and “gatasang baka” (milking cow) to
describe their relationships to their work, their employers (usually called “amo” or
“master”), and the Philippine state, respectively. The image of toilet-scrubbing to portray the
shared experiences of MDWs as a sector evokes intimate but unwanted dirty and degrading
labor, especially for a people notorious for being hygiene snobs. 377 It is also a symbol of the
downward social mobility of many migrant workers, many of whom had a professional
education, or had worked more esteemed jobs in the Philippines before migrating to Hong
Kong for economic reasons.
The common usage of “utusan” and “amo” to denote employee-employer relations
in the specific context of domestic work (but also in other forms of contractual labor in
376 Robyn M. Rodriguez, “Migrant Heroes: Nationalism, Citizenship and the Politics of Filipino
Migrant Labor,” Citizenship Studies vol. 6 no. 3 (2002): 341–365.
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service industries) bring to the fore the huge power differential between the two parties, the
manifold dependencies of the migrant worker on their employer, and the vulnerabilities and
potential for abuse that such a situation creates, especially in a place like Hong Kong, which
requires domestic workers to live in their employers’ abode and harness their everyday-times
to their employers’ shifting schedules, living arrangements, moods, and demands.
The image of the Philippine government treating migrant workers as “milking cows”
is an admonishment of not only the state’s commodification of its own citizens, but also its
failure (or reluctance) to generate sufficient employment, ensure a living wage for all, and
provide welfare services, effectively “forcing” Filipinos to leave their families and seek
employment abroad to survive. This failure to promote the economic rights of its citizens
manifests not only domestically, but also transnationally. The Philippine state may extend
limited citizenship rights (such as legal assistance and absentee voting) to overseas Filipinos
through a vast network of Philippine Overseas Labor Offices (POLOs) in numerous
destination countries all around the world, but as the sociologist Robyn M. Rodriguez
argues, these agencies function more to enforce the obligations the state claims over its
diasporic populations:
the state disciplines workers as particular kinds of citizens: citizens who pay their
taxes [and] send their remittances to their families in the Philippines… Ultimately,
the state disciplines its citizens, who are … the state’s most profitable export … to
secure an income for the government’s coffers and to discipline flexible laborers for
the global economy. … [But] in terms of economic rights, it makes limited
interventions on behalf of workers.”378
In the case of MDWs in Hong Kong, my interlocutors from labor unions and the NGO
Mission for Migrant Workers even point to collusion between the Philippine government and
private recruitment agencies in “preying” on migrant workers and charging them illegal and
excessive “training fees.”
This situation is captured by slogans often chanted by migrant Filipino activists in
Central or in front of the Philippine Consulate General in Admiralty: “Serbisyo, Hindi
Negosyo” (Service, Not Business”) and “Scrap, Not Suspension” (of “state exactions,” such
as mandatory membership in privatized health insurance that may only be claimed in the
Philippines). Such protest language that centers the onerous and exploitative nature of “state
exactions,” the “labor export program,” and “forced migration” thus serve as counterdiscourses to the efforts of the Philippine state to discipline its transnational populations
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under the signs of nationalism and development. These counter-discourses consistently
foreground how the state’s labor export program not only separates families and exposes
migrant workers to precarious working and living conditions in other countries; it also allows
the consumption-driven Philippine economy to withstand crises, even as unemployment,
underemployment, informality, precarity, and depressed wages persist in domestic labor
markets.
In this light, it is not surprising that OFWs, especially migrant domestic workers, are
invested in the politics of the homeland, because in many cases, they are unable to gain
citizenship in their destination countries, where they are employed on a contractual basis.
Unlike the diasporic Filipino "Balikbayan" (the dual citizen who resides and works in
another country and returns to the homeland for occasional vacations), the migrant Filipino
domestic worker in Hong Kong has no right of abode in the city, has no path to citizenship,
and must leave Hong Kong once their contract is terminated (the standard contract is two
years). They are also largely unable to integrate with the local population due to linguistic,
cultural, racial, and class barriers. Their precarious and marginal position in Hong Kong
society and their negotiations with the Philippine state, combined with their reliance on
social media to maintain ties with their families in the Philippines, make them an interesting
community to consider in relation to "long-distance nationalism" in the digital age. The
states of both sending and destination countries tend to treat its migrant workers more as
“populations” subject to transnational governmentality in the service of the interests of
national elites and globalized capital, than as citizens invested with inherent rights. This is
the context of the oppositional politics practiced by migrant worker activists in Hong Kong.

Partha Chatterjee argued that “political society” arose as a consequence of
governmental systems in “most of the world,” systems that exclude from its ambit
“populations” that exist in conditions of informality and have limited access to public goods
and services. Unlike “civil society,” which negotiates with the state within a legal arena,
“political society,” which exists in a grey zone outside legality, mobilizes to collectively
bargain or contend with the state in order to secure resources for the dispossessed and
underprivileged.379 This “politics of the governed” is founded on shared experiences of
dislocation, alienation, marginalization, and precarity as a counterpoint to often elitist liberal
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discourses and their assumptions of equal rights and equal knowledge of and access to those
rights. The emergence and practice of this sort of politics among migrant Filipino domestic
workers in Hong Kong, and what this can mean for the project of nation-building in the
home country, is the subject of this section.
When my interlocutors among the migrant activists asked me how long I’d been in
Hong Kong, and I replied that I’d been here for over three years, they were surprised and
asked, What took you so long to come to us? Didn’t you know about our struggles here? I
said, I did; I didn’t say, But I didn’t go for the same reason that I am usually the only nonMDW sitting and chatting and eating with them on the pavement behind the HSBC Building,
or in the middle of Chater Road, or in the covered pedestrian bridges around Tamar Park. I
said, I was very busy with research and seminars and conferences and teaching duties these
past few years. I did not say, My privileged position as a non-local scholar with guaranteed
funding from the Hong Kong government means that as a matter of bare necessity, I d id not
have to come.
In the beginning of my field research, I thought that I would go to Central for a few
Sundays to observe political demonstrations and conduct qualitative interviews. As of
writing, it has been almost ten months since I began going to Central to participate in
protests, educational discussions, outreach and welfare programs, and other organizational
activities two to four Sundays a month, usually staying there from mid-morning until dusk,
even in the midst of a pandemic and strict protocols on social distancing. In that time I have
joined two organizations: one focused on migrant women’s rights and welfare, the other on
solidarity-building with locals in Hong Kong to promote human rights in the Philippines,
both being affiliated with UNIFIL-MIGRANTE-HK and aligned with broader formations
that espouse militant leftist ideology and politics. For these organizations, I have written,
copy edited, or translated statements, letters, press releases, reports, brochures, and
programs; designed flyers, certificates, and protest materials; taken photos and videos to
document events; procured and printed forms for filing labor complaints at the Philippine
Overseas Labor Office in Hong Kong (POLO-HK) and gone to POLO to accompany and
assist complainants; attended educational discussions and film screenings and webinars on
national, regional, and international political situations, migrant labor, and workers’ rights;
helped plan for and played emcee at events; gave speeches at rallies; conducted informative
“propaganda”; helped provide “migrant welfare services,” like distributing face masks and
sanitizers and doing blood pressure checks; made videos for political campaigns; updated the
organization’s social media accounts; cooked lunch for sharing with the group; gone to
farewell and birthday dinner parties in the street (and did not dance); carried protest
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materials to the organization’s rented storage facility; sold charity raffle tickets; and
provided impromptu counseling.
I’ve emerged from these practices of participant observation with a deeper
appreciation of the work of political activism: of solidarity-building, organization, political
education, lobbying, mobilization, and assessment. I’ve also come to marvel at how MDW
activists manage all the tasks of organizing and mobilization when they work an average of
sixteen hours a day, six days a week (and then some). When I ask them how they cope with
all their tasks, they often shrug and say, “Para-paraan, dapat creative ka.” (Find ways, you
have to be creative about it.) They add, Of course we get tired and overwhelmed, but this is
the life of a migrant, and you have to learn how to be a migrant too—not out of necessity
(which is the condition they found themselves to be in, which drives their activism), but out
of choice, in solidarity. Once, when we were talking about normalized overwork, one of my
interlocutors told me, the difference between you and us is that you always get to choose
what to tire for.
In the beginning, I meant to ask them about their political practices, their thoughts
and feelings about Duterte, and how the rise of Duterte has affected their relationships or
political views. I intended to attend some rallies in order to get a sense of what their political
culture was like. As time went on I realized how these questions were of lesser significance
to my interlocutors than the everyday work of “pagpapalawak at pagpapalakas ng ating
hanay” (broadening and strengthening our collective formation) in order to more effectively
fight for rights in the face of repression and deprivations by both Philippine and Hong Kong
governments. I also realized that given the limitations on their time as domestic workers who
often work 12 to 18 hours a day and had only Sundays free for rest, socialization, personal
errands, and activism, it was often more feasible and productive to have informal interviews
and casual conversations with them while engaged in tasks or at mealtimes, than
sequestering entire hours for formal interviews. A senior member of the organization I was
immersed in told me that though I was welcome to join their activities as part of my
research, it might be more meaningful and beneficial for me and for them if I joined their
struggles not just as a curious and sympathetic observer looking in, but as someone who
learns to see from the inside by owning and embodying the position of “migrant” and
“activist.”
I found that just by going to Central every Sunday, sitting in the middle of Chater
Road all day or on cardboard mats laid on pavements and bridges, I was learning much about
their life-worlds, even if I wasn't asking explicit questions, just by observing as well as
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participating in their activities, listening to their conversations and stories, or chatting with
them. Sharing their times, spaces, networks, and practices allowed me to gain a keener sense
of how they see Philippine democracy (“colonial” and hollow when it comes to fulfilling
promises) and what political action means for them (an imperative for survival under
oppressive regimes, an expression of hope for the future, and a process of selftransformation), and their strategies for negotiating or contending with the state, as well as
with their employers and recruiters. In the interest of communicating a sense of their
embodied experience and the nature of their commitment to political organizing, I share
some of their stories below. 380

Ate Leah
When Leah arrived in Hong Kong in 2018, she said that she became very depressed.
Back in the Philippines, she had worked as a social science teacher in a private school in
Laguna, a position that, while affording no sufficient remuneration, meant that she was
listened to, respected, and accorded honorifics like “ma’am.” In Hong Kong, where she
could earn more than thrice her wages as a teacher, she became an “utusan” (servant) and
was looked down upon by Hong Kongers, even though she had been educated as a
professional. The sense of dignity with which she held herself was evident in the sort of
stories she told: her frustrations with migrant domestic workers (MDWs) who allowed their
employers to abuse them, for one. She recounted with passion the story of one of the MDWs
whom she counseled, who let her boss hit her on the head with a sandok or ladle whenever
she made a mistake, and only approached their organization (Movers, focusing on migrant
welfare) to complain about being underpaid— Leah said, “Okay lang sa kanya yun, na
pinapalo siya sa ulo ng sandok?” (So that’s fine with her, that she’s hit on the head with a
ladle?). In a conversation about tong-its (a rummy type of card game), she talked about how
her grandmother had come from a rich and prominent family in Quezon province, before
losing all their fortune to gambling. She refers to her seven-year-old child as “prinsesa,”
(princess) and said that what gave her strength and courage to join the struggle for rights is
because she cannot stand the thought of admitting to her child and future grandchildren that
she had done nothing while our democracy was being killed (“pinapatay”).
When I asked her why she became an activist in Hong Kong, though she wasn’t one
in the Philippines, she spoke about her desire to use her voice and her gift for communication
380
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for the benefit of others. She recites an oft-repeated phrase in activist circles: “Kapag
namulat ka na, kasalanan na’ng pumikit.” (Once you have been awakened, it is folly to sleep
again.) And so, even though she has lost many friends or been insulted by former colleagues
for her activism (in one of our conversations, she spoke bitterly about being called “bobo,”
“uto-uto,” “bayaran,” “pangit,” “epal,” etc., or stupid, gullible, mercenary, ugly, and a
meddling fame-hungry busybody), she has chosen to persevere in what she believes to be the
right thing to do. But, she said, in the end she can’t make decisions for other people; the
organizations are there to give advice and extend assistance where they can (in explain ing to
fellow MDWs the provisions of their labor contract, for example, or providing legal counsel
or giving shelter to summarily terminated MDWs), but they can’t make a worker leave an
abusive amo if the worker doesn’t want to. But what they can do is share their knowledge
and experiences, and assure their fellow worker with their presence, concern, and support.

Ate Maine
Ate Maine came to Hong Kong in 2014, when she was in her late thirties, at the
encouragement of her cousin, who had already been working as a DH here. Before coming to
Hong Kong, she had worked a series of temporary and contractual minimum-wage jobs in
factories, fast food joints, and retail. She remained single, as she said she could afford to
support only herself, and spent the extra money she had on drinking with her barkada
(clique) and doing drugs. "Sa organisasyon lang ako nagtino, Tin" (I only sobered up and
pulled myself together upon joining the organization) she told me. She first encountered the
migrant activists in Hong Kong when she got into trouble with her labor placement agency.
She had paid more than 70,000 pesos (almost 12,300 HKD, or a little less than three months’
gross salary as a domestic worker) to be employed in Hong Kong, borrowing from the
agency as she didn't have that much money. Her agency confiscated her passport as
collateral, and demanded that she turn over her wages every month. Little did she know then
that by law, the labor placement agency was entitled to at most only 10% of her first monthly
wage. She only learned about it upon talking with members of NGOs and activist
organizations in Hong Kong, as she said that government agencies in the Philippines did
nothing to inform her of her rights, despite the many orientations they required. I asked her,
then what did the government tell you in those orientations? To remit money, she said. To
pay taxes and other fees.
The members of activist organizations helped her file a complaint against the agency
at the Philippine Overseas Labor Office, and assisted her through several months of
177

negotiations with and harassment from agency personnel, until she was able to recov er a
substantial amount of what she had paid them. The succor she received through those months
of struggle motivated her to become an activist herself. Like Leah above, she said that she
came to join the social movement as a way to sublimate feelings of depression and self-pity.
She says that becoming an activist gave her a sense of purpose and joy in serving fellow
migrants.

Ate Jona
When I first expressed interest in joining the mobilizations of Filipino activists in
Hong Kong, it was Ate Jona who made sure that I followed through. For a few weeks after I
first attended a protest in Central, Ate Jona would text me every day. How are you doing,
Ading381 ? Don’t sleep too late. Are you going down to Central this Sunday? We have a
Talakayang Migrante (a weekly webinar about migrant issues, by migrant workers) this
Thursday, you should watch it if you have time. Or, after an event, Have you gotten home
safely? Always take care. At first I felt discomfited by these regular check-ins, and then I got
used to them. Later, when the members of UNIFIL-MIGRANTE-HK and GABRIELA HK
started teaching me how to approach and talk to people, they would tell me how important it
was to make people feel that you had them in mind, that they were seen, and that they were
significant. As one of my interlocutors said, You don’t want to make them (other MDWs)
feel like you’re just talking to them so that they would attend our weekly protest
demonstrations. You want to make them feel that you care about them, even when it’s not a
Sunday. You always have to consider what they might feel.
Tadiar observed that “the political potential domestic helpers bear as a group”
derived from the “disruption of older support systems and the creation of new ones.” 382
Uprooted from their social support networks, receiving barely any assistance from overseas
Philippine government agencies, largely excluded from local Hong Kong society and
affluent spaces of consumption, and congregating en masse in designated public areas on
Sundays, many MDWs are, perforce, driven to seek community in pre-established groups.
Many of the MDWs in the organizations I am immersed in said that they ended up joining
Ilocano for “sister,” commonly used instead of the Tagalog “Ate,” because demographically,
Ilocanos comprise the highest percentage of MDWs in Hong Kong, said my interlocutors.
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the movement because they had received assistance from these organizations, for example in
reclaiming illegal fees charged by agencies, seeking shelter upon being summarily
terminated, or dealing with employers who withhold wages, confiscate passports, force them
to clean other people’s shops or homes, or otherwise break the terms of their contract. In
turn, they also wished to serve their fellow migrants in the community, as such service gave
them a sense of fulfillment and significance. Within the organizations, ties akin to family
also develop, as expressed in the terms of affection and practices of care with which
members treat each other. Aside from the word "kasama" (akin to “comrade” or
“companion”), familial terms like "nanay" (“mother”) or "ate"/"manang"/"ading" (“sister”),
if not “ganda” (“beautiful”) are also often used by members to refer to one another.
Aside from discussions about history, politics, and sectoral/migrant issues, members
also make it a point to check in with each other regularly and share what else is going on in
their lives. The practices of "pagbubukas" and "pagpapaabot" (literally, "to open [up]" and
"to reach [out]," respectively), through which members talk about concerns that may affect
their participation in activities and completion of organizational tasks, are de rigueur. If
information or explanations are not readily offered, a member who seems to be struggling is
outright asked what the matter is. When an explanation is given, the rest of the group is
updated about the matter, and advice or assistance extended to the member concerned if
necessary. The point of this practice, I have learned, is collective responsibility for one
another, for the benefit of each and the entire group. When a member is ailing or tired or
prohibited from leaving the employer's house, other members step up to pick up the slack, so
that organizational aims are not derailed.
In educational discussions (EDs), we are often cautioned about the pitfalls of too
much "liberalism" (in this context understood as individualism and self-serving behavior, the
relentless pursuit of personal interests to the detriment of the larger whole). Discussants
emphasize that the basis of the sort of social transformations that we seek is the
transformation of the self and the ways in which one relates with other people. Such
transformation includes the dissolution of narrow, "tribal" attachments to family or
ethnolinguistic identity, in favor of the interests and agenda of the broader collective. For
instance, even though the members of an organizational sub-unit (for example, the HKB
Branch of GABRIELA-HK), come to treat each other as family and prefer to hang out
together as if in a clique, they must also be ready to be deployed to other areas or other
formations as the situation and the organization demands.
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Ate Jona, who likes to dance and draw, said that she had first joined LIKHA
(literally "creation"), an allied organization of UNIFIL that focuses on cultural production.
LIKHA members usually take the lead in developing and teaching choreography for dances,
composing and performing protest songs, or making campaign materials and art objects for
big mobilizations. However, Ate Jona said she was later asked to "transfer" to GABRIELAHKB, and then to FILWOM, in order to help strengthen these organizations and develop
strategies for political campaigns and recruitment. These days she represents Samahang
Migrante, but, as she said, she's flexible.
I observed that the leaders and members of sub-groups under or allied with UNIFIL
tend to belong in or head multiple sub-groups. For example, the Chairperson of GABRIELA
HK is simultaneously the Vice-Chair of UNIFIL-MIGRANTE-HK, and acts as a
spokesperson for other organizations as the need arises. When a group is already wellestablished, its members are enjoined to form other groups (“sangay” or branch) in a
different area in order to expand the organizations' sphere of influence and activity, and thus
reach more fellow MDWs. I asked Ate Jona and Rina why the borders between groups
seemed so porous, and why they had to keep making new sub-groups, and they said that
that’s because if everyone in one group is already “mulat,”383 then there’s little point in their
sticking together—the goal is to serve and politicize as many people, to get them to join the
struggle or at least learn about the conditions that structure their experience, and so get help
to help themselves.

Ate Rina
Before becoming the chairperson of a migrant workers’ union, Ate Rina said that she
had “lain low” for a while and stopped going to rallies and meetings because she’d felt like
she was losing time for herself, that all the time protesting under the sun was ruining her
beauty (“Hindi na ‘ko maganda”). But what made her become active in the organization
again was a peculiar kind of FOMO 384 : whenever her friends in the organization posted
about demonstrations, especially when their calls (panawagan) were heeded by authorities
and acted upon, she would think to herself, “I wasn’t part of that triumph. I want to be a part
Literally, “eyes opened”—“enlightened” or “awake” don’t quite capture the metaphor of
blind(ered)ness expressed by the adjective “bulag,” the antonym of “mulat,” which they tend to use a
lot to refer to people who seem unaware of socio-historical conditions
383
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of that.” She said that she came to realize that her beauty lay not in her appearance, but in her
concrete contributions to change for the better the situation of her fellow migrants. She also
said that what’s great about “progressive organizations” is that its members are bound by
their common principles and social aims, not private interests. They didn’t join these
organizations because they wanted to make money for “so-called charity” (“charity kuno”),
or because they sought companionship and fun. Unlike other groups that were often fraught
with the drama of gossip and backstabbing, she said, progressive groups followed a more
deliberative model: “Kung may problema ka, ilalatag yan [sa group meeting] at paguusapan hanggang maresolba ayon sa prinsipyo at patakaran ng organisasyon. Kung may
problema ako sayo, halimbawa, hindi ko irereklamo sa kanila [sa ibang miyembro na
walang kinalaman sa isyu]; sasabihin ko sa iyo o sa organization [kung ang problema ay
relevant sa operation ng organization].” (If you have a problem, it will be presented [to the
body during group meetings] and discussed until it is resolved according to the principles
and policies of the organization. If I have a problem with you, for example, I wouldn’t
complain about it to others; I will talk to you about it or bring up the matter to the
organization.)
In becoming part of the mass movement, Rina, who had graduated with a degree in
Fine Arts and loved to compose and perform songs, found an outlet for her creative drive
that also made her feel appreciated and relevant. At demonstrations, she is often seen in front
of a group of dancers, leading the collective singing of protest songs, or holding a
megaphone and delivering speeches. She also serves as one of the “faces” or discussants of
the weekly webinar Talakayang Migrante. She said that when she tried to make a living as
an artist, she found that people were not inclined to buy her work, which often dealt with
themes of poverty and women’s oppression. She said, “Burgis kasi ang art market sa
Pilipinas, hindi ba. Hindi naman ide-display sa mga hotel at resort ang gawa ko.” (“The art
market in the Philippines is bourgeois, isn’t it. They wouldn’t display my work in hotels and
resorts.”)

Alex
When I first met Alex, they were dressed in a polo shirt, pintuck pants, and loafers.
It was the peak of Hong Kong summer, the air heavy with humidity. They were sipping
instant coffee from a paper cup while chatting with the women at the tambayan (hangout
place) of GABRIELA-HKB, behind the HSBC Building. Alex always sported a watch and
looked “respectable” (in the bourgeois sense of the word) however the weather was. This
181

concern about the appearance of respectability is something I hear from other activists. Alex
explained that they had to hold themselves to high standards of behavior because they
interacted with many different kinds of people, each holding some form of prejudice.
Further, they carried the name of their organizations, and any misdemeanor on their part, like
walking around drunk or wearing skimpy clothing, could put the organizations in an
unfavorable light.
Alex, who identifies as a genderqueer lesbian, is one of the more senior members of
the organization, having worked as a domestic worker in Hong Kong for over a decade, and
with the Migrante International headquarters in Quezon City before that. It was the latter
experience that pushed them to commit to activism. As a staffer at Migrante, they said, they
were exposed to the myriad abuses suffered by OFWs from foreign employers as well as
fellow Filipinos, especially predatory recruitment agencies. “Maiiyak ka talaga” (It would
make you cry [to hear their stories]) they told me, emphasizing, as did others, the affective
basis of their commitment to the mass movement. They also spoke about fear in the
experience being surveilled and stalked by suspected police operatives at a time of
heightened harassment and assassination of activists, and anger at being treated rudely at the
Philippine Consulate because they were “just” a domestic worker.
Among all my relationships with the members of the organizations, my relationship
with Alex may be the most challenging. While the other members just let me participate at
my leisure,385 since they know that I join them as a student and researcher in Hong Kong,
Alex considers with gravity the implications of my involvement. They consistently remind
me of the difference and the privileges afforded by my subject position, and consequently the
effort I must undertake to bridge that difference and attempt to inhabit their point of view, or
at least to approximate it, to see things, so to speak, from their place on cardboard mats on
the ground. “You must learn to be a migrant” is their favorite phrase to say to me. “Masanay
ka sa init, sa pagod,” (Get used to the heat, to exhaustion), they would tell me over the
phone while they washed the dishes or cooked dinner and I sat on my desk trying to write.
“Huwag ka magtago” (Don’t hide), they would tell me when they notice me observing their
activities more than actively participating. Another time: “You know the theory and the
history, you have read the books. What does it matter? Now you have to practice. And
struggle alongside the masses.”

In Tagalog, we call this “saling-kitkit,” or one who joins a game but has no real stakes in the
play, and thus is included in a limited and contingent sense, in the spur of the moment and according
to immediate needs and circumstances.
385
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On Political Subject-Formation and Positionality
In the summer of 2010, I graduated with a degree in Literature, one of the over
481,000 college graduates in the Philippines that year, around 5,000 of which came from the
humanities. (The only disciplines that had college graduates numbering more than 100,000
were Business and Health; most of my high school classmates had taken up Nursing in
college in the hopes of working overseas.) 386 That I was able to obtain a university degree,
by itself, is an elite act; only a little over four percent of the 11.5 million students who
enrolled in primary school with me in 1996 were able to complete tertiary education. 387
I have been thinking about the class politics that underpins this research topic for a
long while. My academic background is in Anglo-American literature and philosophy;
thus, my understanding of “Dutertismo” as an event in Philippine social history was
structured by the liberal worldviews celebrated and taken for granted in the course of my
studies. In conducting field research, my assumptions have been challenged. Because I
thought that liberal democracy—with its features of pluralism, the centrality of rights, and
universal suffrage—was a shining ideal of how political life ought to be conducted, I was
surprised to hear my activist interlocutors use the word “liberal” in a derogatory way, to
denote selfishness in a person, or a tendency to minimize the role of hierarchical structures
and one’s place in it in determining one’s social experience and consciousness. When we
speak of democracy, whose experience of “democracy” are we talking about? Who is served
by that discourse? How are the abstractions of liberalism and human rights concretized in
democratic practice? How do we institutionalize democratic practice beyond the bureaucratic
apparatus of the state? How do we democratize communication and relationality itself?
Engaging in activist work expanded my idea of how democracy can be, how democracy
from below can happen.
Fieldwork also induced me to confront issues relating to my own subjectivity and
positionality as a researcher, in relation to my research participants, my political
commitments, and my intellectual aims. In doing fieldwork I have had to learn what it means
386 Statistics from the Commission on Higher Education, https://ched.gov.ph/wpcontent/uploads/2017/09/4-Graduates-by-Discipline-Group-and-Academic-Year.pdf, accessed May
28, 2021.
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to live as a migrant—not just "migrant" in the sense of somebody who has crossed
transnational borders, but the experience of precarity and dislocation that that movement
entails, especially for one whose upward economic mobility is gained at the expense of
downward social mobility. In unpacking my own subject-formation, and that of my research
participants, I have had to then internalize the notion that the way I see and experience the
world as a liberal subject is not the way that most of the Filipinos in the Philippines and
abroad may see and experience the world. Because of this difference, my learning and
unlearning has been facilitated by dialectical engagement.
I often think about dialectical engagement in relation to one of my interlocutors,
Ate Thelma, who has guided me through the process of learning to be an activist and
learning to be a migrant within the political and ideological frames espoused by the
organization I am immersed in. During our educational discussions, she would sometimes
tell me that she felt “intimidated” or “insecure” when she spoke with me, that she was unsure
if she were equipped to teach me, given that in terms of formal education, I am supposedly
more educated than she was. But my formal education is very different from the kind of
education her life experiences have afforded her, as an indigenous woman, a single mother, a
migrant domestic worker, a labor organizer. This difference between us, I have found, is
generative. In the space of dialogue between us, I am able to better interrogate my own
assumptions and knowledge, with her probing and her challenges. With her and the other
activists in the organization, I experienced knowledge-construction as a collaborative effort.
It has been productive for me to listen to them, and to think with them—not just think about
them.
This relation of difference and proximity in the research process also presented the
challenge of negotiating affective entanglements and the ways in which this may color my
analysis. For example, since I have been spending time with them since June 2020, I became
attached to the friends that I made in the activist organizations, as well as to the struggles and
causes they fight for. My desire to learn more about their experiences, politics, and practices
of ideological, political, and organizational work, and to keep in good standing in their view,
may have arrested my interest in seeking out a more varied set of research participants from
so-called “traditional” organizations, or interlocutors who do not belong to any organization.
On the one hand, the "stickiness" of this attachment has helped me appreciate the depth of
the work that goes into activism, which (at least in the so-called “liberal” circles among the
Filipino middle classes and intelligentsia) is too often dismissed or derided from the outside
as so much misguided and futile idealism.
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The field work I've done has also helped me see the specific vulnerabilities and
constraints experienced by migrant worker activists, whose precarious position in Hong
Kong society (having no right of abode or security of employment) means that they have to
be more careful about their activities and involvement in local issues and movements, lest
they be summarily dismissed. They could not, for example, openly support Hong Kongers’
calls for universal suffrage and sovereignty, or participate in the local protests that rocked the
city for the most part of 2019 and early 2020 for fear of getting into trouble. Because most of
their demands and criticisms are addressed to the Philippine state, the Hong Kong
government is lenient with their political expression. However, if they had started openly
criticizing the National Security Law for example, that would be a different story. The 2019
protests also had damaging effects on their own organizing activities, because they could not
flock to Central and other places while locals also protested there. Even before the pandemic,
many of their members had fallen away from the organizations because of the disruptions
caused by the protests. The racism and xenophobia that featured in some sectors of the 2019
protests also rankled with them, who experience discrimination and stigmatization in Hong
Kong.
The insecurity of their belonging to Hong Kong society, because of their racial,
ethnolinguistic, and cultural otherness, as well as their lack of the right of abode in this
territory, has meant that even though many of them had lived in Hong Kong for twenty or
thirty years, have grown old here, and now feel distant from their relatives and communities
in the Philippines, the only "home" that they have and would have to return to is the
Philippines. This is captured by the term "for good," which they use whenever plans for the
future come up, or whenever somebody flies back to the home country. "Are you going back
there for a visit?" they ask. "Or are you going back there for good?" Many of those who had
thought that they would spend just one or two contract terms (two to four years) in Hong
Kong, and then go back home "for good" have been here for over a decade. Thus, a huge part
of what animates their participation in nationalist projects and the politics of the homeland is
the overarching awareness that whether they return sooner or later, their futures are tied up
with those of the Philippine nation-state.
Aside from issues of racial, ethnolinguistic, and class identity, and national
belonging, we also experienced pragmatic constraints to activism, especially in pandemic
times. Many of the activists or their peers have been under pressure to remit more money
back home to support newly unemployed or ailing members of their families. Sometimes
they did not have enough money to pay for the f are to Central, or to buy enough food, masks,
or sanitizers. Some of them had relatives and friends who were directly targeted by recent
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state violence, or lost their homes and livelihoods to successive typhoons and floods in the
Philippines. Sometimes their employers disallowed them from leaving the house on Sundays
for fear of transmitting disease—a practice that they see as a form of stigmatization, and rail
against.

The COVID Crisis as Potential Solvent
On April 1, 2020, late in the evening, the hashtag #OustDuterteNOW became the top
trending Twitter topic in the Philippines and worldwide, with over half a million tweets
calling for Duterte’s ouster. It stayed at the top spot of Twitter’s worldwide trends list for six
hours, until the morning of April 2, with Filipinos all over the world taking to social media to
voice their anger at the government, sharing rants, memes, literary quotes, song lyrics, even
screenshots from political/historical Korean dramas (sageuk). Many of the tweets were
prefaced with a disclaimer to the effect: I don’t usually talk about politics but…
It is the “but” that I find interesting—what does it take to galvanize a critical mass?
The “social media rally” was occasioned by an abruptly announced national address
by the president, following weeks of heightened social turmoil since the National Capital
Region (NCR) and other urban centers in the Philippines were placed under lockdown in
mid-March 2020 to help contain the spread of COVID-19. While neighboring Asian
countries had been putting emergency measures in place since January to address the
spreading pandemic, the Philippine government had, for two months, downplayed the
situation and refused public demands to restrict border access to travelers from China, to
enforce mass testing of persons under investigation (PUIs) for coronavirus infection, or to
begin procurement or local production of necessary medical supplies, such as personal
protective equipment (PPE). Instead, weeks before the lockdown, the chief executive and his
allies in the House of Representatives had been prosecuting a media company for not airing
Duterte’s political campaign advertisements back in 2016 and publishing stories critical of
the administration. 388 It was not until PUIs began dying that the national government
announced community quarantine measures for NCR.

Dharel Placido, “Duterte to 'object' to ABS-CBN franchise renewal,” ABS-CBN News,
November 8, 2018, https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/08/18/duterte-to-object-to-abs-cbn-franchiserenewal.
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The sudden lockdown, widely perceived to be both too much and not enough, had
pushed to the surface of public consciousness not only the governance gaps and
bureaucratic ineptitude of the present administration in managing a national emergency, but
also the almost monotonic quality of its response to any crisis: that is, with threats of violent
repression by the police and the military, who were placed at the forefront of the
government’s response to the public health crisis posed by the pandemic. According to the
president’s spokesperson, military men must implement the government’s “National Action
Plan” against the novel coronavirus because of “their culture of discipline, obedience to
superiors, training in organization, [and] tactical strategies in fighting the enemies of the
state … They are not embroiled in bureaucratic rigmaroles. They abhor useless debates …
They act without fanfare. They get things done.” 389 Such a rationale is consistent with the
Duterte administration’s tendency to frame virtually every social issue in terms of “war,”
normalizing the war imaginary of just violence, necessary deaths, inevitable collateral
damage, exception to established rules, submission to higher authority, and the show of
force. This tendency also involves sidelining constitutionally mandated democratic
principles (due process, rule of law, the centrality of human rights) for posing obstructions to
the efficient and swift implementation of government policy. This rationale is also reflected
in the language the regime chooses to adopt; in the case of the coronavirus crisis, for
example, the Duterte administration has pushed for the vocabulary of policing to be used in
surveilling COVID-19 patients and potential cases, calling “Persons under investigation”
(PUI) “suspect.” 390
The Duterte administration’s response to the coronavirus crisis, its declaration of a
national emergency in order to justify heightened and violent policing, is not surprising, as
the present administration has always put a primacy on violence as a political resource.
Violent language against contextually defined social others, e.g. “the West,” “national
oligarchs,” “Imperial Manila,” “the left,” oppositional “strong” women, criminals, etc., is
central to the chief executive’s charisma. His administration’s campaigns against criminality
and corruption—constructed as the roots of the country’s social ills—are also openly
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predicated on killing as a form of “social cleansing.” However, such violent speech and
policies had ostensibly been targeted against marginalized or demonized groups of people
that Dutertismo presents as posing a threat to national unity, security, and development.
Thus, a supporter of the president’s policies could reason, with regard to extrajudicial
killings, that “It's a moral killing, in a way. It's like a pest in your house. If you see a
cockroach or a mosquito, you'd kill it. For me, if you're a drug user, a drug seller, you're a
sickness in society. You need to disappear.”391 The same could not be said when those
whose lives are put at risk by government policies include the general, “law-abiding,”
populace. What distinguishes the current crisis then, from other crises constructed in the
language of Dutertismo using the frame of war, is that now, more people, regardless of social
class, political affiliation, or ethnolinguistic identity, feel personally threatened by the
government, in addition to, or even more than, they fear infection by the virus.
The specific phrase in the president’s April 1 address that triggered public furor was
this: “My orders are sa pulis pati military … na pagka ginulo at nagkaroon ng okasyon na
lumaban at ang buhay niyo ay nalagay sa alanganin, shoot them dead. Naintindihan niyo?
Patay. … Huwag ninyo subukan ang gobyerno kasi itong gobyerno na ito hindi inutil.”392
(My orders to the police and the military are … that if there’s trouble and an occasion for a
fight arises and your lives are put at risk, shoot them dead. You understand? Dead. … Don’t
you challenge the government because this government is not feckless.) Hours before this
address, a group of urban poor residents of San Roque in Quezon City were dispersed and
arrested by the police while they were holding a public demonstration to ask the government
for food and financial help. A few days before that, a Manila Police District officer was
caught on camera threatening to shoot residents of Muslim Town in Quiapo if they went
outdoors during curfew hours; the officer was also filmed beating up and cursing a man who
was simply passing through the gate of the community on his way to buy groceries. Videos
of these events went viral on social media, along with details of other police abuses,
including the arrests of more than 20,000 people in the span of two weeks for disobeying
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curfew and lockdown rules, 393 extortion and sexual harassment at checkpoints, and other
forms of degrading treatment of detainees.394 These prompted widespread condemnation of
the Duterte regime, with even usually “apolitical” public personalities calling out the
government and expressing solidarity with the poor and those detained.
A year later, in April 2021, as COVID-19 infection and death rates rose, community
lockdowns persisted, livelihoods were wiped out, and the government still refused to
disburse sufficient aid to tide over the increasingly hungry population,395 hundreds of
"community pantries" sprung up all around the archipelago. Organized by decentralized
groups of volunteers of various ideological stripes and social positions in their respective
locales, this anarchic movement for mutual aid and resource-sharing, based on the principle
"Magbigay ayon sa kakayanan, kumuha ayon sa pangangailangan" ("Give what you can,
take what you need"), spread like a viral meme, and showed us what activism sans a unified
and orthodox ideological line could look like. Predictably, the organizers of community
pantries, particularly Ana Patricia Non, the woman who instigated this movement, were redtagged by the government as having links to the communist insurgency, and consequently
harassed.
It is important to note that the above events, as highly publicized manifestations of
the government’s primarily militarist response to a public health issue, do not differ much in
form from other highly publicized police abuses in relation to the “War on Drugs,” another
social problem primarily construed as a threat to law, order, and national security. The police
even use similar scripts in justifying the use of lethal force against both suspected drug users
and suspected quarantine evaders: that they fought back (nanlaban) against police.396 But
while the violation of the rights of suspected drug users and pushers may be morally justified
on the basis of the harms they pose to their communities, the violations of the rights of those
who break curfew because they were unable to reach their homes in time due to the
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suspension of public transportation, or those who roam the streets asking for food for their
families, cannot be similarly justified. These acts cannot be simply attributed to moral
corruption, but to desperate circumstances that were exacerbated by the loss of livelihood
and access to vital resources with the government-imposed lockdown, the effects of which
are felt by all affected, albeit to varying degrees. These common experiences of mundane
abuses at the hands of the state thus become a basis for the sort of social solidarity previously
little felt in a space as segregated as Metro Manila. With the dissolution of a moral
antagonistic frontier between “criminals” (i.e. those who break quarantine/curfew or express
dissent against the government) and the rest of society in the context of shared suffering
under the conditions of an ongoing pandemic, Dutertismo’s rhetoric of war not only falls
flat, but brings to the fore of public attention the government’s lack of malasakit
(compassion). For a regime whose popularity relied on cultivating an image of “tapang at
malasakit” (courage and compassion), this poses a challenge to legitimacy.

190

6. CONCLUSION

As I write this conclusion, the Philippine polity is making ready for another season
of the national elections in 2022. The genre is dystopia, and the stakes, it seems, have not
been higher.
Five years of the Duterte presidency has led to the breakdown of many of the
country’s already tenuous democratic institutions. State power is now more concentrated in
the hands of the Chief Executive, as manifested in the burgeoning of various “national task
forces” concerned with issues—such as public health, environmental disaster management,
and peace and security—that traditionally fall under the purview of established departments
of the government bureaucracy, but now are handled by presidential appointees, many of
them former military officers, who report directly to the office of the Commander-inChief.397 Both Upper and Lower Houses of the Congress are dominated by the president’s
allies, who serve to advance the Chief Executive’s legislative priorities. 398 Justices
appointed by Duterte now constitute the majority of the sitting justices in the Supreme
Court.399 The government bureaucracy has been militarized, 400 the military and police even
more politicized.401 At his last State of the Nation Address (SONA), the president, pandering
to his power base, asked the Congress to legislate more financial and legal benefits for
soldiers and police, including assistance for those facing administrative and criminal
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charges.402 Not only has the system of checks and balances among the nominally coequal
branches of government been eroded; external mechanisms of government accountability
have been weakened too. News media organizations and journalists face constant and
heightened intimidation, litigation, arrests, assaults, killings, online harassment, and
cyberattacks from the state,403 which has even managed to shut down one of the country’s
biggest media networks404 in the name of “dismantl[ing] the oligarchy.”405 Under Duterte,
hundreds of activists, trade unionists and labor organizers, human rights workers, and
lawyers have been assassinated, much more than during any other previous administration,
in addition to the tens of thousands that have been extrajudicially killed as part of the War on
Drugs.406 The passage of the Anti-Terrorism Law in 2020 has only added to the coercive
state’s legal arsenal for persecuting critics of the government.407 Meanwhile, the Philippine
economy, badly hit by the pandemic and a government response characterized primarily by
extended, militarized lockdowns, is facing its worst economic crisis since 1947, with soaring
rates of inflation, unemployment, and poverty, and hardly any social aid to augment gutted
household incomes408 or succor millions of families reporting hunger, 409 despite extensive
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government borrowing amounting to over 200 billion dollars in loans, or more than 60% of
the GDP.410
All of the above notwithstanding, the president’s approval and trust ratings remain
relatively and uncommonly high, especially for an outgoing president.411 As of the time of
writing, President Duterte and his continuity candidate, his daughter and Davao City Mayor
Sara Duterte-Carpio, are leading the social polls on potential contenders for the positions of
vice-president and president, respectively, in the upcoming 2022 electoral race.412 The most
prominent opposition coalition, comprising “anti-Duterte” “democratic forces” from across
the political spectrum united by little more than the mandate to “defeat the forces of tyranny
that has [sic] ruled this country in the last 5 years,” 413 has been characterized by political
analysts as “weak” and unable to “inspire confidence.” 414
In this state of political and pandemic duress, what, one may ask, is the point of
problematizing “democracy” and “Dutertismo” as key terms in understanding contemporary
Philippines, when the energies of all stakeholders in Philippine politics might be better
channeled to the exigencies of survival, or, as my activist interlocutors put it, to battling the
most “sagad-sagarin” (extreme) of the country’s present problems, namely, Duterte himself?

In this thesis, I have attempted to understand the rise of Dutertismo as a symptom of
both deep-seated problems and new developments in Philippine society. Much of the
literature on “Dutertismo,” especially from the social sciences, predominantly analyze it as a
form of “authoritarian populism” animated by anxious and hopeful “penal publics” that arose
in reaction to “elite democracy,” and resulted in “democratic backsliding.” While helpful in
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pointing out the existing and evolving “democratic deficits” of the political system in the
Philippines, these analyses tend to adopt “liberal democracy” as an unquestioned political
ideal, center the nominally democratic state as the steward of the people’s rights and interests
(as emphasized in the reformist narrative of “good governance”), and reproduce an
understanding of contemporary Philippine politics that is centered on state-society relations
mediated by elections and electoral campaigns. In doing so, it elides cleavages and
contradictions within Philippine society—complexities that have lent Dutertismo so much
purchase, which has endured even in the shambolic pandemic present—and overlooks
possibilities for alternative political projects that are not captured by the framework of
electoral contestation.
Seeking to move beyond and complicate statist and liberal-democratic normative
framings, I have tried to examine Dutertismo’s contexts of emergence as a way to bring to
the fore historical structures, political cultures, and social dynamics that tend to be obscured
by the over-emphasis of much existing political commentary on the idiosyncrasies of Duterte
himself, or on the most egregious of his administration’s policies, namely, the War on Drugs,
the violence of the broader attack on the principles and institutions of “human rights” that it
represents, and the militarization and autocratization of the government that has
accompanied its execution. Analyzing a constellation of cultural texts, my thesis examined
Dutertismo as a discourse, embedding the problematics of Philippine society that it peddles
within the “problem-spaces” or thematics of nationalism, democracy, and development.
Each chapter explored a different element or context of the “crisis” that Dutertismo
represents, as I elaborate below. Using “disjunction”—between the phenomenon of
“Dutertismo” and the normative frame of “liberal democracy”—as a heuristic, I chose texts
that help elucidate social contradictions and complexities that are often overlooked in
political discussions that are overwhelmingly structured by the pro-Duterte (“DDS,”
“Dutertard”) vs. anti-Duterte (“Liberal,” “Dilawan,” “Yellow,” “Red,” “communist”)
Manichean binary. More than presenting a neat argument about an ongoing phenomenon
made even more dynamic by the changes perforce brought by the current pandemic, my hope
for each chapter is for it to widen the horizon of questioning and thinking in relation to a
problem that has been pinned down in a particular way.
Chapter 1 examined political speeches, representations of Duterte, and ethnographic
materials from fieldwork among migrant domestic worker activists and Duterte supporters in
Hong Kong to analyze Dutertismo as a “populist” movement and discourse. “Populism”
itself is a disputed term, though it is commonly used as a pejorative in discussions of
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democracy. In this chapter, I drew on Ernesto Laclau’s theorization of populism as an
affectively charged rhetorical operation that enables the unification of usually discrete
interests and the mobilization of various social actors and stakeholders, who are brought
together by the aggregation of demands that are subsumed to a “floating” or “empty”
signifier, which serves to tie and articulate them together. In the case of Dutertismo, this
signifier is “change,” as embodied by the iconoclastic and deviant yet charismatic figure of
“Tatay Digong.” Unlike analyses of “populism” that present it as “illiberal” and therefore
inherently “bad” or anti-democratic, I argued that Duterte's "populism" emerged from
grassroots desire for genuine democracy and its promise of empowerment and development
through "nation-building." Thus, examining how and why Dutertismo's rhetoric resonated
with various publics, how he came to embody "the people's last hope" in 2016, helps
illuminate the gravely undemocratic character of Philippine society, which is erased in the
triumphalist narrative of the EDSA legacy of civil society "people power," political
freedoms, and democratization and modernization along the lines of the liberal consensus. In
describing how Duterte's populist persona is constructed and represented, I explained how
Duterte appealed to various strategic audiences, such as Overseas Filipino Workers, who had
felt themselves marginalized and exploited in society, be it in the Philippines or abroad. By
contrast, their organized practices and expressions of support for Duterte, portrayed as the
father of the nation of the oppressed, lent them a sense of collective identity, belonging, and
agency. Their attribution of paternal care to Duterte also helped foster feelings of intimacy
and connection between him and his “children.” In this regard, this chapter also explored
how Dutertismo systematically cultivated “prosocial” emotions of hope, love, and
community to sustain the engagement of affective publics and mobilize them for political
campaigns in the name of patriotism and the patriarch both online and offline. In paying
attention to the discourses of Duterte supporters in Hong Kong, vis-a-vis those of activists
who oppose him, this chapter adds to existing analyses of Duterte’s “populism” that focus on
its punitive “necropolitics'' and its attendant negative emotions of f ear, anger, and anxiety,
and challenges the easy and sterile dismissal of “DDS'' as “blind fanatics.” Not only is this
latter attitude unhelpful in the project of understanding, and thereby effectively addressing,
the problems that Dutertismo raises, but its condescending view of emotionality and nonrationality, especially when these qualities are attributed solely to Duterte supporters, also
inhibits an understanding of effective politics as fundamentally affective.
Extending the discussion in Chapter 1 on Dutertismo’s use of patriotism to engage
and rouse supporters, Chapter 2 problematized liberal-elite “ilustrado” nationalism as a
context for the success of Dutertismo’s mobilization of an “alternative” discourse of
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nationalism—one that foregrounds the oppressive character of “oligarchic” rule from socalled “Imperial Manila”—to delegitimize the post-EDSA order and the self-proclaimed
bearers of this “democratic” legacy, the Liberal Party and their civil society supporters.
Drawing on Fredric Jameson’s thought on reading Third World literature as national
allegory, I examined three novels written by diasporic Filipinos in the United States that
provide a cognitive map of the Philippine contemporary and its roots in not only the events
that transpired during and after the Cold War-era Marcos dictatorship, but also the enduring
coloniality of the Philippine nation-state that emerged from American rule and democratic
“tutelage” at the turn of the twentieth century. My hope in doing so is to counter the myopic
tendency to locate the contexts of Dutertismo’s resurgence primarily in the failures of the
second Aquino administration, instead of connecting it to more longstanding structures of
injustice and exploitation that perhaps have become so naturalized in Philippine society that
Duterte's promise of radical, systemic change came as both a shock and a relief to those who
echoed this desire. Gina Apostol’s Gun Dealers’ Daughter (2010), largely set in the 1980s
and told from the point-of-view of a scion of the Manila upper crust who joins a Maoist
student movement against Marcos and the “imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratcapitalism'' his regime represents, portrays the stark hierarchies, divisions, class
contradictions, and injustices that characterize Philippine society. Through an exploration of
its protagonist’s memory and subjectivity and the sociohistorical processes that shaped it, the
novel illustrates how the “collaborative neocolonialism” of the national elite, the political
and economic advantages that such collaboration affords them, and the Euro-American
cultural worlds they inhabit, keep them separate from, yet dominant over the great mass of
“Filipinos'' who constitute the nation they purport to represent. The problems that attend this
class’s adoption of “whiteness,” and its often ahistorical and depoliticized application of
“universal” liberal norms and values in trying to understand a society they lack experiential
grounding in, are rendered in Randy Ribay’s Patron Saints of Nothing (2019). The tale’s
protagonist, a Filipino-American teenager, journeys to the Philippines upon learning that his
cousin had been killed in the Duterte administration’s War on Drugs. His attempts to
investigate and comprehend the milieu that allowed his cousin, and thousands like him, to be
so easily deprived of life are hindered by his inability to speak or understand Philippine
vernaculars, by his lack of knowledge about the realities and histories of the countries he
claims as his own, and by his predominant confinement to upper- and upper-middle class
enclaves and company. Even when he encounters the world of the urban poor (an encounter
mediated by a university student), he cannot help but bring his own universalist, humanistic,
and bourgeois assumptions to bear upon his perception of that other world—a perception that
is conveyed to the novel’s “global” audience, who are left with the impressions of an
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“illiberal” Third World country where the poor live in misery and violent rightwing
nationalism runs roughshod over rights, but who are not asked to ask why this is so, or how
it is related to them. Though the novel’s protagonist is a diasporic Filipino raised in the
United States, his perspective approximates that of the upper/middle-class, Manila-based,
car-shuttled, church-going, university-educated member of civil society whose apprehension
of social realities and relations are constrained by their movements within geographies of
comfort. By contrast, Elaine Castillo’s America Is Not the Heart (2018), set in a diasporic
Filipino community in Milpitas, California in the ‘80s and ‘90s, centers the disturbances and
difficulties that drive and that result from displacement. Its focal characters migrated to the
United States to escape “destinies” they would have been doomed to had they stayed in the
Philippines—poverty, political persecution, and perhaps worse forms of class, gender, and
racial oppression than what they encounter in their adopted country. Yet they retain affective
ties to the homeland through memories, kinship bonds, economic flows, folklore, and
cultural practices that live on with their communities in the diaspora. From this geographic
distance, they reminisce about their lives in the old country; in plumbing their personal
histories and their political traumas, which are narratively embedded in broader historical
and social configurations, the novel critically examines the Philippine nation. In depicting
how social cleavages in the homeland, most obviously along class and ethnolinguistic lines,
are reproduced in the diaspora, the novel engages the question of who belongs to the nation,
and whom it ignores, exploits, represses, or throws out. Through this chapter, I tried to show
that the fictive, totalizing, and unitizing discourse of nation is belied by actually existing rifts
between different classes and social groups, whose relations to each other are often shaped
by structures of injustice and violence. Dutertismo’s resonance in part lies in its underscoring
of these existing differences and asymmetries of power and access, which ahistorical and
universalist liberalism often fails to take into account.
While Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the problem-space of nationalism and the
complicated feelings that attend the question of national belonging as vital contexts for
Dutertismo’s rise, Chapters 3 and 4 consider the problem-spaces of democracy and
development, which frame the debates about the Duterte administration’s most prominent
and controversial policy, the War on Drugs. Understanding these contexts is essential to
unriddling that which seems unthinkable and untenable, and thereby clarifying the social
conditions that Dutertismo has forced us to confront and address.
Chapter 3 contextualizes the drug war in the Philippines’ modern history of political
violence, particularly since the Marcos dictatorship. This history, the country’s entrenched
culture of impunity conditioned by asymmetries in power and weak justice mechanisms, and
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structures of everyday violence and precarity, underpin the drug war’s extreme—in terms of
quantity, quality, frequency, and visibility—violence. In this fraught context, the mere
insistence on the protection of “inherent” human rights, when deployed as critique, rings
hollow, because it ignores the fact that in the Philippine context, access to rights is
differentially distributed, the rights of the marginalized are routinely violated, and these
conditions have existed long before Duterte came to power. Instead of criticizing the drug
war from a rights-based perspective, this chapter attempts to demystify the war on drugs’
“exceptional” violence, and in so doing throw light on the workings of power that underlie
its execution. Analyzing media texts such as photojournalism, a hip-hop concept album, a
documentary, and feature films about the Duterte administration’s anti-drug campaign, its
agents, its targets, and the journalists who cover it, I examined the role of media and
mediation in mainstreaming Dutertismo’s imaginary of war. The war imaginary functions
not only as a justificatory mechanism for systematized mass killing, but also normalizes the
use of militarized language and approaches to the country’s problems; whether they concern
the environment or public health, Dutertismo’s war imaginary—so commonly reproduced in
public and media discourses—frames social issues as battles that must be won, necessitating
the use of punitive measures and the full force of the coercive state. Central to the
normalization of the war imaginary is the production and circulation of spectacles of
violence—concerning both that which is framed as a threat to public security and order, and
that which the state discharges in response to a threat. Foremost among these spectacles are
photographs of extrajudicial killing (EJK), typically showing a bloodied and sometimes
mutilated corpse, often labelled a drug pusher or addict, dumped in a dark and dirty street.
EJK photographs have served a number of functions in the drug war. On the one hand, they
document the brutalities of the regime that might otherwise be hidden from public view or
dismissed as exaggeration or falsehood; in this way, the production, circulation, collection,
and archiving of these photographs may serve as a valuable evidential resource for
campaigns to hold Duterte and his aides to account f or their crimes against humanity.415 On
the other hand, the aestheticized violence of the EJK photograph tends to reinforce the
dehumanization of the EJK victim, the image of whose brutal death and brutalized body is
objectified for viral circulation and mass consumption and often commercialized in local and
global mediascapes. With the affects of horror, fear, awe, and disgust that they elicit, EJK
photographs may also be harnessed to serve the interests of Dutertismo in communicating
415 On the importance of memorialization projects for the victims of the drug war, see Ruben
Carranza, “Justice Is More Than Accountability for Victims of Rodrigo Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’,”
International Center for Transitional Justice, July 21, 2021, accessed August 15, 2021,
https://www.ictj.org/news/justice-more-accountability-victims-rodrigo-duterte%E2%80%99s%E2%80%98war-drugs%E2%80%99.

198

the “guilt” of the dead victim accused of drug-related crimes, and the power of the chief
executive’s speech in mobilizing forces and instigating swift punishment against designated
social enemies and “undesirables,” who must be disposed of for the “better good.” In
interrogating Dutertismo’s project of social cleansing and its construction of disposable
populations, this chapter also examined colonial logics of exclusion and exploitation that
characterize urban development in Metropolitan Manila (where the majority of EJKs take
place), as these are represented in two noir films about the drug war. In analyzing these
films’ depiction of the inner-city slum as a site of policing and political action, I tried to
trouble liberal conceptions of justice and rights, and argue for the necessity of developing a
critical perspective and language that do not take the ontological status or normative
desirability of so-called “liberal democratic values” for granted.
Chapter 4 extends the discussion in Chapter 3 on the material and symbolic
structures that have allowed Dutertismo’s representation of the drug war as a form of “social
cleansing” to become normalized in public consciousness. Juxtaposing chronotopes of the
Metro Manila slum and of the Asian “world city,” this chapter proposed that the War on
Drugs be framed by the twin logics of “disposability” and “development.” I argued that the
division between disciplined “citizens” with the right to make a claim to rights, and “nonhuman” “criminals” who deserve to be exterminated, are produced by the dialectics of these
twin logics, employed by Dutertismo, which constructs "undesirable," "undisciplined"
populations as a bane to urban and national development, to the dream of a comfortable and
secure life in an age of generalized precarity. “Disposability” here functions as a conceptual
frame for understanding the effects of globalization, modernization, capitalism, and
neo/colonialism in structuring Filipino lives as expendable. Focusing on the “abject”
figures of Khavn’s MondoManila (2012), the denizens of a garbage slum, this chapter
discussed how othering and the hierarchical segregation of spaces and people, which are
maintained by practices of criminalization, border-keeping, and policing, produce
exploitable and expendable populations who become targets of the settled and the
aspirational classes’ resentments and ire, even as their devalued labor subsidizes the
continued functioning of the city. In speaking truth about their lives rendered nasty, brutish,
and short by oppression and neglect, the abject characters of MondoManila represent a
scathing critique of the hypocrisies of the state and civil society, who celebrate the ideals of
economic growth and human rights, from which the scorned poor are excluded. Yet, they
also refuse the narrative of their disposability by showing how in their hidden and ghettoed
space of “lawlessness,” they make a living, negotiate community, pursue their desires, and
enact justice outside the purview of the state and disciplinary power. By contrast, the desire
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for cleanliness (literally as well as figuratively, especially regarding corruption), efficiency,
security, and expanded public services by the upwardly mobile or aspirational classes fueled
Dutertismo, which capitalized on peddling the dream of rapid and certain development, most
concretely captured by the Duterte administration’s big-ticket, debt-driven infrastructure
development program, Build, Build Build. Using Davao City, where the Dutertes have ruled
for over thirty years, as an idealized example of what “political will” and “discipline” could
achieve, Duterte promised radical change and national development in the authoritarian developmentalist style of Singapore. That this line of campaigning helped lead Duterte to
momentous electoral success is a testament to the desperation of the electorate’s grievances
with the status quo, and the urgency of their desire for the sort of social progress and
development that is palpable in their daily life, even at the cost of more
“discipline”/autocracy and less “freedom”/democracy. This view, too, helps legitimate the
rationalization that the deaths of the salot (vermin) of society are a small price to pay for the
achievement of social order, peace, prosperity, and security for the many.
Chapters 3 and 4 explained how the War on Drugs, its spectacles, and the structures
of feeling that it draws on and perpetuates, render visible the more invisible structural
processes that reproduce poverty and inequality, promote a differential access to rights, and
construct certain populations as disposable under neoliberal and neocolonial globalization.
These chapters, while hardly exhaustive, point to the need for developing a historically
materialist analysis of the challenge that Dutertismo has posed to the liberal discourse of
human rights, especially as this challenge is rooted in the existing system, in which one’s
enjoyment of rights is often predicated on another’s dispossession or violation of theirs.
In Chapters 1, 2, and 4, I briefly touched on the role of diasporic Filipinos in
cultivating the desire for change, progress, and development in the homeland by mediating
images and narratives of their experiences of such progress and development in the countries
where they have permanently migrated to or temporarily work in. As I discussed in Chapter
4, this desire was something that Dutertismo was able to capture and draw political cachet
from. In Chapter 5, I considered how this desire might be differently realized and harnessed
to more substantively democratic political projects and political participation by paying
attention to the “long-distance nationalism” practiced by migrant domestic worker activists
in Hong Kong.
OFWs, possibly more than permanent emigrants, often remain invested in the
politics of the homeland, because in many cases, they are unable to gain citizenship in their
destination countries, where they are employed on a contractual basis. The migrant Filipino
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domestic worker in Hong Kong, for instance, has no right of abode in the city, has no path to
permanent residence, and must leave Hong Kong once their contract is terminated. They are
also largely unable to integrate with the local population due to linguistic, cultural, racial,
and class barriers. Their precarious and marginal position in Hong Kong society, their
separation from their family and established support networks, and the shortcomings of the
Philippine state in providing them with enough support and protection against the
exploitation of predatory placement agencies and abusive employers, means that selforganization and participation in political campaigns are often necessary for them to realize
their rights and lay claim even to legally assured benefits that are often withheld from them.
Combined with their dependence on social media to maintain ties with their families in the
Philippines, their practices of organization, mobilization, and activism make them a
significant community to consider in relation to "long-distance nationalism" in the digital
age, and to the imperative of sustained, concerted political struggle to realize individual
rights and hold power to account. In this light, I began Chapter 5 with a discussion of the
trope of the victimized domestic helper or DH, who experiences exploitation by kin,
community, labor brokers, employers, and the governments of both her home and host
countries, even as she is celebrated in state discourse as a modern-day hero. I then explained
how activist organizations challenge this narrative, which whitewashes the state’s failure to
address the conditions that “force” Filipinos to work abroad at great social cost, and describe
their reasons for political commitment and practices of collective self-empowerment.
Though it is not directly related to Dutertismo, I included Chapter 5 as a
counterpoint to the pessimistic tenor that characterizes much of the discussion about the
implications, immediate consequences, and long-term effects of six years of Duterte’s rule
and the entrenched “elite capture” of democratic processes. Filipinos seem to be held hostage
to a durable structure of social inequality, and there seems to be no way out of it. With
Chapter 5 I tried to suggest that if electoral politics continued to define our political horizon,
if our participation in politics were limited to electoral campaigns every three to six years,
then we would remain in this political impasse; we would get somebody like Rodrigo Roa
Duterte in Malacañang Palace again. Thus the final chapter explored a different mode of
political activity, one that is not held captive to the machinery of the state and electoral
contestation, but is rooted in community organizing. My examination of a marginal
population—marginal in Hong Kong and marginal in the Philippines—is meant to present a
site of possibility, a space for reconstructing or intervening in politics-as-usual. This is also
why I ended this chapter with the pandemic and the responses to it, because this crisis offers
destructive and creative potential—what can, what should we do and build after this, as
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social structures around us crumble? Answering this question demands a serious
consideration of the conditions that must be secured to enable the many to participate in
politics. For migrant domestic worker activists in Hong Kong, these conditions include easy
mobility, shared public spaces and time, common sectoral interests, and, most of all, the
shared experience of marginalization and contingency, and the conviction that these
conditions must and can be changed.

My examination of Dutertismo is part of the broader aim of this thesis to challenge
the current resurgence of the narrative of the “death of liberal reformism in the Philippines”
vis-à-vis the global “crisis of democracy.” 416 Such a narrative implies that liberal democracy
is or ought to be the global political order, when in fact, that has not been the case in most of
the formerly colonized world, which comprises the majority of today’s nation-states.417
Instead of imagining liberal democracy as a universal ideal, and then decrying the “loss” of
this state of affairs or aspiration, we should instead recognize that democracies around the
world, whether “liberal” or not, developed within very specific—and hardly peaceable—
historical circumstances. Thus, the translation of democratic institutions from one context to
another is never smooth or transparent. Recognizing the historicity of political institutions
demands that we bracket liberal democracy as a normative ideal, and instead examine the
myriad political systems in the postcolonial world through the historical and contextually specific processes of their becoming, instead of measuring them, so to speak, by the same
universalizing yardstick. Such a historical examination might reveal that the seeming “trend”
of “illiberalism” heralds not the “failure” of "liberal democracy," but is indicative of the
logical or possible trajectories of state formations in the post/colonial world that political
scientists have been pejoratively calling "illiberal” and “populist.”
In this thesis I have attempted such an examination by considering myriad
phenomena and cultural texts within the frames of "nationalism," "democracy," and
"development," which I presented as constituting the "problem spaces" of contemporary
Philippine postcolonial politics. Though I attempted to embed the problematics of
Mark Thompson, “Bloodied Democracy: Duterte and the Death of Liberal Reformism in the
Philippines,”Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 3 (2016): 39–68.
https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341603500303.
416

417

When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it had 51 member states. Now that number
stands at 193 after the successive inclusion of new states after a period of rapid decolonization. See
United Nations, “Growth in United Nations membership,” UN.org, https://www.un.org/en/aboutus/growth-in-un-membership, accessed May 17, 2021.
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Dutertismo within these discursive contexts in order to clarify the reasons for its resonance,
there are significant factors that this research was unable to probe. These include the role of
social media, virality, and the rise of the anonymous troll and the internet-celebrity-aspolitical-influencer in shaping contemporary public discourse and political campaigns.
Another is the question of how binaristic expressions of political critique in the Philippines,
from leftist militancy (“Marxist vs. Liberal”) to civil society moralizing (“Good vs. Evil”),
especially when they are mediated by online platforms with their epistemic bubbles and echo
chambers, can serve as stabilizing agents for political polarization, which strengthens
Dutertismo. Much more also needs to be said about how coloniality continues to structure
our forms of knowledge and knowledge production, and how a closer examination of
“Duterte studies” might make this apparent.
The modest aim of this thesis at this present juncture is to open the question of
"Dutertismo" and Philippine political cultures beyond the terms set by analyses of a
primarily political scientific and sociological nature, which have often assumed the
normative frame of liberalism and Enlightenment modernity—a frame that I have argued is
insufficient in helping us understand the sociohistorical complexities and contradictions of
which the rise of Duterte is a symptom. Unless we are able to see clearly the conditions of
Dutertismo's enablement, and understand what has driven such an outpouring of support for
it, then we—by which I mean members of "civil society," to which I belong, who tend to
cling to "rule of law," "due process," "inalienable human rights" and other such principles of
liberalism, not as a political project, the object of sustained and strategic political struggle,
but as an assumed ground for political action—then we might continually be reacting in
disbelief, disappointment, or self-righteous outrage. So that we may learn not to respond in
this fashion, I offer the findings of my research into the disjunctures of Philippine society, in
the hope that it will reveal alternative possibilities of engagement with the contemporary.
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